Role of endogenous and exogenous factors in voluntary task switching by Demanet, Jelle
  
 
 
 
 
Role of endogenous and exogenous factors  
in voluntary task switching  
 
Jelle Demanet 
 
 
 
 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. André Vandierendonck 
Co-promotor: Prof. Dr. Marcel Brass 
 
Proefschrift ingediend tot het behalen van de academische graad 
van Doctor in de Psychologie 
 
2010
  
 
 
 
 
Role of endogenous and exogenous factors  
in voluntary task switching 
 
Jelle Demanet 
 
 
 
 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. André Vandierendonck 
Co-promotor: Prof. Dr. Marcel Brass 
 
 Proefschrift ingediend tot het behalen van de academische graad 
van Doctor in de Psychologie 
 
2010
 CONTENTS 
 
CONTENTS 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 9 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN PHILOSOPHY 10 
INVESTIGATING THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN PSYCHOLOGY 11 
EXECUTIVE CONTROL: INTENTIONALITY IN PSYCHOLOGY 13 
TASK SWITCHING PARADIGM 14 
VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING 17 
RESEARCH GOALS AND OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT THESIS 21 
REFERENCES 23 
CHAPTER 2 VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING UNDER 
LOAD: CONTRIBUTION OF TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP 
FACTORS IN GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 29 
INTRODUCTION 30 
EXPERIMENTS 32 
CONCLUSION 39 
REFERENCES 42 
APPENDIX 45 
CHAPTER 3 VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION VERSUS 
RANDOM HAND SELECTION 49 
INTRODUCTION 50 
EXPERIMENTS 56 
DISCUSSION 63 
REFERENCES 67 
APPENDIX 70 
6     CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 4 RESPONSE-SEQUENCES EFFECTS IN THE 
VOLUNTARY SELECTION OF TASKS 73 
INTRODUCTION 74 
EXPERIMENT 1 79 
EXPERIMENT 2 85 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 88 
REFERENCES 92 
APPENDIX A 95 
APPENDIX B 97 
CHAPTER 5 A CHAIN-RETRIEVAL MODEL FOR 
VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING 99 
INTRODUCTION 100 
MODELING TASK SELECTION PROCESSES 103 
EXPERIMENT 111 
MODEL TESTING 123 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 140 
REFERENCES 151 
APPENDIX A 157 
APPENDIX B 159 
CHAPTER 6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 161 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 162 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 165 
CONCLUSION 173 
INDICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 174 
REFERENCES 177 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 181 
INLEIDING 181 
OVERZICHT VAN DE BEVINDINGEN 182 
CONCLUSIE 184 
REFERENTIES 186 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Met grote vreugde presenteer ik jullie deze doctoraatsthesis. Meer dan drie 
jaar geleden kreeg ik de kans om aan een doctoraat te starten op de vakgroep 
Experimentele Psychologie als doctoraatsbursaal op een onderzoeksproject 
gesubsidieerd door het ‗Bijzonder Onderzoeksfonds (BOF)‘ van de 
universiteit Gent. Ik zou dan ook graag de Ugent en de vakgroep willen 
bedanken voor deze aangeboden kans.  
Het is mij een groot genoegen om een aantal mensen te bedanken die mij 
geholpen hebben bij het totstandkomen van dit werk.  
Vooreerst wil ik André Vandierendonck bedanken om mijn promotor te zijn, 
om mij te sturen, om in mij te blijven geloven als het moeilijker ging en om 
me te leren hoe onderzoek in de psychologie precies in elkaar zit.  
Ook Baptist Liefooghe en Frederick Verbruggen zou ik willen bedanken 
voor de vele uren en dagen die zij wilden investeren in mij, om mijn werk te 
lezen, het bij te schaven en om samen te brainstormen over nieuw 
onderzoek.  
I would also like to thank Marcel Brass, for being my co-promoter and for 
the fruitful discussions we had; the members of my PhD advisory 
committee, Geert Crombez (Department of Experimental Clinical and Health 
Psychology, Ugent) and Iring Koch (RWTH, Aachen University), for 
guiding me through this PhD.  
Ook zou ik Björn willen bedanken om het al die tijd uit te houden als m‘n 
bureaugenoot en voor de vele interessante discussies die we hadden (met 
uitzicht over de watersportbaan). 
Het is natuurlijk praktisch onmogelijk (en veel saaier) om een doctoraat te 
schrijven zonder soms eens een momentje te ontspannen. Zo wil ik Baptist, 
Michaël, Frederick, Els en Denis bedanken voor de sportsessies in het 
GUSB, en Jonne en Egbert om aan m‘n wiel te willen plakken op de vlaamse 
8     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
wegen. Op mijn weg kwam ik ook nog vele andere boeiende mensen tegen, 
welke allen hun stempel op mij hebben gedrukt.  
Ik zou ook zeker al mijn andere vrienden willen bedanken voor het tonen 
van hun interesse en om voor de nodige afleiding te zorgen. 
Ook door mijn familie ben ik altijd gesteund. Papa, bedankt voor onze 
looptochten in het weekend, met de bijhorende gesprekken, die een prettige 
aflossing waren voor de vele uren voor de computer. Mama, bedankt om me 
bij te staan met je kennis van de Engelse taal, om mee te vieren als het goed 
ging en me te steunen als het minder goed ging. Ik zou jullie ook willen 
bedanken om me de kans te geven om mijn dromen waar te maken. Ook 
Jannick, Carmen, Nils, Charlotte, m‘n opa‘s en oma‘s, alsook m‘n 
schoonfamilie, de clan Dejonckheere, wil ik bedanken voor hun interesse en 
steun. 
Afsluiten doe ik met de belangrijkste persoon voor mij. Charlotte, m‘n 
schatje, zonder jou was het me nooit gelukt en dit werk is evenzeer jouw 
verdienste als de mijne.  
Gent, 9 maart 2010 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‘My first act of free will shall to believe in free will’  
– William James 
 
In most situations in daily life, people have the feeling that their 
actions and choices are caused by their own will or intentions. To most 
people this freedom of action is one of the most important human features 
because it allows us to fulfill our desires, pursue our goals and claim moral 
responsibility for our actions. However, one cannot deny that many (if not 
all) of our actions and decisions are influenced by elements in our 
environment (e.g. advertising, actions of others, etc.) and are guided by our 
history (e.g. education, past experiences, etc.). These observations can lead 
to the question whether we really can control our behavior intentionally or 
that intentional free will is only an illusion. In philosophy this question is 
known as the problem of free will and has been the subject of philosophical 
discussions over centuries.  
Because in the present thesis we focused on the ability of selecting 
tasks on the basis of free choice, we start this introduction with an overview 
of the most important perspectives in philosophy about the problem of free 
will (for extensive reviews see Kane, 2002; Watson, 2003).  
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THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN PHILOSOPHY 
The traditional idea about human behavior is that our actions are free 
and are directly caused by an intentional decision. This idea is very 
important in our society because it implies that people are morally 
responsible for their actions. Another perspective about human behavior is 
called determinism, which entails that all our actions, thoughts and feelings 
are determined by past events (e.g. brain processes, environment, education, 
etc.), which follow the laws of nature. Because in this perspective behavior 
can be seen as a result of an interaction between brain processes and the 
environment, it leads to the position that all human behavior is caused by 
mechanisms that can be investigated and predicted. But what does 
determinism imply for the existence of an intentional free will?  
At first sight, determinism and intentional free will seem 
incompatible positions. This conviction is called incompatibilism and is 
supported by the hard determinists. In short, these philosophers argue that a 
consequence of a deterministic view is that all our actions must be caused by 
other events and hence that intentional free will cannot be the cause of our 
actions. A more thorough elaboration of this so-called consequence 
argument can be found in work of van Inwagen (1983). According to hard 
determinism the perception of an intentional free decision, which is the 
cause of our behavior, is nothing more than an illusion. However, this view 
has large consequences as for moral responsibility. When we only act in 
response to preceding events in the environment, on the basis of what is in 
our genes or in the way we are educated, how can we ever be held 
responsible for our actions?  
Another group of philosophers that support incompatibilism are the 
libertarians. These philosophers reject the idea that our actions are 
completely determined and argue that the freedom of action lies in the fact 
that our behavior is undetermined and depends on chance. By assuming that 
our behavior depends on chance they reject the idea that our behavior is 
predictable. However, this view leads to another problem. How can an event 
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that happens by chance ever represent a responsible action? In order to 
explain how chance events can be compatible with freedom of action, 
libertarians often invoke immaterial entities such as spirits, souls, etc. Hence, 
it is no surprise that religious people often are supporters of this perspective. 
A review of the most important arguments for and against this vision can be 
found in O‘Connor (2003).  
Another movement in psychology disagrees that believing in free 
will and believing in determinism are incompatible positions. These 
philosophers are called compatibilists and argue that the fact that our 
behavior can be predicted on the basis of past events does not mean that we 
do not have a free will (e.g. Dennett, 2003). They even put it stronger. 
Behavior can only be free when caused by other events such as emotions or 
brain processes. In this interpretation, free actions are unconstrained but are 
never uncaused. According to Dennett (2003), intentional free will in 
compatibilism is not the same as in the traditional view, but represents the 
ability of a system to anticipate positive consequences and to act to avoid 
undesirable consequences based on past experiences. In this perspective, a 
person can be held responsible for his or her actions when these actions 
stemmed from the person‘s desires and preferences formed during his or her 
life, which can be interpreted as a person‘s character according to Hume 
(1739). This view allows investigation of human behavior as a mechanism as 
well as brain processes responsible for intentional behavior.  
Although we recognize that this overview of the different 
perspectives about the problem of free will is far from exhaustive, it was 
included to make a more convincing case for the idea that the perspective 
about free will a person supports has large consequences on how that person 
can investigate and interpret human behavior.  
INVESTIGATING THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN PSYCHOLOGY 
In modern cognitive science the general idea is that our actions are 
caused by processes in the brain that interact with the environment. 
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However, the debate is still ongoing whether brain processes also can 
explain mental subjective phenomena such as intentional free will, 
consciousness, etc. (e.g. Sherrington, 1940), and whether the perception of 
an intentional decision indeed represents the trigger of our actions. Much of 
the argumentation for the illusory nature of intentional free will in cognitive 
science is based on a study performed by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 
(1983). These authors started from the idea that when the perceived 
intentional decision would be the trigger of an action, the action itself and 
the brain activity to perform this action should occur after this feeling. In an 
EEG study he used an electrophysiological marker, the readiness potential, 
as a measure for the activation in the brain that corresponds with the 
initiation of an action. Surprisingly, it was found that the point in time when 
subjects decided to perform an action followed approximately 350 ms after 
the brain activation related to that action started to build up. This remarkable 
finding indicated that the brain starts doing something first, followed by the 
perception of an intention to do the action. Although the results of Libet et 
al. (1983) seem to reject the causal role of an intention in our behavior, it is 
worth mentioning that Libet (1999) himself did not agree with that 
interpretation. Libet believed that although free will may not cause behavior 
it can still act as a veto over automatic activity. This idea was supported by 
the finding that although the decision occurs 350 ms after the increase in 
brain activation, it still occurred 200 ms before the action really took place. 
Despite this veto-account of Libet (1999), the results of Libet et al. (1983) 
together with some other evidence brought the social psychologist Wegner 
(2002), amongst others, to the idea that the perception of an intentional 
decision in a classic view is only an illusion. Although Wegner believed that 
the mechanisms of our acts are deterministic in nature, he believed that the 
illusion of free will serves an important goal. It informs us that we are the 
cause of our actions, which gives us moral responsibility for them. In line 
with the compatibilist Dennett (2003), he also argued that intentionality lies 
in the ability of a system to learn more from past actions, in order to be more 
efficient in future behavior.  
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In sum, in cognitive sciences more and more evidence seems to 
indicate that behavior that is considered to be intentional is caused by brain 
processes that are non-intentional in nature. This opens the door for 
psychologists to investigate the psychological processes that are involved in 
intentional behavior; or to put it in the words of Logan (2003, p.45): ‗… the 
main job of psychology is to explain how intentionality can arise out of non-
intentional stuff.‘ 
EXECUTIVE CONTROL: INTENTIONALITY IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Neuroscience studies have found that the regions involved in 
intentional behavior are mostly localized in the frontal lobes of the brain 
(e.g., Stuss & Benson, 1986). It is found that when people have a damaged 
frontal lobe they often show a reduced performance in so-called executive 
tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Tower of Hanoi 
(Damasio, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). These patients seem to have 
problems with planning of future actions and with keeping track of ongoing 
actions when pursuing particular goals. These lost abilities combined with 
damage in the frontal lobes have been called the frontal lobe syndrome, and 
resembles to what people would attribute intuitively to a loss of the ability to 
act intentionally. In psychology this control portion of the brain is called 
executive control.  
Not surprisingly, this control mechanism received a lot of attention in 
experimental and cognitive psychology and occupied a central role in several 
psychological theories and models. For example, an influential 
psychological model that can be linked to the study of executive control is 
the multi-component model of working memory developed by Baddeley 
(1986). In this model, next to two ‗slave‘ components of working memory 
that are responsible for the active maintenance of phonological information 
(the phonological loop) and visual and spatial information (the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad), a central component was incorporated to account for executive 
control, called the central executive. Also, in an influential model of 
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attentional control, introduced by Norman and Shallice (1986), a similar 
control mechanism was included, namely the Supervisory Attentional 
System (SAS).  
Research in the framework of these psychological models could 
identify a variety of psychological processes that depend on executive 
control, the co-called executive functions. Research showed that the most 
important functions of executive control are, shifting between tasks, 
updating working memory and inhibiting automatic actions (e.g. Logan, 
2003; Miyake et al., 2000). That the study of these executive functions is 
very important to understand human behavior is shown by the large amount 
of studies investigating these processes in cognitive psychology, cognitive 
neuroscience, psychopathology, study of life-span development, and the 
study of individual differences. Undoubtedly, executive functions also play a 
crucial role our in daily life, especially in situations in which mental 
flexibility is important.  
Imagine a situation in which a person is performing one task (e.g. 
working at a manuscript on a computer) and has to switch to another task 
(e.g. answering the phone that is ringing). In such a situation one can assume 
that this person has to activate the new task goal (e.g. answering the phone), 
inhibit the first task goal and update working memory with the rules (e.g. 
pick up the phone with right hand and bring it to your ear and mouth) needed 
to accomplish the new task goal. In that perspective, studying human 
behavior in situations in which people have to shift between tasks can 
provide new insight into the processes that are needed to exert executive 
control and the ability to perform intentional goal-directed behavior. 
TASK SWITCHING PARADIGM 
A first attempt to investigate the ability to shift tasks in a controlled 
experimental setting was done by Jersild (1927). Years later, these 
experiments were considered as the starting point of the task-switching 
paradigm (Spector & Biederman, 1976). In order to investigate task-
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switching performance, Jersild compared the duration of blocks of trials in 
which subjects switched tasks constantly with the duration of blocks in 
which subjects repeated the same task from trial to trial. By doing this, he 
was the first to observe the switch cost. He observed that, on an average, the 
switch trials were performed much slower and less accurate than the 
repetition trials. This switch cost was considered as a measure of the 
duration of the executive processes that are needed when subjects are 
switching between tasks. In later studies the original procedure of Jersild 
(1927) was adjusted because it was assumed that in the blocks of trials with 
only task repetitions only one task had to be maintained in working memory 
while in the switch blocks two tasks had to be maintained. This difference 
results in greater effort and arousal in task switches compared with task 
repetitions and leads to an overestimation of the switch cost. This confound 
was eliminated in a study of Rogers and Monsell (1995) where the 
alternating-runs procedure was introduced. In this procedure subjects had to 
switch tasks in a predictable fashion every N trials, with N being constant, 
allowing comparison of switch and repetition trials within a single block. 
This resulted in a more valid measure of the executive processes.  
Another finding in the task-switching paradigm is that the switch cost 
is larger with short than with long inter-trial intervals (ITIs). At first sight 
this reduction in switch cost indicates that time consuming executive 
processes that cause the switch cost can be prepared with a long ITI, causing 
faster switch trials (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995). However, Altmann 
(2004a; 2004b) found that this reduction in switch cost only occurs when ITI 
is varied within subjects but not when varied across subjects. The finding 
that the switch cost can depend on the used design (within- and between-
subjects design) suggests that executive processes involved in a task switch 
seem to be a functional rather than a structural property of shifting between 
tasks (e.g. Poulton, 1982). In addition, it was also found that the size of the 
switch cost in the alternating runs procedure was not only caused by worse 
performance on task switches but also by better performance due to task-set 
priming on the task repetitions. This point was illustrated by Allport, Styles 
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and Hsieh (1994) in a situation in which subjects were told to switch 
between a highly practiced (word reading) and a less practiced task (color 
naming) on Stroop stimuli. Surprisingly, it was found that switching to the 
easier task produces a larger cost than switching to the more difficult task. 
This asymmetric switch cost supports the idea that the switch cost partly 
represents persisting activation of tasks, and thus again not solely the time 
taken by executive processes needed to switch tasks.  
In order to control the effects of task-set priming, Meiran (1996) 
suggested using a task-cuing procedure, which was previously introduced by 
Sudevan and Taylor (1987). In this procedure the task sequence was 
unpredictable and on every trial a cue was presented to inform the subjects 
which task they had to perform. The introduction of this cue was 
advantageous because it allowed independent manipulation of the cue-
stimulus interval (for the manipulation of the efficiency of executive 
processes needed on a task switch) and the response-cue interval (for the 
manipulation of the impact of task-set priming). Indeed, with this procedure, 
it was found that with a sufficiently long response-cue interval and with a 
short cue-stimulus interval, task-set priming was almost eliminated and the 
switch cost represented a better measurement of the time needed by 
executive processes to switch tasks (Meiran, 1996).  
However, again, this task-cuing procedure did not offer a solution to 
the problem of the validity of the switch cost measurement. By using two 
different cues per task, Logan and Bundesen (2003) and Mayr and Kliegl 
(2003) observed almost simultaneously that a large part of the switch cost in 
the task-cuing procedure was caused by shorter cue-encoding processes on 
task repetitions when the cue was repeated. These results suggest that earlier 
reported task-switch costs measured with one cue per task are contaminated 
with cue-related processes. The observation that cues can activate tasks 
automatically without the need for executive processes can be considered as 
a major problem when one attempts to use the task-cuing procedure as a tool 
to investigate executive control.  
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In our opinion, all these findings above point to a more general 
problem with the task-switching paradigm. Namely, a task a subject has to 
perform is always imposed by the experimenter and is never selected by the 
subject. In other words, control on which behavior to perform is taken away 
from the subject and is delegated explicitly to the environment. In this 
perspective one could even argue that no true intentional control can be 
measured in the task-switching paradigm. 
VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING 
In an attempt to capture true intentional control in a task-switching 
context, Arrington and Logan (2004) introduced a new procedure. In this 
new procedure, the tasks were not cued nor performed in a predictable order, 
but subjects had a free task choice on each trial. Because in this voluntary 
task switching (VTS) procedure subjects have full control about which task 
they perform, this procedure can be considered to have a higher ecological 
validity for the study of intentional control than the traditional procedures. 
Arrington and Logan (2004; 2005) observed that, even when subjects are 
selecting tasks voluntarily, task switches still show a cost compared to task 
repetitions.  
In a study of Liefooghe, Demanet and Vandierendonck (2009) was 
found that the reduction in switch cost was identical when the ITI was varied 
within and between subjects, supporting the idea that the switch cost 
obtained with VTS really is a structural cost. A follow-up study of 
Liefooghe, Demanet and Vandierendonck (in press) investigated whether 
persisting activation of a previously executed task can influence the switch 
cost in VTS. Based on the idea that the switch cost in VTS is a pure measure 
of executive processes, it was predicted that the persisting task activation 
would have no effect on the switch cost in VTS. In order to investigate the 
influence of persisting task activations, subjects were asked to switch 
voluntarily between a word-reading task and a color-naming task on Stroop 
stimuli, similar as in the study of Allport et al. (1994) described above. The 
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observation that the asymmetric switch cost was very small in VTS in 
comparison with other procedures again supports the idea that the switch 
cost in VTS represents executive control. 
Also on a neuro-anatomical level, differences were observed between 
cued and voluntary task switching. In a study using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, Forstmann, Brass, Koch, and von Cramon (2006) 
revealed stronger fronto-medial activation in VTS compared to cued task 
switching. More specifically, voluntary task choices resulted in a stronger 
activation in the left middle cingulate cortex than a cued task choice. This is 
a region that has been shown to be involved in response-selection processes 
(e.g. Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004). This activation was 
suggested to be responsible for the voluntary choice of the task set. In a 
follow-up study this frontal activation in VTS was replicated using EEGs 
(Forstmann, Ridderinckhof, Kaiser, & Bledowski, 2007). The involvement 
of the fronto-medial cortex in VTS was confirmed in a study by Haynes et 
al. (2007) where was shown that internally driven task choices could be best 
predicted from activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex. 
Another advantage of the VTS procedure is that one cannot only 
measure how fast or how accurate subjects are performing a task, but also 
how many times and when they choose to perform a particular task. The 
availability of information about the task choice allows studying intentional 
control in task switching in a totally new perspective. The idea that different 
kinds of control may exist in intentional behavior is not new. The distinction 
between task choice and task execution may be related to the distinction 
made by Searle (1983) between a ‗prior intention‘ to act (the conscious 
desire to do something) and an ‗intention in action‘ (steps that need to 
precede an executed act). Support for this distinction in VTS was already 
reported in a study of Arrington and Yates (2009). These authors found that 
the switch cost and task choice are tapping on different underlying processes 
by observing that both are correlating with different attentional networks as 
measured by the Attention Network Test (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & 
Posner, 2002). 
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Investigating this task choice, Arrington and Logan (2004; 2005) 
observed that when subjects have to choose among two tasks and when they 
are instructed to select tasks in a random order, they show a tendency to 
repeat tasks more than to switch between tasks. This so-called task-repetition 
bias was found to be stronger on short than long ITIs. Arrington and Logan 
(2005) suggested that this task-repetition bias results from a competition 
between two executive processes, one process related to the random task 
generation (e.g. Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998) and the other 
related to switching tasks. On short ITIs this competition would be more 
severe. Arrington and Logan (2005) also observed that task choice is largely 
unaffected by elements in the environment, which supports the claim that a 
task choice is made on the basis of internal selection processes. Mayr and 
Bell (2006) replicated the task-repetition bias and on the basis of a 
correlational analysis they concluded that subjects with slower task 
repetitions switched more between tasks. According to these authors this 
finding suggests that subjects who treat trials as discrete events by 
strategically inhibiting the preceding task set, repeat tasks less often. They 
also argued that subjects have a natural tendency to repeat the tasks, which is 
caused by the fact that the previous task is the most active one when 
selecting a new task. In other words, Mayr and Bell (2006) interpreted the 
repetition bias as the result of the efficiency of executive processes to avoid 
sticking with the currently most active task-set. As an underlying executive 
process they proposed an active inhibition of the preceding task set. In 
another study, Lien and Ruthruff (2008) found evidence for the involvement 
of task-set inhibition when selecting tasks voluntarily. Using three tasks, 
they observed that subjects avoided switching back to a task that was 
recently abandoned. They attributed this effect to backward inhibition (Mayr 
& Keele, 2000), which entails that in order to implement a new task set, the 
previous task set must be inhibited. Lien and Ruthruff (2008) argued that this 
inhibition persists to the next trial and causes subjects to avoid switching 
back to the recently abandoned task.  
20     CHAPTER 1 
Recently, an EEG study performed by Vandamme, Szmalec, 
Liefooghe and Vandierendonck (in press) provided direct evidence for the 
idea that subjects have a natural tendency to repeat tasks and that this 
tendency has to be counteracted for a task switch to be successful. By using 
an experiment in which two tasks were mapped onto different hands, 
lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) were used to investigate the time 
course of the task-selection mechanisms. On switch trials, the previously 
activated hand (task) was activated again, as shown by a foreperiod LRP, 
followed by a switch in activation to the alternative hand, shown by a late 
LRP. This suggests that subjects indeed activate the preceding task again in 
an early selection stage and that when one decides to switch this tendency is 
counteracted.  
In contrast with Arrington and Logan (2005), Mayr and Bell (2006) 
observed that in particular situations elements in the environment can have a 
strong impact on the task choice. They observed that when the stimulus was 
repeated, the chance to repeat the task was higher than when the stimulus 
was alternated. They also found that this stimulus-repetition effect was 
reduced when subjects treated trials as discrete events. From the observation 
that elements of the environment can bias the task choice, Mayr and Bell 
(2006) concluded that the VTS procedure cannot only be used to study 
intentional control but also to study exactly those factors that stand in the 
way of intentional control.  
In line with this conclusion, recently a series of studies were 
conducted in which various factors were discovered that can bias a voluntary 
task choice. Weaver and Arrington (in press) observed that items held in 
working memory can affect task choice and Arrington and Rhodes (in press) 
observed that task choice can be influenced by the perceptual characteristics 
of the stimulus. Stimuli that were presented in the left visual field were more 
likely to engage a global categorization task, while stimuli presented in the 
right visual field were more likely to engage a local categorization task. 
Arrington (2008) could show that stimuli can bias task choice when two 
tasks with univalent stimuli are used and a stimulus of one task is earlier 
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available than the other. She also observed that this effect was stronger with 
short than with long ITIs. Based on these findings, Arrington (2008) 
suggested to conceptualize task choice in VTS as a race between the 
activation of tasks guided by the exogenous factors (bottom-up control) and 
the activation of tasks guided by endogenous executive processes (top-down 
control). This suggests that when ample time is provided for top-down 
control to activate a task, this task activation will reach the selection 
threshold first, eliminating all effects of bottom-up control. However, when 
top-down control is hampered by time constraints and bottom-up control 
activates a task strongly, this automatic activation will reach the selection 
threshold first and bottom-up control will define a task selection. 
RESEARCH GOALS AND OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT THESIS 
The main goal of the present thesis was to investigate the interplay 
between top-down and bottom-up control when selecting tasks in the VTS 
procedure. By introducing different sources of bottom-up control and by 
manipulating the efficiency of top-down control, we tried to learn more 
about that the mechanisms underlying intentional goal-directed behavior. 
Besides this Introduction (Chapter 1) and the General Discussion (Chapter 
6), there are four empirical chapters in this thesis. Each chapter was written 
as an individual paper. We will now give a short outline of the chapters. 
In Chapter 2, we investigated how stimuli can guide a task choice in 
VTS. In a first experiment we tried to replicate the stimulus-repetition effect 
observed by Mayr and Bell (2006). In a second experiment we investigated 
the impact of task-irrelevant stimulus features on the task choice. In a third 
experiment we investigated if stimuli that are associated with a particular 
task can trigger the selection of that task. In order to manipulate the 
efficiency of top-down control a concurrent working memory load was used 
in all these experiments. By manipulating the efficiency of top-down control 
we tried to investigate how top-down control interacts with different bottom-
up factors. 
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In Chapter 3, we tested three accounts about voluntary task selection 
that were proposed in Chapter 2. First, we tested the account that the 
observed task-repetition bias is related to the fact that tasks had to be 
selected. Second, we tested the account that the higher task-repetition bias 
with a concurrent working memory load in Chapter 2 is related to a reduced 
ability to switch between tasks under load. Third, we tested the account that 
the stimulus-repetition effect observed in Chapter 2 is caused by the 
associations that are formed between a stimulus and a response during task 
execution. In order to investigate these accounts, subjects were not asked to 
select tasks but to select hands randomly.  
Chapter 4 was designed to investigate the hypothesis that a procedure 
in which a separate task selection and task execution response are given, 
provides a good measure of voluntary task choice uncontaminated by 
bottom-up influences. In this chapter we investigated that by using two 
responses per trial, new response-sequence effects on task selection are 
induced that are non-existing in single-registration procedures. In order to 
manipulate the efficiency of top-down control, the length of the preparation 
interval was varied. 
In Chapter 5, a model for voluntary task selection was introduced, in 
which is assumed that task selection is based on automatic retrieval of chains 
of task information from long term memory. In this model a) the requirement 
to produce random sequences, b) the idea that the ease of execution are taken 
into account and c) the possibility that bottom-up factors can bias task 
choices, were incorporated. The fits of the predictions of this chain-retrieval 
model were compared with the fits of alternative models that are typically 
used to predict random selection behavior. Additionally, several tests were 
performed to investigate the importance of the three parameters of the 
model.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING UNDER LOAD: 
CONTRIBUTION OF TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP 
FACTORS IN GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review (in press)
 1
 
 
The present study investigated the relative contribution of bottom-up 
and top-down control to task selection in the voluntary task switching (VTS) 
procedure. In order to manipulate the efficiency of top-down control, a 
concurrent working-memory load was imposed during VTS. In three 
experiments bottom-up factors such as stimulus repetitions, repetition of 
irrelevant information and stimulus-task associations were introduced to 
investigate their influence on task selection. We observed that the tendency 
to repeat tasks was stronger under load, suggesting that top-down control 
counteracts the automatic tendency to repeat tasks. The results also 
indicated that task selection can be guided by several elements in the 
environment, but that only the influence of stimulus repetitions depend on 
the efficiency of top-down control. The theoretical implications of these 
findings are discussed within the interplay between top-down and bottom-up 
control that underlies the voluntary selection of tasks. 
                                                     
1
 This paper was co-authored by Frederick Verbruggen, Baptist Liefooghe and 
André Vandierendonck. 
30     CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Many researchers assume that goal-directed behavior relies on the 
intentional and controlled activation of task goals (Baddeley, 1992; Logan & 
Gordon, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). However, several studies 
demonstrated that task goals can also be activated automatically by 
information in the environment (e.g. Mattler, 2003; Mayr & Bryck, 2007; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) or by the retrieval of previously formed 
associations between a stimulus and a particular goal (e.g. Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003). In the present study we 
examined the contribution of top-down and bottom-up activation of task 
goals in voluntary task switching (VTS).  
In VTS, subjects switch between cognitive tasks. They are free to 
select the task to perform, as long as each task is selected an approximate 
equal number of times and subjects do not follow a predictable pattern of 
task selections (Arrington, 2008; Arrington & Logan, 2004; 2005; 
Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009; Mayr & Bell, 2006). A 
general finding is that subjects repeat tasks more often than they switch 
(Arrington & Logan, 2005). This task-repetition bias has been linked to the 
efficiency of top-down control processes involved in the voluntary selection 
of task goals. For example, Mayr and Bell (2006) argued that subjects tend 
to repeat tasks because the task of the previous trial is still the most active 
one when selecting a new task. In order to overcome this bias, the activated 
task has to be inhibited. Thus, selection of tasks would depend on top-down 
control processes (see also Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005).  
However, several studies showed that bottom-up processes also 
contribute to task selection in VTS (e.g. Arrington, 2008) and Mayr and Bell 
(2006) observed that the task-repetition bias was stronger when the stimulus 
of the previous trial was repeated compared to when the stimulus alternated. 
This stimulus-repetition effect suggests that voluntary task selection is not 
completely immune to bottom-up priming effects.  
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In the present study, we focused on the contribution of top-down 
control and bottom-up priming in voluntary task selection. Studies in several 
paradigms have shown that bottom-up factors contribute more to behavior in 
cognitively demanding situations (see Lavie, 2005 for a review). A 
manipulation that is often used to reduce the efficiency of top-down control 
is a concurrent working memory (WM) load (e.g. Logan, 2007). To test the 
relative contribution of bottom-up and top-down processes in task selection, 
we manipulated WM load in the VTS procedure in three experiments. Each 
experiment consisted of two conditions: a load condition and a no-load 
condition (see Logan, 2007). In the load condition, subjects were shown six 
letters which they had to remember (study phase), followed by 13 voluntary 
switch trials (VTS phase), followed by a recall phase in which subjects had 
to indicate which letters were shown in the study phase. In the no-load 
condition, the study phase was immediately followed by the recall phase, 
which was in turn followed by the VTS phase, so that there was no 
concurrent memory load during the test phase. We predicted that bottom-up 
control would contribute more to task selection in the load condition than in 
the no-load condition. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed this prediction 
and showed that the stimulus-repetition effects and the task-repetition bias 
were stronger in the load condition than in the no-load condition. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, we further tested how stimulus repetitions affected 
task-selection processes. We propose three accounts for the stimulus-
repetition effect. First, the effect could be caused by the repetition of visual 
information on the screen; this could prime the decision to repeat the task 
(see also Arrington & Logan, 2005). Second, the effect could be caused by 
retrieval of associations that were formed between the stimulus and the task 
executed on the previous trial. When the stimulus repeats, this association is 
retrieved and the task goal of the previous trial is primed (see e.g. 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Third, the effect could also be due to the 
retrieval of associations between the stimulus and the task-execution 
response (see e.g. Hommel, 1998; Soetens, 1998). When the stimulus 
repeats, the task-execution response of the previous trial is also repeated. 
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This would suggest that subjects did not select a new task first; instead, they 
would have directly executed a response. Experiments 2 and 3 were 
designed to test these accounts by including repetitions of task-irrelevant 
features in Experiment 2 and by the formation of strong stimulus-task 
associations in a training phase in Experiment 3.  
 
EXPERIMENTS 
Because the method and results sections of the three experiments 
strongly overlapped, we describe them together. 
METHOD 
Subjects and materials. 80 students from Ghent University 
participated for course requirements and credit (Exp.1: 24; Exp.2: 24: Exp.3: 
32). They were tested individually by means of a Pentium III personal 
computer with a 17-inch color monitor running Tscope (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). We used an external 
response box with 4 buttons to register responses in the VTS phase and a 
QWERTY keyboard to register responses in the recall phase. 
 
Procedure. The experimental session of Experiment 1 consisted of a 
study phase, a recall phase, and a VTS phase. In the study phase we 
presented six different low inter-confusable consonants (see 
Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998 for details). The 
consonants were presented in the center of the screen at a rate of one item 
per second (500 ms on; 500 ms off). In the recall phase subjects had to recall 
the memorized items in the correct order by typing the items on the 
keyboard. There were no time constraints in the recall phase. In the VTS 
phase subjects categorized a stimulus as smaller or larger than ‗5‘ 
(magnitude task) or as odd or even (parity task). We used digits 1-9, 
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excluding 5. The magnitude task (smaller: left-outer button; larger: left-inner 
button) and the parity task (odd: right-inner button; even: right-outer button) 
were mapped on a different hand. The task-to-hand assignment was 
counterbalanced across subjects. There were 13 trials in the VTS phase. 
Each trial started with the presentation of a stimulus. When a response was 
executed or the maximal response time of 3000ms had elapsed, a fixed 
response-stimulus interval of 100 ms started. The first trial was a filler; of 
the remaining 12 trials four were stimulus repetitions (25%). The 
experimental session started with three practice blocks in which subjects 
practiced a) the study and recall phase separately, b) the VTS phase 
separately and c) the combination of the three phases. Before the practice 
blocks, we presented the instructions of Arrington and Logan (2004) (in 
Dutch) on the screen and paraphrased them if necessary. The practice trials 
were followed by the experimental session, which consisted of 20 lists per 
condition (load condition: study-test-recall, or no-load condition: study-
recall-test). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced over subjects. 
The experimental session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that in the VTS 
phase, stimulus repetitions were excluded. Instead, we presented a task-
irrelevant shape on each trial. The target stimulus appeared inside one of 
four white non-filled shapes (circle, triangle, hexagon, square; each shape = 
5.9cm
2
). On 25% of the trials, the shape of the previous trial was repeated.  
In Experiment 3, subjects performed an ‗animacy‘ task (‗non-living‘ 
or ‗living‘), or a ‗size task‘ (‗smaller‘ or ‗larger than a basketball‘) on nouns. 
128 nouns were selected on the basis of word frequency (per million) and 
word length (average frequency: 11.0; average length: 5.6). For every 
subject, three different stimulus sets of 32 nouns were selected (matched for 
frequency and word length). All sets consisted of 8 large living, 8 small 
living, 8 large nonliving, and 8 small nonliving stimuli. Before the 
experimental session, subjects performed a training session of 16 single-task 
blocks (±40 minutes). In the training session, the first stimulus set was 
always used for the animacy task; the second stimulus set was always used 
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for the size task. Subjects practiced one task in the odd-numbered blocks and 
the other task in the even-numbered blocks. Task-to-block mapping was 
counterbalanced. Each training block consisted of 32 trials, and each item of 
the relevant set was presented once. All trials in the training session started 
with the presentation of a noun in the center of the screen. This stimulus 
remained on the screen for 1,000 ms, regardless of the response time. The 
maximal-response time was 4,000 ms and the response-stimulus interval 
750ms. Subjects responded orally by saying ‗[bu:]‘ for living, ‗[bi:]‘ for non-
living, ‗[ba:]‘ for small, and ‗[bo:]‘ for large. The structure of the 
experimental phase of Experiment 3 was similar to that of Experiment 1. 
Because VTS stimuli were words, the WM load consisted of six different 
numbers (range 1-9). There were no other differences in the study or recall 
phase. In the VTS phase the animacy task was performed with one hand 
(non-living: left-outer button; living: left-inner button) and the size task with 
the other hand (small: right-inner button; large: right-outer button). Eight 
lists of VTS trials were used in both load conditions. In each VTS phase, 
twelve stimuli were presented: four stimuli of the ‗animacy‘ set, four stimuli 
of the ‗size‘ set, and four stimuli of the third stimulus set (the neutral set, 
which was not used in the training phase). The maximal response time in the 
VTS trials was 5,000ms because the tasks were more difficult than in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The first trial of each VTS phase and trials following an error were 
discarded (data loss: Exp1 = 12.8%; Exp2 = 11.5%; Exp3 = 12.3%). In this 
study, we are interested in the processes that are involved in the voluntary 
selection of tasks. Therefore, in the results section, we will focus on task-
choice data only. Analyses of response latencies are presented in Appendix 
A. The task-selection proportions appear in Table 1 and all analyses appear 
in Table 2.  
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Table 1: Task-repetition proportions as a function of load, trial type and task transition for 
Experiment 1 and 2 and task-selection proportions as a function of load, trial type and task for 
Experiment 3.  
 
  no-load condition  load condition 
       
 
task  
repetitions 
task  
switches 
 task 
repetitions 
task  
switches 
 Experiment 1      
 stimulus repetitions .48 (.04) .52 (.04)  .62 (.04) .38 (.04) 
 stimulus alternations .48 (.02) .52 (.02)  .54 (.02) .46 (.02) 
 Experiment 2      
 shape repetitions .55 (.02) .45 (.02)  .59 (.03)  .41 (.03) 
 shape alternations .51 (.03) .49 (.03)  .55 (.02) .45 (.02) 
       
 
animacy  
task 
size 
task 
 animacy 
 task 
size  
task 
 Experiment 3      
 animacy stimuli .54 (.02) .46 (.02)  .57 (.02) .43 (.02) 
 size stimuli .46 (.02) .54 (.02)  .46 (.02) .54 (.02) 
 neutral stimuli .51 (.02) .49 (.02)  .49 (.01) .51 (.01) 
Note – Standard errors are presented within brackets. 
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Table 2: Outcome of the ANOVAs conducted on the selection proportions of task repetitions 
for Experiments 1 and 2, and of the task-selection proportions for Experiment 3.  
 
 Experiment 1 
 Proportion task repetitions 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp² 
load .0118 (1,23) 18.70* .45 
trial type .0254 (1,23) 1.41 .06 
load*trial type .0034 (1,23) 12.96* .36 
 Experiment 2 
 Proportion task repetitions 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp² 
load .0045 (1,23) 7.46* .24 
trial type .0027 (1,23) 10.84* .32 
load*trial type .0025 (1,23) .00 .00 
 Experiment 3 
 Proportions ‗animacy‘ task 
 Wilks (df1,df2) F ηp² 
load .9986 (1,31) .04 .00 
trial type .5204 (2,30) 13.83* .48 
load*trial type .9390 (2,30) .98 .06 
Note – *: p<.05 
 
Data of Experiment 1 were analyzed by means of a repeated 
measures ANOVA with load (no-load vs. load) and trial type (stimulus 
repetition vs. alternation) as factors, performed on the task-repetition 
proportions. When relevant, individual t-tests were performed to test whether 
proportions were different from .50. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 subjects 
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repeated the task of the previous trial more often in the load (M=.579, 
SE=.029; comparison .50: t(23) = 2.68, p = .01) than in the no-load condition 
(M=.483, SE=.026; comparison .50: t(23) = -.66, p = .51). These results 
confirm the hypothesis that top-down control is needed to counteract the 
tendency to repeat tasks (e.g. Mayr & Bell, 2006). The absence of a tendency 
(in comparison with .50) to repeat tasks in the no-load condition is probably 
due to the length of the sequences. This result converges with the findings of 
Rapoport and Budescu (1997) indicating that in random selection of events 
there is a larger tendency to alternate for shorter sequences. 
Importantly, we observed a stimulus-repetition effect in the load but 
not in the no-load condition of Experiment 1 (see Tables 1 and 2). Simple 
main effects showed that the effect of trial type was significant in the load, 
F(1,23) = 4.93, MSE = .0163, ηp
2
 = .18, but not in the no-load condition, 
F<1. This suggests that bottom-up control contributes more to task selection 
in cognitively demanding situations (i.e. the load condition) than in less 
demanding situations (i.e. the no-load condition). The complete absence of a 
stimulus-repetition effect in the no-load condition is probably due to the 
relatively low number of stimulus repetitions (see also Arrington & Logan, 
2005, Experiments 3 and 4). 
Data of Experiment 2 were analyzed by means of a repeated 
measures ANOVA with load (no-loaded vs. load) and trial type (shape 
repetition vs. alternation) as factors. The analyses showed that tasks were 
repeated more often in the load (M=.570, SE=.024; comparison .50: t(23) = 
2.91, p = .01) than in the no-load condition (M=.532, SE=.023; comparison 
.50: t(23) = 1.41, p = .17). Furthermore, tasks were repeated more often on 
shape repetitions (M=.569, SE=.022) than on shape alternations (M=.534, 
SE=.024), which suggests that repeating visual information can prime task 
repetitions. However, the size of the shape-repetition effect was comparable 
for the load and the no-load condition (see Table 2). The absence of an 
interaction suggests that the stimulus-repetition effect observed in 
Experiment 1 was not simply caused by the repetition of visual information 
on the screen.  
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The data of Experiment 3 were analyzed in two steps. First, we 
examined whether task selections were influenced by the training phase by 
means of a repeated measures ANOVA with load and stimulus set (animacy 
vs. size vs. neutral set) as factors. We focused on the proportions of the 
animacy task; we would get symmetrical results if the focus was on the size 
task. The analysis showed that there was a strong learning effect (see Table 
2). Contrasts showed that the animacy task was selected more often for the 
animacy set (M=.554, SE=.012) than for the neutral set (M=.501, SE=.010), 
F(1,31)=10.31, MSE=.0088 , ηp²= .25, and the size set (M=.458, SE=.011), 
F(1,31)=28.57, MSE=.0104, ηp²= .48. The difference between the size and 
neutral sets was also significant, F(1,31)=7.94, MSE=.0074, ηp²= .20, which 
suggests that subjects tended to choose the size task for the size set. 
Combined, these findings suggest that learned stimuli primed the selection of 
the task they were associated with in the training phase. However, this 
stimulus-priming effect was similar in the no-load and load condition (Table 
2). The absence of an interaction shows that stimulus-task associations do 
not cause the priming effect in Experiment 1. 
 In a second step, we examined whether there was an influence of 
load on the general task-repetition bias, like in the other experiments. We 
analyzed task-repetition proportions with a one-way ANOVA with load as 
factor. Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, we found that tasks were 
repeated more often in the load (M=.517, SE=.021; comparison .50: t(32) = 
.81, p = .42) than in the no-load condition (M=.472, SE=.020; comparison 
.50: t(32) = -1.44, p = .16), F(1,31)=6.55, MSE=.0050, ηp²= .17. Again, this 
finding shows that the task-repetition bias is stronger in cognitively 
demanding situations. 
 
Recall phase. The proportions of correct recall represent the 
probability that a particular item was remembered correctly in the correct 
order. We analyzed the proportions by means of a simple main effects 
ANOVA with load as the only factor. As shown in Table 3, proportions were 
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higher in the no-load than in the load condition, which can be explained by 
the different order of the VTS and recall phases.  
 
Table 3: Mean proportions of correct recall in the no-load and load condition and the results 
of the main effect ANOVAs on these proportions with load as the only factor. 
 
  Note – *: p<.05. Standard errors are presented within brackets. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present study, we examined how bottom-up and top-down 
processes contribute to voluntary selection of tasks in situations that are 
cognitively demanding. In Experiment 1, we found that subjects repeated 
tasks more often in the load (demanding) condition than in the no-load (non-
demanding) condition. We replicated this load effect in Experiments 2 and 3. 
The effect of load on the task-repetition bias is consistent with the idea that 
top-down processes are required to overcome the tendency to keep repeating 
the same task. This is consistent with the idea that top-down control inhibits 
the most recent task, which reduces the tendency to repeat tasks (Mayr & 
Bell, 2006; see also Lien & Ruthruff, 2008).  
In Experiment 1, we found that stimulus repetitions elicited more 
task repetitions in the load than in the no-load condition. This observation 
seems to support the idea that bottom-up control contributes more to task 
selection in cognitively demanding situations (for a similar idea; Arrington, 
 no-load load  main effect load 
    (df1,df2) F MSe ηp
2 
Experiment 1 .93 (0.1) .84 (0.2)  (1,23) 42.80* .0025 .65 
Experiment 2 .91 (0.1) .84 (0.2)  (1,23) 31.74* .0020 .58 
Experiment 3 .97 (0.1) .83 (0.3)  (1,31) 27.36* .0101 .47 
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2008; Lavie, 2005). In Experiments 2 and 3, however, we observed priming 
effects of repeating shapes and acquired stimulus-task associations but these 
effects did not interact with load. This suggests that some bottom-up driven 
effects occur independently of the cognitive demands of the situation. 
Furthermore, the results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that the stimulus-
repetition effect, which was observed in Experiment 1 and which interacted 
with load, was not caused by repetition of visual information or the retrieval 
of stimulus-task associations. Instead, we propose that the stimulus-
repetition effect is caused by the retrieval of associations between the 
stimulus and the task-execution response. When the stimulus is repeated, the 
task-execution response of the previous trial is activated and executed again. 
Interestingly, this suggests that on a proportion of the trials, a response is 
executed without advance selection of a new task. The interaction with load 
in Experiment 1 suggests that there are more non-selection trials when top-
down control is degraded in highly demanding situations. In less demanding 
situations, however, top-down processes can counteract this response-
repetition tendency. This seems to suggest that an important function of top-
down control in VTS is to protect task-selection from automatically 
triggered responses. This function of top-down control can be related to the 
response-inhibition account of Hübner and Druey (2006), which states that 
in a task-switching context a response has to be inhibited in order to avoid its 
automatic re-execution on the following trial (for a similar idea, Logan & 
Gordon, 2001). In this perspective, the present study contributes by showing 
that when a response is inhibited less efficiently in a high demanding 
situation, the chance to re-execute this response on the next trial is increased 
on stimulus repetitions. In sum, this study showed that different bottom-up 
factors can guide task selection but also that top-down control is necessary to 
shield task selection from the effects of stimulus-response associations, and 
to counteract the tendency to perseverate tasks.  
In conclusion, the data of the present study also allowed us to 
formulate an answer to the question what is really ‗voluntary‘ or 
‗intentional‘ in the VTS procedure. We obtained convincing evidence for the 
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ideas that task goals are automatically triggered by factors in the 
environment (e.g. Waszak et al., 2003) but also that subjects can inhibit 
recently activated task goals and suppress automatically triggered responses 
to protect intentional goal-directed behavior. Thus, maybe the intentional or 
voluntary act in VTS is not to activate what is ‗willed‘ but to suppress what 
is ‗unwilled‘. 
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APPENDIX 
The mean RTs and analyses are presented in Tables A1 and A2. 
Error rates were very low (Exp1 = 3.6%; Exp2 = 3.1%; Exp3 = 4.6%) and 
not further analyzed.  
We analyzed the mean RTs of Experiments 1 and 2 with a repeated 
measures ANOVA with the factors load (no-load vs. load), trial type and 
task transition (task repetition vs. task switch). In both experiments, we 
found main effects of load [RT(no-load) < RT(load)] and task transition 
[RT(repetition) < RT(switch)]. The main effect of trial type was also 
significant, indicating that repetitions of stimuli or shapes induced faster 
responses than alternations. In Experiment 1, the interaction between trial 
type and task transition was reliable indicating that the switch cost was 
smaller on stimulus repetitions than alternations (see Allport & Wylie, 
2000). The interaction between load and task transition was significant, 
indicating that the switch cost was smaller in the load than in the no-load 
condition. A contrast showed that this was especially due to marginally 
slower task repetitions in the load than in the no-load condition, 
F(1,23)=3.75, MSE=9861, ηp²= .14, and not by faster switches, F<1 (for 
similar results Liefooghe et al., 2005). In Experiment 2, the interaction 
between load and task transition was not significant. Possibly this difference 
between Experiment 1 and 2 is due to the inclusion of stimulus repetitions in 
Experiment 1.  
We analyzed mean RTs of Experiment 3 with a mixed ANOVA with 
the factors load, trial type (animacy vs. size vs. neutral stimulus set), task 
transition and task We found main effects of load [RT(no-load) < RT(load)] 
and task transition [RT(repetition) < RT(switch)]. Also, the main effect of 
trial type was significant. Contrasts showed that responses to neutral stimuli 
were slower than responses to stimuli of the size stimulus set, 
F(1,31)=17.12, MSE=18931, ηp²= .36. The differences between neutral and 
animacy and the differences between animacy and size were not significant; 
F(1,31)=1.61, MSE=34019, ηp²= .05, and F(1,31)=2.64, MSE=42558, ηp²= 
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.08, respectively. The interaction between trial type and task was significant, 
indicating that performing task on a stimulus that is associated with that 
same task leads to better performance than performing another task. 
Contrasts confirmed this for both the animacy, F(1,31)=18.19, MSE=39806, 
ηp²= .37, and size stimulus set, F(1,31)=17.43, MSE=21759, ηp²= .36, but not 
for the neutral stimulus set, F<1.  
Table 1A: Mean RTs as a function of load, trial type and task transition for Experiment 1 and 
2 and mean RTs as a function of load, trial type and task transition and task for Experiment 3.  
Note – Mean RTs and standard errors are given in milliseconds. Standard errors are presented 
within brackets. 
  
 no-load condition 
 load condition 
Exp. 1 
task  
repetitions 
task 
 switches 
 task  
repetitions 
task  
switches 
stimulus  
repetition 
624 (31) 889 (29) 
 
656 (32) 849 (33) 
stimulus  
alternation 
831 (25) 940 (27) 
 
877 (33) 965 (34) 
Exp. 2      
shape 
 repetition 
798 (35) 930 (45) 
 
796 (31) 989 (39) 
shape  
alternation 
809 (41) 962 (46) 
 
837 (35) 1010 (42) 
      
 no-load condition  load condition 
Exp. 3 repetitions switches  repetitions switches 
 
animacy 
task 
size 
task 
animacy 
task 
size 
task 
 animacy 
task 
size 
task 
animacy 
task 
size 
task 
          
animacy  
stimuli 
974  
(52) 
1063  
(62) 
1155 
 (52) 
1233 
 (62) 
 1000  
(52) 
1165 
 (68) 
1233 
 (55) 
1327 
 (77) 
size  
stimuli 
1042 
 (58) 
1006 
 (62) 
1145 
 (46) 
1091 
 (39) 
 1138 
 (63) 
1066 
 (50) 
1286 
 (59) 
1140 
 (55) 
neutral  
stimuli 
1054 
 (59) 
1112 
 (69) 
1228 
 (54) 
1177 
 (43) 
 1097 
 (58) 
1137 
 (53) 
1244 
 (51) 
1267 
 (59) 
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Table 2A: Outcome of the ANOVAs conducted on the RTs for Experiments 1, 2 and 3.  
 
Experiment 1 
 
  
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp²  
load 16665 (1,23) .72 .03  
 trial type 16818 (1,23) 63.04* .73  
task transition 30245 (1,23) 42.59* .65  
load*trial type 8087 (1,23) 2.31 .09  
load*task trans 5549 (1,23) 4.76* .17  
trial type*task trans 7083 (1,23) 28.73* .56  
load*trial type*task trans 3836 (1,23) 2.00 .08  
      
 
Experiment 2 
 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp²  
load 31502 (1,23) 1.67 .07  
 trial type 4213 (1,23) 7.89* .26  
task transition 15822 (1,23) 80.79* .78  
load*trial type 1901 (1,23) .55 .02  
load*task trans 4970 (1,23) 3.88 .14  
trial type*task trans 4059 (1,23) .00 .00  
load*trial type*task trans 2700 (1,23) 1.89 .08  
 
Experiment 3 
 
  
 Wilks (df1,df2) F ηp²  
load .8501 (1,31) 5.47* .15  
trial type .6417 (2,30) 8.37* .36  
task transition .4100 (1,31) 44.60* .59  
task .9712 (1,31) 0.92 .03  
load*trial type .9387 (2,30) 0.98 .06  
load*task trans .9878 (1,31) 0.38 .01  
trial type*trans .8244 (2,30) 3.20 .18  
load*task .9997 (1,31) 0.01 .00  
trial type*task .4647 (2,30) 17.28* .54  
task trans*task .8849 (1,31) 4.03 .12  
load*trial type*task trans .9999 (2,30) 0.00 .00  
load*trial type*task .8751 (2,30) 2.14 .12  
load*task trans*task .9992 (1,31) 0.03 .00  
trial type*task trans*task .9959 (2,30) 0.06 .00  
4-way interaction .8699 (2,30) 2.24 .13  
Note – *: p<.05 
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In the present study we tested the hypotheses that the task-repetition 
bias in voluntary task switching (VTS) is related to the fact that it is easier to 
repeat tasks than to switch between tasks (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2005; 
Mayr & Bell, 2006) and that the effect of a concurrent working memory 
(WM) load on the repetition bias is related to a reduced ability to overrule 
task repetitions under load (Demanet, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, in press). In two experiments, were no tasks but hands had 
to be selected randomly, we found support for both hypotheses by observing 
a tendency to alternate hands (in contrast with a tendency to repeat tasks) 
and by observing that a WM load did not affect the hand-selection 
proportions (in contrast with task-selection proportions). The finding that 
stimulus repetitions only affected the amount of hand selections when a task 
had to be executed, supports the account of Demanet et al. (in press) that the 
effect of stimulus repetitions in VTS is caused by stimulus-response 
associations that are formed when executing a task.  
                                                     
1
 This paper was co-authored by André Vandierendonck 
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INTRODUCTION 
Top-down processes are involved when selecting the right actions in 
the appropriate situations and are often considered to be of main importance 
for goal-directed behavior (e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001). The voluntary task 
switching (VTS) procedure was developed to investigate these processes 
involved in the selection and execution of tasks in a multi-tasking 
environment. In contrast with traditional task-switching procedures, where 
the sequence of tasks always is predefined by the experimenter, in the VTS 
procedure subjects are free to select the task to perform, as long as each task 
is selected an approximate equal number of times and tasks are selected in a 
random fashion (e.g. Arrington, 2008; Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005; 
Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, in press, 2009; Mayr & Bell, 
2006). This procedure was developed by Arrington and Logan (2004) based 
on the conviction that the switch cost in VTS can only reflect the duration of 
top-down processes, which are needed when switching tasks, because only a 
minimal amount of environmental support is provided and top-down control 
is indispensable for executing the selected task correctly. Recently, two 
recent studies confirmed that the switch cost in VTS is more stable and is 
less influenced by persisting task-set activation of preceding trials 
(Liefooghe et al., in press) and by variations in the experimental design 
(Liefooghe et al., 2009) than the switch costs observed in traditional task-
switching procedures. 
Because in VTS the task choice is free, the procedure does not only 
allow an investigation of the processes that are needed in task performance, 
but also the processes that are involved in task selection. Support for the 
distinction between processes of task selection and task performance was 
found in a study of Arrington and Yates (2009) in the observation that both 
are uncorrelated. In VTS, processes responsible for task selection can be 
investigated by studying the task-selection proportions as a function of 
variations in the design or the procedure (e.g. Arrington, 2008; Mayr & Bell, 
2006; Arrington & Rhodes, in press; Weaver & Arrington, in press). A well-
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replicated finding with respect to task-selection proportions is that subjects 
tend to repeat tasks more often than expected by chance (e.g. Arrington & 
Logan, 2004) and that this tendency is stronger with shorter inter-trial 
intervals (ITIs; Arrington & Logan, 2005). This finding is known as the task-
repetition bias. In view of the fact that in VTS subjects are instructed to 
generate tasks randomly this observation is quite surprising. Namely, in 
studies investigating random generation of simple events, in which similar 
instructions are given, typically an alternation bias is observed (Lopes, 1982; 
Lopes & Oden, 1987; Neuringer & Allen, 1986; Rapoport & Budescu, 1992; 
Treisman & Faulkner, 1987; Wagenaar, 1972). Arrington and Logan (2005) 
explained this discrepancy by arguing that the task-repetition bias in VTS 
results from a race between a heuristic based on random generation 
processes (representativeness heuristic) and a heuristic based on the 
availability of the tasks (availability heuristic). While the representativeness 
heuristic results in a tendency to alternate, as shown by Rapoport and 
Budescu (1997), the availability heuristic is assumed to result in a tendency 
to repeat tasks, because the previously executed task often is more available 
(or activated) than the other task due to persisting task-set activation. 
Arrington and Logan (2005) argued that the availability heuristic is 
dominant in short ITIs and can be overruled by the representativeness 
heuristic when ITI is long. Mayr and Bell (2006) proposed a similar account, 
namely that subjects have a natural tendency to repeat the tasks (see also 
Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press) and that this 
tendency can be overruled by strategically driven inhibition processes.  
In general, both accounts of the task-repetition bias can be translated 
into the hypothesis that switching between tasks is more difficult than 
repeating tasks and that, as a result, tasks are repeated more often, especially 
when the processes that are responsible to counteract this tendency are less 
efficient.  
In a recent study (Demanet, Verbruggen, Liefooghe & 
Vandierendonck, in press), we found evidence for this hypothesis by 
observing that the number of task repetitions was boosted when tasks were 
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selected voluntarily with a concurrent working memory (WM) load. This 
effect of load on the task-repetition bias is consistent with the hypothesis that 
top-down processes intervene to overrule the tendency to keep repeating the 
same task and that when these processes are less efficient due to a concurrent 
WM load, tasks are repeated more often. However, in a recent study, 
Liefooghe et al. (in press) observed that the repetition bias was stronger 
when the instruction to produce random task sequences was weakened at the 
start of the experiment. This finding could lead to the alternative hypothesis 
that the influence of a load on the repetition bias as observed in Demanet et 
al. (in press) is caused by the fact that processes involved in random 
generation were less efficient due to the WM load and not by a reduced 
efficiency of top-down control that is involved in a task choice.  
In sum, in literature there is some but no conclusive evidence for the 
hypotheses that the size of the task-repetition bias and the impact of a WM 
load on this bias are related to the relative difference in difficulty when 
executing task repetitions and switches. However, this hypothesis was never 
tested directly. To settle this issue in the present study, we conducted two 
experiments where subjects still had to generate random sequences of events 
in conditions with and without a concurrent WM load, but where, in 
comparison with VTS, the difficulty of switching between events was 
drastically reduced. 
Another important finding in the VTS literature is that, besides the 
general task-repetition bias, also external factors can bias a task choice. 
Mayr and Bell (2006) found that when a stimulus was immediately repeated, 
the chance to repeat the same task is higher than when the stimulus was 
alternated. In a recent study (Demanet et al., in press) we proposed an 
account for this stimulus-repetition effect. In a first experiment we found 
that this effect was stronger in conditions with than without a concurrent 
WM load. On the basis of two additional experiments, we concluded that the 
influence of stimulus repetitions is caused by the fact that on a subset of the 
trials no new task is selected but simply the same response is automatically 
triggered and executed when the stimulus is repeated. In other words, 
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stimulus repetitions do not affect the task choice itself but make it more 
difficult to disengage from a previously executed action (see also, Hübner & 
Druey, 2006). We argued that a stimulus can prime a response through 
stimulus-response associations that are formed each time a subject is 
responding to a stimulus when performing a task (e.g. Logan, 1988). When 
this stimulus was repeated, the associated response is automatically 
activated. The observation that this effect was stronger with a concurrent 
WM load supports the conclusion that its size depends on the efficiency of 
top-down processes.  
In the present study, we collected more direct evidence for the role of 
these associative response effects in VTS and the way they are overruled by 
top-down control processes. A first experiment investigated choice behavior 
when subjects were not required to select tasks randomly, but to select hands 
to perform a task, both in conditions with and without a concurrent WM 
load. In other words, subjects always had to execute the same task and on 
each trial, they could freely choose the hand to execute this task (see Figure 
1, panel A). Because in this experiment a task still had to be executed and, as 
a consequence, a stimulus had to be translated into a correct response, we 
predicted that stimulus-response associations will be formed that affect the 
hand choice in a similar way as the task choice as observed in Demanet et al. 
(in press). In order to compare hand-selection and task-selection behavior, 
the selection proportions of this first experiment will be compared directly 
with Experiment 1 in Demanet et al. (in press). To this end, this first 
experiment was designed in such a way that the only difference between the 
present Experiment 1 and Experiment 1 of Demanet et al. (in press) was that 
no tasks but hands had to be selected randomly. 
In a second experiment we also asked subjects to select hands 
randomly (see Figure 1, panel B), but in contrast with Experiment 1, subjects 
never had to execute a task on a stimulus. The presentation of the stimuli 
simply served as a probe for the next random response. In this experiment, 
the identity of the stimulus was irrelevant for the performance. Therefore we 
expect that no stimulus-response associations will be formed and stimulus 
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repetitions will not affect the hand choice. By including this second 
experiment we also tested an alternative account for the stimulus-repetition 
effect. Namely, it is possible that this effect arises because subjects tune their 
selections to repeating or changing elements in the environment. According 
to this account stimulus repetitions would still have an effect when no tasks 
had to be executed. In order to compare these hand-selection proportions 
with the hand-selection proportions that we calculated in the present 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that no 
tasks had to be executed. 
In addition, these two experiments allow us to investigate the selection 
proportions and the impact of a concurrent WM load on these proportions in 
situations where no tasks but hands had to be selected. On the basis of the 
hypothesis that the task-repetition bias is related to the difficulty to overrule 
task repetitions and on the basis of findings in studies investigating random 
generation (e.g. Rapoport & Budescu, 1997) we can predict to observe a 
tendency to alternate hands in both experiments. On the basis of the 
argumentation that the concurrent WM load hinders top-down processes that 
are responsible to counteract the tendency to repeat tasks (Demanet et al. in 
press), we can predict in both experiments that when no tasks had to be 
selected, the effects of load will disappear. This result would also confirm 
the findings of Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny and Duncan (1998) who 
observed that when subjects had to generate random sequences of ten 
possible responses, the tendency to avoid immediate response repetitions 
was not affected by a concurrent WM load.   
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Figure 1: Panel A: Response mappings of Experiment 1: subjects had to perform one task 
while selecting hands randomly. Panel B: Response mappings for Experiment 2: subjects had 
to select left and right hands randomly, without executing a task. Panel C: Response mappings 
for Experiment 1 of Demanet et al. (in press): subjects had to execute the magnitude or the 
parity task randomly. Response mappings of the first mapping condition are presented in a 
normal font and response mappings of the second mapping condition are presented in Italic.  
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EXPERIMENTS 
Because the method and result sections of the two experiments 
strongly overlapped, we described them together. 
METHOD 
Subjects, apparatus, tasks and stimuli. Forty-eight (Exp.1: 24; Exp.2: 
24) students from Ghent University completed the experiments for course 
requirements and credit. They were tested individually by means of a 
Pentium III personal computer with a 17-inch color monitor running Tscope 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). In the study 
phase a series of six consonants was presented. We avoided high 
phonological similarity within each list (Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & 
Van der Goten, 1998). The consonants were grouped into 13 low confusable 
groups based on their Dutch pronunciation: (B,D,P,T), ( C ), (F,S), (G), 
(H,K), (J), (L), (M, N), (Q), (R), (V, W), (X), (Z). Each list of 6 items was 
constructed by randomly selecting 6 pronunciation groups without 
replacement, and then randomly selecting one consonant within the group. 
For every subject, we selected 40 different lists. In the recall phase, subjects 
had to type the sequence of consonants on a keyboard in the order in which 
they were presented in the study phase. The keyboard was placed on the left 
of the subjects. Cues on the screen indicated which item (first, second…) in 
the sequence they had to generate. If they wanted they could restart entering 
the consonants by pressing the backspace key. In the test phase in 
Experiment 1, half of the subjects were asked to categorize a stimulus as 
smaller as or larger as ‗5‘ (magnitude task) and the other half to categorize a 
stimulus as odd or even (parity task). This task could be performed with 
buttons assigned to the left or to the left hand (see Figure 1, panel A). The 
subjects were randomly assigned into two mapping conditions. The subjects 
of the first mapping condition performed the magnitude task and the subjects 
of the second mapping condition performed the parity task. Subjects 
performing the magnitude task had to press a left key (with the left or the 
right hand) for smaller than 5 and a right key (with the left or the right hand) 
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for larger than 5. Subjects performing the parity task had to press a left key 
(with the left or right hand) for odd and a right key (with the left or right 
hand) for even numbers. In the test phase in Experiment 2 subjects were 
asked to press a button assigned to the left hand and a button assigned to the 
right hand (see Figure 1, panel B), in order to generate random sequences of 
hands without task execution. The identity of the stimulus was irrelevant in 
Experiment 2 and the stimulus onset served as a prompt for a next response. 
In both experiments we used digits 1-9, excluding 5 and the responses in the 
test phases were registered with an external response box that was placed in 
front of the subjects. 
 
Procedure. Each series started with the study phase, in which six 
consonants were presented in the center of the screen at a rate of one 
consonant per second (500 ms on; 500 ms off). In the recall phase subjects 
were asked to recall the six consonants in the correct order, without any time 
constraints. At the end of the recall phase the percentage of correct recall 
was presented. In the test phase, each trial started with the presentation of a 
stimulus, which required a response within 3,000 ms. When a response was 
executed or when the maximal response time had elapsed, a fixed response-
stimulus interval (RSI) of 100 ms started. Each test phase consisted of 13 
stimuli. The first trial was considered a filler trial in order to exclude restart 
effects; of the remaining 12 trials, 3 trials were stimulus repetitions (25%) 
and 9 trials were stimulus alternations (75%). The percentage of stimulus 
repetitions deviated from the expected percentage of 12.5% stimulus 
repetitions when using eight stimuli. Each condition started with three 
practice blocks. In the first practice block, subjects practiced the study and 
recall phase separately. In the second practice block, subjects practiced the 
test phase separately. In a third practice block, subjects practiced the 
combination of the three phases. All training sessions were repeated until the 
subjects were confident in performing the three phases. Before the practice 
of the test phase (i.e. second practice block), in both experiments instructions 
based on the instructions of Arrington and Logan (2004) concerning 
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unpredictability were displayed on the screen (in Dutch) and paraphrased if 
necessary. These instructions were adjusted for the random generation of 
hands. The practice blocks were followed by an experimental phase, which 
consisted of 20 lists per condition (load condition, study-test-recall or no-
load condition, study-recall-test). The order of the conditions was 
counterbalanced over subjects. The experiment lasted approximately 40 
minutes. 
 
Results. The first trial of each VTS phase and trials following an error 
were discarded (data loss: Exp1 = 11.0%; Exp2 = 7.7%). In this study, we 
were particularly interested in the sequences of selected hands. Therefore, in 
the results section, we focused on the selection proportions only. Analyses of 
response latencies can be found in the Appendix. The selection proportions 
appear in Table 1 and the analyses in Table 2. The analyses on the selection 
proportions only were performed on the repetition proportions, because in 
the present study these are complementary with alternation proportions due 
to the binary sequences. We chose to report the analyses of the selection 
proportions in a step-wise order. First, we reported the results of the analyses 
on the hand-selection proportions obtained in Experiment 1. Second, we 
compared these hand-selection proportions with the task-selection 
proportions collected in Experiment 1 in Demanet et al. (in press) in order to 
investigate the differences between the selection of hands (with task 
execution) and the selection of tasks. Third, the analyses of the hand-
selection proportions obtained in Experiment 2 were described. Finally, we 
compared these proportions with the hand-selection proportions in 
Experiment 1 in order to investigate the influence of a task execution on the 
sequences of hand selections.  
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Table 1: Selection proportions as a function of load, stimulus transition and hand\task 
transition for Experiment 1 and 2 and Experiment 1 of Demanet et al. (in press). 
 
no-load 
 
load 
 
hand  
repetitions 
hand  
switches 
 
hand 
repetitions 
hand  
switches 
Experiment 1      
stimulus repetitions .56 (.04) .44 (.04) 
 
.56 (.04) .44 (.04) 
stimulus alternations .41 (.02) .59 (.02) 
 
.44 (.02) .56 (.02) 
Experiment 2      
stimulus repetitions .43 (.02) .57 (.02) 
 
.41 (.03)  .59 (.03) 
stimulus alternations .41 (.01) .59 (.01) 
 
.39 (.03) .61 (.03) 
 
task  
repetitions 
task  
switches 
 task 
repetitions 
task  
switches 
Exp. 1, Demanet et 
al. (in press) 
  
 
  
stimulus repetitions .48 (.04) .52 (.04) 
 
.62 (.04) .38 (.04) 
stimulus alternations .48 (.02) .52 (.02) 
 
.54 (.02) .46 (.02) 
Note – Standard errors are presented within brackets. 
 
Hand-selection proportions of Experiment 1 (with task execution). 
First, an individual t-test was performed to test whether the proportions of 
hand repetitions differed from .50. This test showed that in general there was 
a trend to alternate between hands (M=.454, SE=.027; comparison .50: t(23) 
= -1.69, p = .10). Hand-repetition proportions were analyzed by means of a 
repeated measures ANOVA with load (no-load vs. load) and stimulus 
transition (stimulus repetition vs. alternations) as factors, with α = .05. As 
can be seen in Table 2, the main effect of load was not significant indicating 
that hand-repetition proportions did not differ between the no-load (M=.485, 
SE=.027) and the load condition (M=.494, SE=.036). A main effect of 
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stimulus transition was observed, indicating that on stimulus repetitions the 
proportion of hand-repetitions was higher (M=.560, SE=.042) than on 
stimulus switches (M=.418, SE=.027). This indicates that when generating 
hands to execute a task, the transition of a stimulus has a strong influence on 
the choice of hands. No interaction between load and stimulus transition was 
observed. 
 
Hand-selection proportions of Experiment 1 vs. Task-selection 
proportions in Experiment 1 in Demanet et al. (in press). In order to 
investigate the similarities and differences between hand-selection and task-
selection proportions, these proportions were subjected to a repeated 
measures ANOVA with load (no-load vs. load) and stimulus transition 
(stimulus repetition vs. alternation) as within-subjects factors and the 
generated event (hand vs. task) as a between-subjects factor. The results of 
this analysis (see Table 2) showed no main effect of event, indicating that 
tasks (M=.531, SE=.028) and hands (M=.489, SE=.028) were repeated 
equally often. The interaction between load and event was significant 
indicating that a WM load had a larger effect when tasks were selected. 
Stimulus transition and event also interacted, indicating that the stimulus-
repetition effect was stronger when selecting hands than when selecting 
tasks. This significant interaction reveals the cause for the non-significant 
main effect of event. As shown in Table 1, tasks were repeated more often 
(M=.511, SE=.024) than hands (M=.418, SE=.023) when a stimulus was 
alternated, F(1,46)=7.81, MSE=.0265, ηp 
2
= .15. On stimulus repetitions, the 
selection proportions did not differ between hand (M=.560, SE=.040) and 
task selections (M=.550, SE=.040), F<1. Also, the three-way interaction 
between load, stimulus transition and event was significant indicating that in 
contrast with task selection, F(1,23) = 12.96, MSE=.0034, ηp 
2
= .36, the load 
and stimulus transition did not interact when hands are selected, F(1,23) = 
12.96, MSE=.0034, ηp
2
= .36.  
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Table 2: Outcome of the ANOVAs conducted on the selection proportions for Experiments 1 
and 2 and of the ANOVAs used to compare hand-selection proportions obtained in 
Experiment 1 with the task-selection proportions obtained in Experiment 1 of Demanet et al. 
(in press), and with the hand-selection proportions obtained in Experiment 2.  
 Experiment 1 
 Proportion hand repetitions 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp² 
load .0094 (1,23) .21 .01 
stimulus transition .0293 (1,23) 16.35* .42 
load*stim trans .0063 (1,23) .09 .00 
 Experiment 2 
 Proportion hand repetitions 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp² 
load .0082 (1,23) 1.14 .05 
stimulus transition .0082 (1,23) 1.93 .08 
load*stim trans .0119 (1,23) .00 .00 
 Hand selection (Exp. 1) vs. Task selection 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp² 
event  .0763 (1,46) 1.09 .02 
load .0106 (1,46) 12.50* .21 
load*event .0106 (1,46) 8.52* .16 
stimulus transition .0274 (1,46) 14.19* .24 
stim trans*event .0274 (1,46) 4.63* .09 
load*stim trans .0049 (1,46) 3.66 .07 
load*stim trans*event .0049 (1,46) 5.70* .11 
 Hand (Exp. 2) vs. Hand (Exp. 1) selection 
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp² 
event .0615 (1,46) 4.82* .09 
load .0088 (1,46) .15 .00 
load*event .0088 (1,46) 1.14 .02 
stimulus transition .0188 (1,46) 17.84* .28 
stim trans*event .0188 (1,46) 8.54* .16 
load*stim trans .0091 (1,46) .04 .00 
load*stim trans*event .0091 (1,46) .02 .00 
Note – *: p<.05  
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Hand-selection proportions of Experiment 2 (without task 
execution). A t-test showed a tendency to alternate hands (M=.404, SE=.018; 
comparison .50: t(23) = -5.24, p < .01). Hand-repetition proportions were 
analyzed by means of a repeated measures ANOVA with load (no-load vs. 
load) and stimulus transition (stimulus repetition vs. alternations) as factors, 
with α = .05. As can be seen in Table 2, the main effect of load was not 
significant indicating that the amount of hand repetitions did not differ 
between the no-load (M=.420, SE=.017) and the load condition (M=.401, 
SE=.024). Also, the main effect of stimulus transition was not significant, 
indicating that the proportion of hand-repetitions was similar on stimulus 
repetitions (M=.423, SE=.022) and on stimulus alternations (M=.398, 
SE=.019). The interaction between load and stimulus transition was not 
significant, F<1. 
 
Hand-selection proportions in Experiment 2 vs. Experiment 1. In 
order to investigate the differences between hand-selection proportions when 
no task had to be executed (Experiment 2) and when a tasks had to be 
executed (Experiment 1), these proportions were subjected to a repeated 
measures ANOVA with load (no-load vs. load), stimulus transition (stimulus 
repetition vs. alternation) as within-subjects factors and the generated event 
(hand without task execution vs. hand with task execution) as a between-
subjects factor. The results of this analysis (see Table 2) showed a main 
effect of event, indicating that hands were repeated more when a task had to 
be executed (M=.489, SE=.025) than without a task execution (M=.411, 
SE=.025). The interaction between load and event was not significant. 
Stimulus transition and event interacted, indicating that the stimulus-
repetition effect on hand selection was more pronounced when a task had to 
be executed. This significant interaction reveals the cause for the main effect 
of event, because only on stimulus repetitions the hands were repeated more 
with (M=.560, SE=.034) than without a task execution (M=.423, SE=.033), 
F(1,46)=8.19, MSE=.0544, ηp 
2
= .15. On stimulus alternations no difference 
was observed between hand selections with (M=.418, SE=.023) and without 
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a task execution (M=.398, SE=.023), F<1. The three-way interaction 
between load, stimulus transition and event was not significant. 
Recall phase. The proportions of correct recall represent the 
probability that a particular item was remembered correctly in the correct 
order. We analyzed the proportions of Experiment 1 and 2 by means of a 
simple ANOVA with load as the only factor. As shown in Table 3, in both 
experiments, proportions of correct recall were higher in the no-load than in 
the load condition, which can be explained by the larger time interval in the 
load than in the no-load condition between the study and recall phases due to 
the different order of the phases.  
 
Table 3: Mean proportions of correct recall in the no-load and load condition and the results 
of the main effect ANOVAs on these proportions with load as the only factor. 
 no-load load  main effect load 
    (df1,df2) F MSe ηp
2 
Experiment 1 .92 (0.1) .82 (0.2)  (1,23) 44.28* .0030 .66 
Experiment 2 .97 (0.1) .83 (0.3)  (1,23) 27.36* .0101 .47 
Note – *: p<.05. Standard errors are presented within brackets. 
DISCUSSION 
In the literature, the observed bias towards selecting more task 
repetitions than task switches in the VTS procedure (e.g. Arrington & 
Logan, 2004) does not seem to fit with the typically observed tendency to 
alternate between events in studies investigating random generation (e.g. 
Rapoport & Budescu, 1997).  
A first goal of the present study was to test the hypothesis that the 
repetition bias is related to the fact that switching between tasks is more 
difficult than repeating tasks and that as a result tasks are repeated more 
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often (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Mayr & Bell, 2006). We observed in two 
experiments that when no tasks but hands had to be selected, the proportion 
of repetitions was lower than one could expect on the basis of chance (.50). 
This hand-alternation bias confirms previous findings in the random 
generation literature (e.g. Baddeley et al., 1998; Rapoport & Budescu, 1997) 
and supports the hypothesis that the task-repetition bias typically observed in 
VTS is related to the requirement to select tasks rather than hands (see 
Arrington & Logan, 2005; Mayr & Bell, 2006). In our view, a task selection 
is different from the selection of hands, because the selection of a task 
repetition or a task switch has large consequences in the subsequent task 
execution. In Demanet et al. (in press) was found that it is much easier to 
repeat than to switch tasks, while the difference in performance between 
hand repetitions and hand switches is much smaller (see Appendix ). The 
idea that the consequences of a choice can drive this choice can be related to 
the ‗law of least mental effort‘ introduced by Balle (2002) which states that 
people develop a tendency to avoid situations that need high levels of metal 
effort when given the choice. This interpretation is also supported by recent 
findings of Botvinick and Rosen (in press) who observed that subjects learn 
to avoid situations with a large amount of task switches.  
In sum, the present study showed that when a selection of a switch of 
an event does not have large repercussions for the amount of effort that 
needs to be invested, the tendency to avoid switches of that event disappears 
completely.  
A second goal in the present study was to test the account proposed in 
Demanet et al. (in press) that the higher task-repetition bias with than 
without a concurrent WM load is related to a reduced efficiency of top-down 
control to overcome the task-repetition tendency. This hypothesis was 
supported by the observation that the effects of WM load disappeared 
completely when hands were selected. With this finding we also confirmed 
the findings of a study of Baddeley and colleagues (1998) where was 
observed that a WM load does not affect the number of repetitions in a 
sequence of randomly generated numbers. Most importantly, it also rejects 
VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION VS. RANDOM HAND SELECTION    65 
the hypothesis that the effect of the concurrent WM load observed in 
Demanet et al. (in press) is caused by the fact that random-generation 
processes were less efficient.  
In our view, the present findings together with the findings of 
Liefooghe, et al. (in press), in which is observed that tasks are repeated more 
when the random instruction is weakened, can be considered as evidence for 
the idea that a voluntary task selection results from an interplay between 
random generation processes and other processes that are particularly 
involved when tasks are selected. In a recent study (Vandierendonck, 
Demanet, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, submitted) we proposed a model in 
which both kinds of processes are incorporated and in which is assumed that 
a voluntary task selection is based on the automatic retrieval of chains of 
task-related information that are stored in long-term memory.  
A third goal in the present study was to unravel the mechanisms 
behind the stimulus-repetition effect (Mayr & Bell, 2006). In Demanet et al. 
(in press) we argued that this effect is caused by the fact that each stimulus 
that has to be translated into a correct response becomes automatically 
associated with that response (see also, Logan, 1988). The observation in 
Experiment 1 that hands are repeated more often on stimulus repetitions than 
on stimulus alternations supports this account. Hence, when a hand is 
selected to execute a task, the stimulus still has to be translated into the 
correct response, resulting in an association between that stimulus and that 
response. Also the finding in Experiment 2 that the stimulus-repetition effect 
disappeared when stimuli were not translated into a response is in line with 
this account. 
Finally, in contrast with Experiment 1 in Demanet et al. (in press), 
where only a stimulus-repetition effect was found under a concurrent WM 
load, in the present Experiment 1, the stimulus-repetition effect was equally 
strong in conditions with and without a WM load. This observation seems to 
suggest that an exclusive function of task selection, in contrast with hand 
selection, is to shield behavior from automatically triggered responses, and 
66     CHAPTER 3 
that this function depends on the efficiency of top-down control. Possibly, 
this account can be related to the concept of goal-shielding of Goschke and 
Dreisbach (2008). 
To conclude, in the present study we found strong evidence in support 
of the hypotheses that the task-repetition bias in VTS and the effect of a 
concurrent WM load on this bias is related to the relative difference in 
difficulty between repeating and switching tasks. We also found strong 
evidence for the idea that the stimulus-repetition effect (e.g. Mayr & Bell, 
2006) is caused by associations between a stimulus and a response that are 
formed during task execution. In addition, we found support for the idea that 
top-down processes in voluntary task selection, in contrast with random hand 
selection, are necessary to shield task selection from external factors (see 
also Goschke & Dreisbach, 2008). In sum, this study clearly shows that 
voluntary task selection is more than just random generation of hands and, as 
a consequence, can be considered as a useful tool to investigate intentional 
goal-directed behavior.   
VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION VS. RANDOM HAND SELECTION    67 
REFERENCES 
Arrington, C. M. (2008). The effect of stimulus availability on task choice in 
voluntary task switching. Memory & Cognition, 36, 991-997. 
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2004). The Cost of a Voluntary Task 
Switch. Psychological Science, 15, 610-615. 
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2005). Voluntary task switching: Chasing 
the elusive homunculus. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 31, 683-702. 
Arrington, C. M., & Rhodes, K. M. (in press). Perceptual asymmetries 
influence task choice: the effect of lateralized presentation of 
hierarchical stimuli. Laterality. 
Arrington, C. M., & Yates, M. M. (2009). The role of attentional networks in 
voluntary task switching. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 660-665. 
Baddeley, A., Emslie, H., Kolodny, J., & Duncan, J. (1998). Random 
generation and the executive control of working memory. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 51A, 819-852. 
Balle, M. (2002). La loi du moindre effort mental: Les representations 
mentales. Sciences Humaines, 128, 36-39. 
Botvinick, M. M. & Rosen, Z. (in press). Anticipation of cognitive demand 
during decision-making. Psychological Research. 
Demanet, J., Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (in 
press). Voluntary task switching under load: Contribution of top-down 
and bottom-up factors in goal-directed behavior. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review. 
Goschke, T., & Dreisbach, G. (2008). Conflict-triggered goal shielding: 
Response conflicts attenuate background monitoring for prospective 
memory cues. Psychological Science, 19, 25-32. 
68     CHAPTER 3 
Hübner, R., & Druey, M.D. (2006). Response execution, selection, or 
activation: What is sufficient for response-related repetition effects 
under task shifting? Psychological Research, 70, 245-261. 
Liefooghe, B., Demanet, J., & Vandierendonck, A. (2009). Is advance 
reconfiguration in voluntary task switching affected by the design 
employed? Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65, 850-857. 
Liefooghe, B., Demanet, J., & Vandierendonck, A. (in press). Selecting tasks 
of unequal strength. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of 
automatization. Psychological Review, 95, 492-527. 
Lopes, L. L. (1982). Doing the impossible: A note on induction and the 
experience of randomness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 8, 626-636. 
Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C. (1987). Distinguishing between random and 
nonrandom events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 13, 392-400. 
Mayr, U., & Bell, T. (2006). On how to be unpredictable: evidence from the 
voluntary task-switching paradigm. Psychological Science, 17, 774-780. 
Miller, E.K., & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal 
cortex function. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 24, 167-202. 
Neuringer, & Allen. (1986). Can people behave ``randomly'': The role of 
feedback. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 62-75. 
Rapoport, A., & Budescu, D. V. (1992). Generation of random series in two-
person strictly competitive games. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 121, 352-363. 
Rapoport, A., & Budescu, D. V. (1997). Randomization in individual choice 
behavior. Psychological Review, 104, 603-617. 
VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION VS. RANDOM HAND SELECTION    69 
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between 
simple cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
124, 207-231. 
Stevens, M., Lammertyn, J., Verbruggen, F., & Vandierendonck, A. (2006). 
Tscope: A C library for programming cognitive experiments on the MS 
Windows platform. Behavior Research Methods, 38, 280-286. 
Treisman, M., & Faulkner, A. (1987). Generation of random sequences by 
human subjects: Cognitive operations or psychophysical process? 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116, 337-355. 
Vandamme, K., Szmalec, A., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (in 
press). Are voluntary switches corrected repetitions? Psychophysiology. 
Vandierendonck, A., De Vooght, G., & Van der Goten, K. (1998). Does 
random time interval generation interfere with working memory 
executive functions? European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 10, 
413-442. 
Wagenaar, W. A. (1972). Generation of random sequences by human 
subjects: A critical review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 77, 
65-72. 
Weaver, S. M., & Arrington, C. M. (in press). What‘s on your mind: The 
influence of the contents of working memory on choice. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
  
70     CHAPTER 3 
APPENDIX 
The mean RTs and analyses are presented in Tables A1 and A2. Error 
rates were very low (Exp1 = 3.2%; Exp2 = 0.0%) and were therefore not 
analyzed further.  
We analyzed the mean RTs of Experiments 1 and 2 with a repeated 
measures ANOVA with the factors load (no-load vs. load), stimulus 
transition and hand transition (repetition vs. switch). In Experiment 1 a main 
effect of hand transition was observed indicating that responses were faster 
on hand repetitions (M=622ms, SE=19) than on hand switches (M=690, 
SE=20). The main effect of stimulus transition was also significant, 
indicating that repetitions of stimuli (M=618ms, SE=25) induced faster 
responses than alternations (M=694ms, SE=16). In Experiment 1, the 
interaction between stimulus transition and hand transition was reliable 
indicating that stimulus repetitions speeded up the responses more when 
hands were repeated than when hands were switched. No other effects or 
interactions were reliable in Experiment 1. For Experiment 2, none of the 
effects or interactions was significant; indicating that neither load, nor 
stimulus transition nor hand transition influenced the response latencies.  
Table 1A: Mean RTs as a function of load, stimulus transition and hand transition for 
Experiment 1 and 2.  
     
 no-load  load  
Experiment 1 
hand  
repetitions 
hand 
 switches 
hand  
repetitions 
hand 
 switches 
stimulus repetitions 535 (24) 678 (29) 583 (37) 677 (34) 
stimulus alternations 671 (18) 694 (21) 700 (16) 712 (21) 
     
Experiment 2     
stimulus repetitions 369 (36) 372 (41) 321 (37) 330 (38) 
stimulus alternations 372 (38) 355 (30) 323 (38) 337 (35) 
     
Note – Standard errors are presented within brackets.  
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Table 2A: Outcome of the ANOVAs conducted on the RTs for Experiments 1 and 2.  
 Experiment 1  
  
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp²  
load 18434 (1,23) 1.44 .06  
stimulus transition 24856 (1,23) 11.16* .33  
hand transition 15496 (1,23) 14.21* .38  
load*stim trans 4168 (1,23) .00 .00  
load*hand trans 2688 (1,23) 4.11 .15  
stim trans*hand trans 4718 (1,23) 25.54* .53  
load*stim trans*hand trans 1775 (1,23) 2.34 .09  
      
 Experiment 2  
 MSe (df1,df2) F ηp²  
load 18739 (1,23) 3.85 .14  
 stimulus transition 870 (1,23) .11 .00  
response transition 7109 (1,23) .04 .00  
load*stim trans 379 (1,23) 4.10 .15  
load*hand trans 1516 (1,23) 2.64 .10  
stim trans*hand trans 2341 (1,23) .31 .01  
load* stim trans*hand trans 2566 (1,23) .77 .03  
      
Note – *: p<.05 
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RESPONSE-SEQUENCES EFFECTS IN THE VOLUNTARY 
SELECTION OF TASKS 
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Previous research has shown that the selection of tasks in the 
voluntary task switching procedure is based on an interaction between top-
down processes and bottom-up influences (Arrington, 2008; Demanet, 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press). In two experiments, in 
which a double-registration procedure was used, we observed that task 
selections were guided by sequences of preceding actions. This finding 
indicates that even with a double-registration procedure a voluntary task 
selection is never truly voluntary and is always biased by bottom-up factors. 
Over the two experiments, we also found evidence for the idea that the 
efficiency of top-down processes that are responsible to counteract 
influences of bottom-up depends on strategic modulations.  
                                                     
1
 This paper was co-authored by Baptist Liefooghe, André Vandierendonck and 
Frederick Verbruggen 
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INTRODUCTION 
A key facet of executive control relates to how people can change 
their behavior in order to achieve different task goals. The task-switching 
paradigm allows investigation of the ability to shift between different tasks. 
Traditionally, in this paradigm subjects perform a series of tasks that are 
imposed by the experimenter (for reviews, see Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003). 
The longstanding idea is that the switch cost (i.e., the impaired performance 
on task switches compared to task repetitions) observed in this paradigm 
provides a valid measure of the executive processes that are necessary to 
configure the cognitive system when switching between tasks. However, in 
several studies was found that factors unrelated to a task switch, such as 
stimulus-response associations (e.g. Allport & Wylie, 2000), cue-related 
processes (e.g. Logan & Bundesen, 2003), stimulus-task associations (e.g. 
Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003) and preceding task sequences (Schneider 
& Logan, 2005) can affect the switch cost, suggesting that this cost does not 
represent the duration of switch-related processes. A second problem with 
traditional task-switching procedures is that they only allow us to investigate 
a subset of the processes that are used when switching tasks in daily life, 
because in most situations we are not told to switch from one task to another 
on command but we can choose the tasks we want to perform. Therefore, in 
our view, these procedures are lacking ecological validity. 
In order to overcome these problems with the traditional task-
switching procedures, Arrington and Logan (2004; 2005) introduced the 
voluntary task switching (VTS) procedure (see also; Arrington, 2008; 
Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; Forstmann, Ridderinkhof, 
Kaiser, & Bledowski, 2007; Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009; 
Lien & Ruthruff, 2008; Mayr & Bell, 2006). In this procedure subjects are 
free to select the task to perform, as long as each task is selected an 
approximate equal number of times and subjects do not follow a predictable 
pattern of task selections. Typically, in VTS a single-registration procedure 
is used in which one task is mapped to the left hand and the other task to the 
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right hand (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2004; 2005; Demanet, Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press; Mayr & Bell, 2006).  
With respect to the problem of the switch cost, recent studies have 
shown that the switch cost in VTS is less contaminated by other factors such 
as proactive task interference (Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, in 
press) and by variations in the experimental design (Liefooghe et al., 2009). 
These studies suggest that the switch cost in VTS can be considered as an 
accurate measure for executive processes involved when switching tasks.  
With respect to the problem of ecological validity, the VTS procedure 
was designed to investigate the processes involved in voluntary task 
selection and the factors that bias a voluntary task choice. In VTS, a 
frequently replicated finding is that subjects tend to repeat the tasks more 
often than expected by chance, especially with short inter-trial intervals 
(ITIs). Several accounts for this so-called task-repetition bias have been 
proposed. Arrington and Logan (2005) argued that it is caused by a 
competition between task selection and task execution processes. When the 
ITI is short, the subjects are confronted with a dual-task situation in which 
they have to select a task and configure the cognitive system to execute this 
task in a minimum of time. Selecting a task repetition reduces this overlap 
because preparing for a task repetition is less time-consuming than preparing 
for a task switch (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995). When ITI is long, this 
overlap is already minimal regardless of whether a task repetition or a task 
switch is selected, leading to a reduction of the repetition bias. Mayr and 
Bell (2006) suggested that subjects have a natural tendency to stick with the 
most active task set and that this tendency can be overruled by strategically 
driven inhibition processes. The more they inhibit the no-longer relevant 
preceding tasks in the ITI, the lower the task-repetition bias will be. Mayr 
and Bell also argued that the strength of this inhibition depends on the 
strategy to treat consecutive task selections as discrete events. In our view, 
both these accounts of the repetition bias can be related to the ‗law of least 
mental effort‘ introduced by Balle (2002), which entails that people will 
always develop a tendency to avoid situations that need high levels of 
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cognitive control. Consistent with that idea, Botvinick (Botvinick, 2007; 
Botvinick & Rosen, in press) demonstrated that subjects learn to avoid 
situations involving many task switches when given the chance. 
In addition, Mayr and Bell (2006) observed that elements in the 
environment can boost the task-repetition bias. They found that tasks were 
repeated more when a stimulus was repeated, especially when stimulus 
repetitions were frequent. In a recent study (Demanet et al., in press) 
evidence was reported that suggests that this stimulus-repetition effect is 
caused by previously formed stimulus-response associations and that on a 
proportion of trials, especially on stimulus repetitions, a response is executed 
without an actual task selection. The observation that on a part of the trials 
no task is selected seems to question the idea that VTS with a single 
registration is an appropriate procedure to investigate voluntary task 
selection. 
A potential solution for this problem was already introduced by 
Arrington and Logan (2005; Experiment 6). They used a double-registration 
variant of VTS, in which each trial consists of two parts. First, a probe (‗?‘) 
is presented, instructing the subjects to indicate which task they choose to 
perform. Second, a stimulus is presented, to which the selected task must be 
applied (see Figure 1 for an example of a particular trial). In other words, by 
requiring an additional task-selection response, subjects were forced to make 
a task choice before they executed the task. Because the task-selection 
response is assumed to reflect task-selection processes, and the second 
response (i.e., the task-execution response) is assumed to reflect task-
execution processes, one could argue that this procedure can be used to 
examine the task-selection processes uncontaminated by task-execution 
processes. By replicating the task-repetition bias with double registration, the 
results of Arrington and Logan (2005, Experiment 6) suggested that the 
general repetition bias in VTS, at least with this procedure, is caused by 
choice-related processes, and not only by simple re-executions of the same 
task as observed by Demanet et al. (in press). Because the probe was the 
same on all trials and because the target did not appear until the task choice 
SEQUENCE EFFECTS IN VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION    77 
was made, there were also no external stimuli that could have affected the 
task choice. Both these considerations could lead to the hypothesis that when 
one wants to investigate voluntary task choice independent of external 
factors, the double-registration variant of VTS is an appropriate tool.  
The main goal of the present study was to investigate if this 
hypothesis holds or that, on the contrary, by introducing an extra task-
selection response, new sequence effects on the task choice are created. 
Based on recent research (Demanet et al., in press, Experiment 2) where was 
shown that even the repetition of task-irrelevant features can strongly bias 
the task selections (more task repetitions on feature repetitions), we could 
predict that preceding actions that are generated by the subject him or herself 
will have a similar effect on the task selections. In the present study we will 
test this issue directly by investigating whether a task choice can be affected 
by repeating responses on preceding trials in VTS with double registration. 
The effect of these response sequences was investigated by manipulating the 
relation of the task-execution responses of trial n-2 and trial n-1 (see Figure 
1) and by testing whether the task selection on trial n is influenced by this 
relation (response repetition vs. alternation). If response sequences indeed 
have an effect on following task selections, we expect to find more task 
repetitions following task-execution response repetitions than following 
task-execution response alternations. In order to investigate if the occurrence 
of this potential sequential effect depends on particular conditions and to 
investigate its underlying mechanism, two additional factors were 
manipulated. 
A first factor we manipulated was the time between the stimulus 
presentation on trial n-1 and the presentation of the probe on trial n 
(stimulus-probe interval; SPI). The rationale behind this manipulation is that 
the efficiency of top-down control, which is involved when selecting tasks 
voluntarily, depends on the length of the SPI (for a similar manipulation see 
Arrington, 2008). Arrington observed that external influences on task choice 
in VTS were stronger when little time is available to select a task. According 
to this finding, we predicted that also sequential effects will be stronger 
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when the SPI was short. To investigate this in Experiment 1, SPI was 
manipulated as a within-subjects factor with four levels (50; 300; 1,000; and 
1,500ms). 
Second, we manipulated the alignment of the task-selection and the 
task-execution responses in two alignment conditions (horizontal vs. 
orthogonal alignment). According to a study of Elsner and Hommel (2004) 
one could predict that the task-execution response of trial n-2 and the task-
selection response on trial n-1 can become temporarily associated when the 
execution response and selection response occur in close succession, 
especially when SPI is short (see Figure 1). When the task-execution 
response is immediately repeated on trial n-1, the associated task-selection 
response could be automatically activated, leading to more task repetitions 
following task-execution repetitions. We argue that when the potential 
sequential effects are caused by these associations, one should find that these 
are stronger when the spatial codes of the selection and execution responses 
overlapped strongly (as in the horizontal alignment condition) than when the 
spatial codes did not overlap (as in the orthogonal alignment condition; see 
Figure 2; see also Lien & Proctor, 2000).  
Figure 1: An example of three consecutive trials in the double-registration procedure of 
voluntary task switching. SELECT = task-selection response; EXEC = task-execution 
response. 
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Figure 2: Horizontal and orthogonal alignment conditions. The Delete and End keys from a 
normal keyboard were always assigned to the left hand. For the right hand, 7 and 8 (horizontal 
alignment) or PageDown and PageUp (orthogonal alignment) were used. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Subjects. Forty first-year psychology students (twenty subjects per 
condition) at Ghent University participated for course requirements and 
credit. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-
handed, and all were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the alignment conditions. 
Materials. Stimuli were the digits 1–9, excluding 5. Subjects were 
required to judge either the magnitude of the digit (smaller or larger than 
five) or its parity (odd or even). Responses were registered by means of the 
numeric pad of a standard keyboard. Two sets of response keys were 
defined, and each set was assigned to a different hand. One hand was used 
for pressing the task-selection keys; the other hand was used for pressing the 
task-execution keys. The specific assignment of the task-selection and task-
execution keys depended on the alignment condition (see Figure 2).  
Procedure and design. Subjects were tested by means of Pentium III 
personal computers with a 17-inch color monitor. All experimental 
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procedures reported in this paper were administered using the Tscope C/C++ 
library (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). Each 
session lasted for approximately 45 minutes. After subjects signed an 
informed consent, instructions were presented on screen and paraphrased if 
necessary. The instructions concerning unpredictability of voluntary task 
switches were the same as those used by Arrington and Logan (2005).  
On each trial, a probe (‗?‘) was presented 5 mm above the centre of 
the screen. When subjects pressed a task-selection key, the probe 
disappeared and was followed 400 ms later by the stimulus, which appeared 
5mm below the centre of the screen. Stimuli were selected in such a way that 
the task-execution responses were repeated on 50% of the trials. The 
stimulus remained on screen until subjects responded to the selected task or 
until a maximal response time of 2,500 ms elapsed. The probe of trial n 
appeared 50; 300; 1,000 or 1,500 ms after the presentation of the stimulus of 
trial n-1. SPI varied on a trial-to-trial basis. Subjects were assigned randomly 
to two alignment conditions, which differed in the overlap in response codes 
between task-selection and task-execution responses.  
Subjects first performed two practice blocks of 64 trials, followed by 
four experimental blocks of 256 trials. In the first practice block, the 
familiarization of the procedure of selecting and executing the different tasks 
was emphasized. In the second practice block, the random generation of the 
tasks was emphasized. In order to make the subjects more aware of their 
selection behavior, the warning ‗do not forget to switch tasks‘ appeared for 
1,000ms whenever the subjects repeated a task four times in a row; when the 
subjects switched between tasks four times in a row the warning ‗do not 
forget to repeat tasks‘ appeared for 1,000ms. The task-selection feedback 
was presented in the second practice block only.  
During the entire experiment, subjects received on-line feedback about 
their performance. A red screen appeared for 50ms when they made an error 
on the target. When they were too slow to select a task (> 2,500ms), the 
sentence ‗no task selected‘ was presented. Following each block (practice 
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and experimental) a general summary about the performance during that 
block was presented. This feedback consisted of the mean reaction times on 
the targets, the percentage of errors, the selection percentage of each task, 
the percentage of failures to select a task, and the percentage of task 
repetitions and task switches. If necessary, subjects were corrected. They 
were urged to switch more or repeat more, when the proportion of repetitions 
or switches was above .70, respectively. They were urged to make fewer 
errors when percentage of errors was above 15%, and to respond faster when 
mean task-execution reaction time was above 1,200 ms or when the 
proportion of trials without a task-indication response was above 10%. 
Finally, they were urged to be more random when they selected a particular 
task on more than 75% of the trials.  
RESULTS 
For the analyses of task-selection proportions, only trials on which a 
task was selected and trials following trials with a correct task-execution 
response were used. Also trials following exact stimulus repetitions were 
excluded in order to avoid aftereffects of stimulus repetitions. This resulted 
in the loss of 21.1% of the trials. All analyses in this study are based on 
MANOVAs, the reported F-values are approximations to Wilks‘ lambda. 
Several task-switching studies have demonstrated that response-sequence 
effects on task execution can be influenced by the transition of the task. For 
example, on task-repetition trials, a response-repetition benefit is observed, 
whereas on task-switch trials, this benefit is typically no longer observed and 
even a response-repetition cost is found (e.g. Kleinsorge, 1999; Schuch & 
Koch, 2004). For that reason, in the present study we included task transition 
of trial n-1 in the analyses of the task-repetition proportions. The analyses 
concerning the task-execution latencies and error rates do not belong to the 
main concern of this study; for completeness, they are presented in Appendix 
A.  
The proportion of task repetitions was subjected to a 2 (alignment: 
horizontal vs. orthogonal) by 4 (SPI: 50; 300; 1,000 vs. 1,500ms) by 2 (task 
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transition on trial n-1: task repetition vs. task switch) by 2 (response 
transition on trial n-1: response repetition vs. response alternation) mixed 
MANOVA with repeated measures on the last three factors. Mean 
proportions are presented in Figure 3. We found that the task-repetition bias 
on trial n was influenced by execution-response repetitions on trial n-1: the 
proportion of task repetitions on trial n was higher when trial n-1 was an 
execution-response repetition (M=.646, SE=.02) than when trial n-1 was an 
execution-response alternation (M=.615, SE=.02), F(1,38)=15.85, p<.01, 
ηp
2
= .29. The task-repetition proportions were also influenced by task 
transition on trial n-1: the proportion of task repetitions on trial n was lower 
when trial n-1 was a task repetition (M=.486; SE=.02) than when it was a 
task switch (M=.775; SE=.02), F(1,38)=256.87, p<.01, ηp
2
= .87. The 
interaction between response transition and task transition on trial n-1 was 
significant, F(1,38)=6.09, p=.02, ηp
2
= .14, indicating that the effect of a 
response transition was stronger when trial n-1 was a task repetition than 
when it was a task switch (Figure 3). Planned comparisons showed that the 
response-sequence effect was significant following task repetitions, 
F(1,38)=12.44, p<.01, ηp
2
= .25, and marginally significant following task 
switches, F(1,38)=3.96, p=.05, ηp
2
= .09. This interaction between response 
transition and task transition can possibly be linked to the interaction 
between task transition and response transition that we found on the task-
execution latencies (Appendix A): consistent with previous research (see e.g. 
Schuch and Koch, 2004), a response-repetition advantage was observed 
when repeating tasks, which transformed into a response-alternation 
advantage when switching tasks (see Table A1). The main effect of SPI was 
also reliable, F(3,36)=14.22, p<.01, ηp
2
= .54, indicating that task-repetition 
proportions were larger the shorter the SPI (SPI-50ms: M=.660, SE=.02; 
SPI-300ms: M=.645, SE=.02; SPI-1,000ms: M=.625, SE=.02; SPI-1,500ms: 
M=.592, SE=.02). No other effects or interactions were significant.   
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Figure 3: Proportion of task repetitions as a function of SPI, task transition on trial n-1, and 
task-execution response transition on trial n-1, for Experiment 1. TR=task repetition on trial 
n-1; TS=task switch on trial n-1. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
With respect to task-selection RTs, we were only interested in the 
main effect of SPI
2
. This main effect was significant, F(3,37)=542.95, p<.01, 
ηp
2
= .98, indicating that RTs were faster the longer the SPI (SPI-50ms: 
M=1146, SE=26; SPI-300ms: M=895, SE=28; SPI-1,000ms: M=388, SE=12; 
SPI-1,500ms: M=378, SE=15). 
                                                     
2
 In the main text we did not report these latency data in the same way as for the 
task-repetition proportions because we would need a five-way MANOVA (i.e., 
‗response properties trial n-1’ x ‗task-switch properties trial n-1‘ x ‗task-switch 
properties trial n‘ x SPI x mapping condition). The theoretical relevance of this 
analysis for the interpretations of the selection proportions—which are our main 
focus—is low. The main effect of SPI obtained with this MANOVA was significant 
and did not differ from the main effect reported in the main text. 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 1 were straightforward. Subjects repeated 
tasks more than they switched and this bias decreased with longer SPIs. Of 
central importance for the present study is that the proportion of task 
repetitions on trial n was higher when the task-execution response of trial n-2 
was repeated, than when the task-execution response alternated on trial n-1. 
In other words, repetition of task-execution responses on trial n-1 resulted in 
a higher amount of task repetitions on trial n. Another important finding is 
that this effect was strong following a task repetition and was seriously 
reduced following a task-switch trial. The strength of the sequence effect did 
not depend on the alignment condition. The theoretical implications of these 
findings will be discussed in the General Discussion. 
Opposed to the expectations, the response-sequence effects were not 
affected by SPI. This observation seems to suggest that response sequences 
can bias task selection independently of the efficiency of top-down control. 
However, according to Poulton‘s (1982) asymmetric-transfer hypothesis it is 
possible that when factors (e.g. SPI) are manipulated in within-subject 
designs a strategy that is adopted in one condition transfers to the other 
conditions where this strategy would normally not be adopted. A possible 
way to investigate this is to vary SPI as a between-subjects variable, and this 
is exactly what we did in Experiment 2. Two SPIs were used, namely the 
two extreme values used in Experiment 1 (50ms vs. 1,500ms). A comparison 
of the course of the response-sequence effects in Experiment 1 and 2 over 
different SPIs can help us to understand the nature of the sequence effects. A 
replication of the response-sequence effects that are independent of SPI in 
Experiment 2 would support the idea that response sequences indeed have a 
structural effect on task selection independent of the time available for this 
selection and of the strength of top-down control. If a different course of the 
response-sequence effect over SPIs is observed in Experiment 2, this would 
support the idea that this effect depends on the involvement of strategies. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
Subjects. Eighty first-year psychology students at Ghent University 
participated for course requirements and credit. They were randomly 
assigned to the four cells that resulted from the factorial design of the two 
SPI and two alignment conditions. This resulted in twenty subjects per cell. 
Subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, all 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and none of them had 
participated in Experiment 1.  
Materials and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1 
except for the following: we used the two extreme values of SPI from 
Experiment 1 (50ms vs. 1,500ms). There were two experimental blocks of 
256 trials.  
 
RESULTS 
The same exclusion criteria as in Experiment 1 were applied. This 
resulted in the loss of 22.6% of the trials. The analyses concerning the task-
execution latencies and error rates are presented in Appendix B.  
Task-repetition proportions were subjected to a 2 (alignment: 
horizontal vs. orthogonal) by 2 (SPI: 50ms vs. 1,500ms) by 2 (task transition 
on trial n-1: repetition vs. switch) by 2 (response transition on trial n-1: 
repetition vs. alternation) mixed MANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last two factors. Mean proportions are presented in Figure 4. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that the proportion of task 
repetitions was higher when trial n-1 was an execution-response repetition 
(M=.649, SE=.02) than when it was an execution-response alternation 
(M=.610, SE=.02), F(1,76)=39.65, p<.01, ηp
2
= .35. Also, the proportion of 
task repetitions was higher after a task switch (M = .746; SE=.02) than after 
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a task repetition (M = .513; SE=.02), represented by a main effect of task 
transition, F(1,76)=132.82, p<.01, ηp
2
= .63. The interaction between task 
transition and response transition was significant, F(1,76)=34.02, p<.01, 
ηp
2
= .36. The effect of response repetitions on task proportions was observed 
following a task repetition, F(1,76)=67.48, p<.01, ηp
2
= .48, but not following 
a task switch, F<1.  
Figure 4: Proportion of task repetitions as a function of SPI, task transition on trial n-1, and 
task-execution response transition on trial n-1 for Experiment 2. TR=task repetition on trial n-
1; TS=task switch on trial n-1. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
The main effects of alignment, F(1,76)=5.80, p<.05, ηp
2
= .07, and 
SPI, F(1,76)=8.19, p<.01, ηp
2
= .10, were significant. The task-repetition bias 
was higher in the orthogonal alignment (M=.671, SE=.02) than in the 
horizontal alignment condition (M=.588, SE=.02). Also, the task-repetition 
bias was higher in the SPI-50ms (M=.679, SE=.02) than in the SPI-1,500ms 
condition (M=.580, SE=.02). The factor response transition interacted with 
SPI, F(1,76)=4.46, p<.05, ηp
2
= .06, suggesting that the sequence effect was 
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more pronounced when SPI was short. Planned comparisons showed that the 
effect of response transition was significant in the SPI-50 ms, F(1,76)=35.35, 
p<.01, ηp
2
= .32, and in the SPI-1,500ms condition, F(1,76)=8.76, p<.01, 
ηp
2
= .10. Finally, the three-way interaction between task transition, response 
transition and SPI was reliable, F(1,76)=10.10, p<.01, ηp
2
= .12. Figure 4 
shows that the interaction between task transition and response transition is 
more pronounced in the SPI-50ms than in the SPI-1,500ms condition. No 
other interactions were significant with the highest F-value for the 
interaction between SPI and alignment condition, F(1,76)=1.80, p=.18, ηp
2
= 
.02. 
In the task-selection RTs the main effect of SPI again was 
significant
3
, F(1,78)=578.23, p<.01, ηp
2
= .88, indicating that RTs were much 
faster in the SPI-1,500ms (M=318, SE=18) than in the SPI-50ms condition 
(M=946, SE=18). 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 are for the most part in line with the 
results of Experiment 1. A task-repetition bias was observed that was 
stronger when SPI was short. The response-sequence effect was replicated 
and we again observed that this effect was stronger following task repetitions 
than following task alternations. Also, we replicated the finding that the 
strength of the response-sequence effect did not depend on the alignment 
condition. However, in contrast with Experiment 1 the alignment of the 
                                                     
3
 As in Experiment 1, the main effect of SPI observed with a five-way MANOVA 
(i.e., ‗response properties trial n-1’ x ‗task-switch properties trial n-1’ x ‗task-switch 
properties trial n‘ x SPI x mapping condition) was identical to the effect of SPI that 
is reported in the main text. 
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responses affected the general tendency to repeat tasks. We have yet no 
explanation for this inconsistency.  
Interestingly, in contrast with Experiment 1, the size of the response-
sequence effects in Experiment 2 depended on the length of the SPI. 
Namely, these effects were stronger in the short than in the long SPI 
condition. In line with Poulton‘s (1982) argumentation, the observation that 
the course of the sequence effect over SPIs depends on how SPI is 
manipulated (within- vs. between-subjects) supports the idea that the size of 
this effect depends on the use of strategies. These findings will be discussed 
in the General Discussion. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present study, we investigated whether voluntary task selections 
were influenced by sequences of preceding actions. To obtain a direct 
measurement of task-selection processes uncontaminated by task-execution 
processes of the selected task we used a double-registration procedure for 
VTS. This procedure was introduced by Arrington and Logan (2005; 
experiment 6) to provide a clean measure of the processes involved when 
selecting tasks voluntarily. The main goal of the present study was to 
investigate that by introducing an additional response in double registration, 
new sequential effects are induced. 
In both experiments we found that sequences of preceding actions can 
affect a task choice, even when a double-registration methodology is used 
and in conditions in which sufficient time is provided to select a task 
voluntarily. We observed that tasks were repeated more when preceded by a 
task-execution response repetition than when preceded by a response 
alternation. We also observed that this response-sequence effect was reduced 
strongly (Experiment 1) and even eliminated (Experiment 2) when both 
responses were given in the context of a different task.  
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In our view, this finding can help us to understand the mechanisms 
behind these sequence effects because it suggests that a task repetition was 
not primed by the response itself but by the stimulus category with which 
this response was associated. In the task-switching literature, a stimulus 
category often is interpreted as the meaning of the response when 
performing a particular task (e.g. Meiran, Chorev & Sapir, 2000, Schuch & 
Koch, 2004). In the present study, left responses were associated with the 
stimulus categories, ‗smaller than five‘, or ‗odd‘, while right responses were 
associated with the stimulus categories, ‗larger than five‘, or ‗even‘. Only 
when both consecutive responses were executed in the context of the same 
task, they were also associated with the same stimulus category. More 
evidence for the formation of such associations can be found in the task-
execution latencies (Appendices A and B). We found that response 
repetitions were faster than response alternations when the task was 
repeated, while response alternations were faster than response repetitions 
when the task was switched (e.g. Schuch & Koch, 2004). In our view, the 
finding that response repetitions only primed a task repetition when both 
responses represented the same stimulus category seems to suggest that not 
response repetitions but stimulus-category repetitions primed the selection of 
a task repetition. Possibly, the observed sequence effects can be related to 
the effect of task-irrelevant stimulus repetitions on the number of task 
repetitions as observed in Demanet et al. (in press). Together with the 
present results, these effects suggest that a task repetition in VTS can be 
primed by repetitions of events in the environment. The finding that the 
sequence effects in the present study were not modulated by the alignment of 
the responses supports this conclusion and suggests that the sequence effects 
were not caused by temporary associations between task-selection and task-
execution responses (e.g. Elsner & Hommel, 2004).  
Regarding the impact of the length of the SPI on the strength of the 
sequence effects, the results of both experiments were less consistent. While 
SPI did not modulate the sequence effects when manipulated as a within-
subjects factor in Experiment 1, SPI had a strong impact when it was 
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manipulated as a between-subjects factor in Experiment 2. This finding 
indicates that the size of the sequence effects can depend on the use of 
strategies (Poulton, 1982). When SPI is always very short (SPI-50, 
Experiment 2), the efficiency of top-down control is reduced and the 
sequence effects are strong
4
. When SPI is always long (SPI-1,500, 
Experiment 2) top-down control is very efficient and contributes strongly to 
task selection and the sequence effects are counteracted. The observation 
that SPI had no influence on the sequence effects in Experiment 1 and that 
these effects were relatively small compared to the SPI-50ms condition in 
Experiment 2, implies that when the length of SPI is unpredictable, subjects 
invest more top-down control for voluntary task selection independent of the 
SPI. In other words, in Experiment 1, the strategy to select tasks 
intentionally and to avoid sequence effects seems to transfer from the SPI-
1,500ms condition to the other conditions. In general, these findings clearly 
indicate that the relative contribution of top-down control and external 
factors in task selection can depend on strategic modulations.  
In both experiments, we also found a substantial task-repetition bias 
which reduces with longer SPIs. This is consistent with previous studies of 
VTS (Arrington & Logan, 2004; 2005), and supports the idea that top-down 
processes are necessary to overcome the tendency the repeat tasks (e.g. 
Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, in press). Surprisingly, 
we observed that more tasks were repeated when preceded by task switches 
than by task repetitions. In other words, this indicates that people seem to 
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 We also investigated the possibility that the stronger sequence effects in the SPI-50 
condition in Experiment 2 were caused by the fact that the SPI on trial n-1 was 
always 50ms and that therefore the idea of a repetition was more accentuated than in 
Experiment 1. An extra analysis indicated that the length of the SPI on trial n-1 did 
not affect the size of the sequence effects in Experiment 1, F<1, which disconfirms 
this hypothesis. 
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avoid switching two trials in a row. Possibly, this finding can be related with 
the findings of Lien and Ruthruff (2008). Recently, they observed that when 
subjects were asked to switch voluntarily between three tasks they have a 
reluctance of switching back to the recently disengaged task (i.e., there were 
fewer ABA sequences than ABC sequences). These authors argued that this 
effect was due to persisting task-set inhibition, also called backward 
inhibition (e.g. Mayr & Keele, 2000). Possibly, the tendency to avoid two 
consecutive task switches in the present study could also be due to this 
persisting inhibition.  
However, in a recent study of Vandierendonck, Demanet, Liefooghe, 
and Verbruggen (submitted) a model was developed that suggests that task 
selection depends on automatic retrieval of chains of task information from 
long-term memory. In this study, it was found that the repetition bias and the 
avoidance to switch two times in a row depends on the way task sequences 
are stored in and retrieved from long-term memory and not on persisting 
task-set inhibition.  
To conclude, our results support the idea that a voluntary task choice, 
even in a double-registration procedure is never truly voluntary but is always 
the result of an interaction between bottom-up influences and top-down 
processes. Information in the environment guide a task choice, but this 
influence can be overruled by top-down control (Arrington, 2008; Ach, 
1910/2006). The present study also indicates that the efficiency of these top-
down processes to counteract bottom-up influences can be modulated by the 
use of strategies. 
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APPENDIX A 
For reasons of completeness we briefly report the results concerning 
the task-execution responses of Experiment 1. In the RT analysis, only trials 
on which a task was selected, correct trials and trials following correctly 
selected and executed trials were considered. In analogy with the analysis of 
the selection proportions, the trials with stimulus repetitions were excluded. 
This resulted in a loss of 26.2% of the trials. RTs were analyzed by means of 
a 2 (alignment: horizontal vs. orthogonal) by 2 (task transition: task 
repetition vs. task switch) by 2 (response transition: response repetition vs. 
response alternation) mixed MANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
two factors. We found a significant main effect of task transition, 
F(1,38)=46.73, p<.01, ηp
2
= .55. Task switches (M=731ms, SE=22) were 
slower than task repetitions (M=632ms, SE=14). The effect of response 
transition was reliable, response repetitions were slower (M=689ms, SE=17) 
than response alternations (M=674ms, SE=17), F(1,38)=13.87, p<.01, ηp
2
= 
.27. Task transition interacted with response transition, F(1,38)=69.84, 
p<.01, ηp
2
= .65. Switch costs were higher on response repetitions than on 
response alternations, and on task repetitions a response-repetition advantage 
was observed which transformed into a task-alternation advantage on a task 
switch (Table A1). Other effects were not significant. 
For the error rates, only trials on which a task was selected and trials 
following correctly selected and executed trials were considered. Error rates 
were analyzed in a similar way. More errors were made during task switches 
(M=8.8%, SE=.9) than during task repetitions (M=6.6%, SE=.7), 
represented in a reliable effect of task transition, F(1,38)=22.98, p<.01, ηp
2
= 
.38. Also the effect of response transition was reliable, F(1,38)=68.14, 
p<.01, ηp
2
= .64. More errors were made on response repetitions (M=9.3%, 
SE=.8) than on response alternations (M=6.1%, SE=.7). The interaction 
between task transition and response transition was significant, 
F(1,38)=20.83, p<.01, ηp
2
= .35. Planned comparisons showed a 
disadvantage of response transitions on task switches, F(1,38)=55.15, p<.01, 
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ηp
2
= .59, and an advantage on task repetitions, F(1,38)=10.36,p<.01, ηp
2
= 
.21. No other effect or interaction was reliable.  
 
Table A1: Task-execution RTs and Error Rates as a function of response alignment, response 
transition and task transition for Experiment 1. Standard Errors are presented in Italic. 
 Horizontal Alignment Orthogonal Alignment 
 Response 
Repetition 
Response 
Alternation 
Response 
Repetition 
Response 
Alternation 
 RT Error RT Error RT Error RT Error 
Task 
Repetition 
608 
18  
8.5 
1.0 
625 
20 
6.9 
1.0 
633 
18  
6.1 
1.0 
662 
20  
5.1 
1.0 
Task 
Switch 
765 
33 
13.0 
1.5 
703 
30 
7.8 
1.2 
750 
33 
9.6 
1.5 
706 
30 
4.8 
1.2 
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APPENDIX B 
For Experiment 2, the same exclusion criteria were used for 
calculating RTs and error rates as in Experiment 1. This resulted in a loss of 
28.8% of the trials. As in Experiment 1, task-execution RTs and error rates 
were analyzed to check for the effect of task transition and response 
transition on the task-execution responses itself. Task-execution RTs and 
error rates were analyzed by means of a 2 (alignment: horizontal vs. 
orthogonal) by 2 (task transition: task repetition vs. task switch) by 2 
(response transition: response repetition vs. response alternation) mixed 
MANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors. The RTs 
confirmed the significant effect of task transition, F(1,78)=87.20, p<.01, 
ηp
2
= .53. Task switches (M=711ms, SE=14) were slower than task 
repetitions (M=626ms, SE=9). The interaction between task transition and 
response transition was reliable, F(1,78)=29.71, p<.01, ηp
2
= .28. A response-
repetition benefit when repeating a task changed into a response-alternation 
benefit when switching tasks (Table B1). This was confirmed through 
planned comparisons for task repetitions, F(1,78)=10.89, p<.01, ηp
2
= .12, 
and task switches, F(1,78)=20.86, p<.01, ηp
2
= .21. Also, the interaction 
between task transition and alignment was reliable, F(1,78)=4.57, p=.04, 
ηp
2
= .06, showing that switch costs were higher with a horizontal than an 
orthogonal alignment. No other interactions were significant with the highest 
F-value for the interaction between response transition and alignment, F<1.  
More errors were made on task switches (M=10.1%, SE=.7) than on 
task repetitions (M=7.5%, SE=.5), represented by a reliable main effect of 
task transition, F(1,78)=34.86, p<.01, ηp
2
= .31. The interaction between task 
transition and alignment, F(1,78)=3.87, p=.05, ηp
2
= .05, was marginally 
significant, indicating that the effect of task transition was stronger in the 
horizontal than in the orthogonal alignment (Table 2). The main effect of 
response transition was significant, F(1,78)=40.18, p<.01, ηp
2
= .34; response 
repetitions (M=10.13%, SE=.6) were more error prone than response 
alternations (M=7.4%, SE=.7). The significant interaction between task 
transition and response transition, F(1,78)=25.72, p<.01, ηp
2
= .25, shows a 
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response-repetition disadvantage when switching tasks (Table B1) and no 
effect of response transition when repeating tasks. This was confirmed by 
planned comparisons on task repetitions, F<1, and task switches, 
F(1,78)=50.55, p<.01, ηp
2
= .39. No other interactions were significant; 
highest F-value for the three-way interaction between task transition, 
response transition and alignment, F<1. 
 
Table B1: Task-execution RTs and Error Rates as a function of response alignment, response 
transition and task transition for Experiment 2. Standard Errors are printed in Italic. 
 Horizontal Alignment Orthogonal Alignment 
 Response 
Repetition 
Response 
Alternation 
Response 
Repetition 
Response 
Alternation 
 RT Error RT Error RT Error RT Error 
Task 
Repetition 
629 
13  
7.6 
.7 
644 
14 
7.1 
.9 
606 
13  
7.5 
.7 
625 
14  
7.6 
.9 
Task 
Switch 
766 
21 
13.3 
1.3 
718 
19 
8.3 
1.0 
700 
21 
12.1 
1.3 
663 
19 
6.5 
1.0 
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A CHAIN-RETRIEVAL MODEL FOR VOLUNTARY TASK 
SWITCHING 
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1
 
 
To account for the findings obtained in voluntary task switching, it 
was hypothesized that random task selection involves retrieval of task 
information from long-term memory, and that the retrieved information 
guides task selection and task execution. This was formalized in the chain-
retrieval model, which is based on retrieval of acquired sequences of tasks 
from long-term memory. To test this model, sequences of tasks (magnitude 
and parity judgment) and the corresponding transition sequences (task 
repetitions or switches) were analyzed with the help of dependency statistics. 
Task sequences showed an immediate repetition bias followed by an 
alternation bias, whereas transition sequences only showed an immediate 
alternation bias. The model parameters were estimated on both task and 
transition sequences and these estimates were used to predict 
autocorrelations of tasks and transitions. The transition-based fit showed 
better correspondence to the data. Implications for our understanding of 
voluntary task selection and broader theoretical implications are discussed. 
 
                                                     
1
 The first author of this paper is André Vandierendonck, co-authored by Jelle 
Demanet, Baptist Liefooghe and Frederick Verbruggen. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Goal-directed behavior relies on a determination to achieve the current 
goal, but is also adaptive to changes in the environment (e.g., Logan & 
Gordon, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Such changes may require a shift 
to another goal. The task-switching paradigm has been the preferred method 
to study such flexible changes in the laboratory (see Monsell, 2003, for a 
review). Many studies have shown that task switching comes with a cost, 
which has been attributed to task-set reconfiguration processes, interference, 
or both (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Meiran, 
1996, 2008; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). 
It can be doubted, however, whether voluntary choices contribute much to 
the switch cost, because most procedures to study task switching are quite 
restrictive in this respect. These procedures typically instruct the subject 
when to repeat and when to switch. Behavioral flexibility, on the contrary, 
also involves the possibility to choose for a particular course of action or for 
a particular goal. In most task switching procedures, there is no room for 
such task-choice processes. The voluntary task switching (VTS) procedure 
(Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005) is an exception. This specific procedure 
was designed to allow more ‗freedom‘ in choosing or selecting a particular 
task or task goal by giving subjects the freedom to select and execute the 
task of their choice on every trial. This makes it an interesting procedure 
because it not only provides the usual task performance measures but also 
enables investigation of the processes involved in choosing or selecting a 
task to be performed. 
Even though the theoretical importance of understanding the processes 
underlying voluntary choice of courses of action is undisputed, thus far not 
so much is known about these processes. Previous research using the VTS 
procedure has shown that people tend to repeat the same task more often 
than expected on the basis of chance (Arrington & Logan, 2004), and that 
this tendency becomes stronger when the response-stimulus interval (RSI) is 
shorter (Arrington & Logan, 2005). These findings suggest that choosing to 
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perform a task depends on endogenous task selection (see e.g., Arrington & 
Logan, 2005; Arrington & Yates, 2009; Liefooghe, Demanet, & 
Vandierendonck, 2009). However, bottom-up factors also seem to play a role 
as it was shown that task choice is affected by repetition priming (Mayr & 
Bell, 2006), stimulus availability (Arrington, 2008), and processing 
efficiency (Arrington & Rhodes, In press). Furthermore, the presence of a 
working memory load increases the task-repetition bias in the presence of 
bottom-up factors such as stimulus repetitions, repetitions of irrelevant 
events and stimulus-task associations (Demanet, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, in press). 
The present study aims to contribute to our understanding of the 
processes involved in task choice by elaborating and testing a model of task-
choice processes as they occur in VTS. The instructions typically used in 
VTS experiments impose a constraint on task selection by stressing that both 
tasks must be executed about equally often and in random order. As similar 
instructions have been used in previous research on random generation, it 
seems straightforward to expect similar behavior in both situations and to 
hypothesize that the processes underlying generating random series of events 
and random series of tasks are the same. Yet, there is a clear difference in 
choice behavior between the two kinds of procedure both in terms of the 
tasks imposed on the subjects and in terms of the processes involved. 
Random task selection in VTS consistently shows a tendency to repeat the 
same task more often than expected on the basis of chance, whereas random 
generation of events reveals an alternation bias, i.e. a tendency to alternate 
too often between two events and to produce too short runs of repetitions of 
the same event (Lopes, 1982; Lopes & Oden, 1987; Neuringer & Allen, 
1986; Rapoport & Budescu, 1992; Treisman & Faulkner, 1987; Wagenaar, 
1972).  
 Given the fact that the choice instructions used in VTS and in random 
generation are the same, and the hypothesis that the generation process is the 
same in both task settings, there must be other important differences between 
both settings that can account for these distinctive patterns. The most 
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important difference is that in traditional random generation tasks, the goal is 
to generate series of random events, whereas in VTS, the randomly selected 
tasks must also be executed. This difference has two consequences. First, by 
executing the tasks, events that are external to the process of task generation, 
such as repetition priming, may directly interfere with the process of random 
generation. As was already mentioned, in VTS more task repetitions are 
selected under conditions with repetition priming (Mayr & Bell, 2006) and 
this effect is enhanced when top-down control is less efficient by imposing a 
working memory load (Demanet et al., in press). Second, the task selected 
may have an effect on performance. More in particular, one task may be 
experienced as being much easier than another one, which in turn may affect 
the decision to repeat the task or to switch to the other task (Liefooghe, 
Demanet, & Vandierendonck, in press). Third, it is well known from 
research on task switching that task repetitions are much easier than task 
switches, and this is also the case in VTS (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2005). 
Accordingly, subjects may experience that repetitions go easier than 
switches and may thus prefer task repetitions over task switches. 
As an interim conclusion, it seems fair to say that random generation 
and random task selection both involve random selection. In VTS, the 
context in which these random selection processes occur, differs in important 
ways. Understanding the processes underlying task choice in VTS thus 
requires the elaboration of models of random generation that meet the 
additional task settings imposed by VTS. Accordingly, the present study 
aims to elaborate the hypotheses about the processes underlying task choice 
in VTS. The method used to achieve this goal consists of the development of 
a model of random task generation that allows the result of the generation to 
be changed by external events. These models will be compared with other 
models of random generation by applying the models to the data of a VTS 
experiment. 
CHAIN-RETRIEVAL MODEL    103 
MODELING TASK SELECTION PROCESSES 
The long standing tradition of research in human random generation 
has already shown that sequences of events generated by humans show 
robust deviations from a model of statistical independence (e.g., the 
Bernoulli model). For example, generated sequences of coin tosses deviate 
from independence by the presence of an alternation bias, as already 
mentioned. Models of human random generation have tried to account for 
this in different ways.  
A first approach to account for statistical dependence uses Markov-
type models. The model of Budescu (1987) and some related models have 
been proposed to specifically predict statistical dependence in the form of 
perseveration (i.e., repetition bias) and alternation (Vandierendonck, 2000a). 
Although such models— in particular those that can predict perseverations—
could be useful to describe what goes on in VTS, it will become clear later in 
this article that these models are insufficient to account for task choice 
processes. It seems likely that task choice in VTS depends on several factors 
for which a more elaborate model is needed.  
A second approach that has been followed is exemplified in the model 
developed by Rapoport and Budescu (1997). According to this model, events 
are generated while a monitoring process follows within a window of a 
particular width whether the generated sequence looks random. When the 
monitoring process detects a deviation from this subjective idea of 
randomness, the next event will be selected so that randomness is restored 
within the window. This model provides an excellently fitting description of 
human random generation behavior. Application of the model of Rapoport 
and Budescu to task choice in VTS leads to some difficulties, though. For 
one thing, the model predicts a tendency to alternate, whereas task choice in 
VTS is characterized by a tendency to repeat. Under the hypothesis that 
external occurrences occasionally provoke task repetitions, a task repetition 
bias could ensue. However, the monitoring mechanism will detect such 
occurrences as deviations from the person‘s randomness conception, and this 
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will result in corrective action so that in the end an alternation tendency will 
still be present. In other words, even though bottom-up events could occur, 
monitoring and subsequent correction will still result in an alternation bias. 
Clearly, the problem arises because the monitoring mechanism of the model 
inspects retrospectively the recent part of the sequence; with a proactive 
mechanism this difficulty could be avoided.  
In what follows, we describe a model of task selection in VTS. For 
such a modeling effort to be successful, it should take into account results 
from earlier studies of random generation as well as results from studies of 
VTS. 
MODELING ASSUMPTIONS 
The proposed model builds on the hypothesis that random task 
selection in VTS and random generation are based on a common 
mechanism. The subjective notion of randomness as specified in the model 
of Rapoport and Budescu (1997) is taken as a sufficient basis for generating 
random sequences with an alternation bias. We further adopt the hypotheses 
that (1) task performance difficulty affects the outcomes of the random 
generation mechanism and (2) that bottom-up events such as repetition 
priming (Mayr & Bell, 2006) intrude into the outcome of random generation 
such that cognitive control does not efficiently block these intrusions 
(Demanet et al., in press). We first elaborate the processes involved in 
random generation and subsequently describe how the outcome of this 
process can be modified in VTS. 
For the instantiation of the random generation mechanism, we propose 
that the selected tasks are retrieved from long-term memory (cf. Baddeley, 
1996). More specifically, we propose that tasks are retrieved from long-term 
memory (LTM) in chunks (or strings of tasks), so that task selection is based 
on a retrieval of the task name from LTM (cf. Schneider & Logan, 2007), 
and that associative chaining or chunking of task names occurs. During the 
initial phases of the experiment, task chunks such as BAA, BAB and BBA 
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are formed and become more strongly associated with practice. Having just 
executed task A, this event will prime chunks that start with an A, and so 
chains such as ABB, ABA and AAB may become active. 
The chains that are formed and applied during the experimental 
session may be biased by a number of factors. First, we assume that the 
instruction to be random imposes a restriction, so that chains with too many 
repetitions will be avoided (as in the model of Rapoport & Budescu, 1997). 
This will result in storing and strengthening chains such as ABBAB rather 
than ABBBB, and this effect may be amplified by feedback that is presented 
during the training phase with the aim of ensuring that the instructions are 
followed. Second, we assume that the instruction that both tasks must occur 
approximately an equal number of times will result in strengthening of 
sequences that do not violate this balance. This results in a preference for 
sequences such as ABBAA and ABBAB over AABAA and ABBBB. Third, 
we also assume that the application of the generated chain of tasks to the 
targets may have implications for preferences among chains (e.g., Liefooghe 
et al., in press). As already explained, the experience of the difference in 
difficulty between task switches and task repetitions may bias the selection 
towards chains with more repetitions, which would lead to a preference of 
chains like AAABB over AABAB. Fourth, we assume that the size of the 
chains is constrained by working memory capacity. As a retrieved chain has 
to be maintained in short-term memory during a number of trials, the 
maximal length of a chain will normally be within working memory 
capacity. Even though the chain may be coded as an entity (a chunk), it is 
important to keep track of the progress when the chain is applied and this 
necessitates a decoding of the chunk. 
MODEL ELABORATION 
These assumptions are now elaborated in a formal model. We will 
define three parameters, m, p, and r, that express quantitatively the operation 
of underlying processes. 
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The first parameter, m, is related to working memory capacity and 
specifies the maximal length of the chains retrieved from LTM
2
. We assume 
that the minimum length is 3. Of course, chains of two elements are possible, 
but chains of this length do not allow enough variability: only AB and BA 
are balanced sequences, and because such sequences do not contain 
repetitions, a repetition bias based on experience with the easier repetitions 
cannot develop. Therefore, we adopted 3 as the lower limit. Table 1 displays 
the sequences that are possible at each of the lengths 3-6. The sequences 
considered are balanced in the sense that the two tasks occur  times in 
the sequences with an even length and occur minimally  times and 
maximally  times in odd numbered sequences (this is similar to the 
procedure used by Logan, 2004, in the task span procedure).  This way, both 
tasks will be selected approximately equally often. At the same time, also the 
requirement of randomness is realized because all the sequences in the table 
are those that are usually judged as looking random (see also Rapoport & 
Budescu, 1997) as these sequences show, on average, a tendency to 
alternate, which is shown in Table 1 in the column labeled ‗# Rep‘. 
  
                                                     
2
 In view of the considerations that have led us to the concept of chains of task 
names, it is likely that the actual size of the chains would increase during the initial 
practice session and further on through the experimental session.  However, because 
of lack of information about this hypothesized process and about the development of 
the changes through a session, we make the simplified assumption that m is constant 
throughout the experiment and takes a value between 3 and 6. 
 
m / 2
m / 2
m / 2 1
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Table 1. Overview of the balanced sequences of tasks A and B that are possible at lengths 3-6. 
The corresponding sequences of transitions (R = repetition; S = switch) are also displayed as 
well as the number of repetitions in the sequence. 
Length 3  Length 4 
Tasks Transitions # Rep  Tasks Transitions # Rep 
AAB RS 1  AABB RSR 2 
ABB SR 1  ABBA SRS 1 
ABA SS 0  ABAB SSS 0 
Length 5  Length 6 
Tasks Transitions # Rep  Tasks Transitions # Rep 
AAABB RRSR 3  AAABBB RRSRR 4 
AABBB RSRR 3  AABBBA RSRRS 3 
AABBA RSRS 2  AABBAB RSRSS 2 
AABAB RSSS 1  AABABB RSSSR 2 
ABBBA SRRS 2  ABBBAA ARRSR 3 
ABBAA SRSR 2  ABBAAB SRSRS 2 
ABBAB SRSS 1  ABBABA SRSSS 1 
ABABB SSSR 1  ABAABB SSRSR 2 
ABAAB SSRS 1  ABABBA SSSRS 1 
ABABA SSSS 0  ABABAB SSSSS 0 
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The second parameter, p, is related to the strength of a chain. We 
assume that all the sequences of a particular length m (as presented in Table 
1) are stored in LTM. In order to model the variability in the retrieval of 
chains, each chain is supposed to have a strength that determines its 
likelihood of being retrieved. This likelihood depends on the value of a 
parameter p, which is the probability of a repetition in the stored sequence (1 
- p is the probability of a switch). The larger the value of p, the larger will be 
the probability of selecting a chain that contains one or more repetitions. In 
other words, p represents a bias towards more repetitions. This way, the 
consideration is implemented that experience with execution of the tasks 
(repetitions are easier than switches) will influence the retrieval of task 
chunks. The parameter p can now be used to define the strength of each 
chain as , where w is the weight or strength of the chain and 
R and S are respectively the numbers of repetitions and switches in the chain. 
The sequence AABB, for example, contains two repetitions and one switch: 
thus . Let W be the sum of the weights w of all the sequences 
in the set, the probability to select a particular sequence i with weight is 
then . 
The third parameter, r, is related to bottom-up priming. We assume 
that with a probability r an event occurs that triggers an action intruding at 
this particular point in the sequence. We assume that the r parameter could 
account for the task-repetition bias typically observed in VTS
3
. Several 
choices as to what happens with the already selected chain are possible; in 
the present model, execution of the retrieved chain continues after the 
                                                     
3
 Even though the p parameter may also lead to more repetitions, its efficiency in 
this respect is limited in that a value of p above 0.5 only helps to select chains with 
more repetitions.  The intrusions that occur with probability r add additional 
repetitions to the generated sequence. 
 
w pR(1 p)S
w p2(1 p)
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wi /W
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intrusion. The importance of this choice will be addressed in the General 
Discussion. 
Thus far this chain-retrieval model specifies that short balanced 
sequences (chains) avoiding too many repetitions are stored in memory and 
have a strength that determines the probability of being selected. However, 
Table 1 indicates that the pool of chains defined this way is biased towards 
alternations, whereas previous findings suggest a repetition bias in VTS. We 
can account for the latter finding in two ways. First, experience with task 
difficulty will lead to a preference (parameter p) for chunks with more 
repetitions (Liefooghe et al., in press). A second way to achieve more task 
repetitions is by assuming that bottom-up intrusions will occur (with a 
probability r) in the form of task repetitions. This is in line with the nature of 
the bottom-up events reported in the literature (Demanet et al., in press; 
Mayr & Bell, 2006). 
The description above focused on how the retrieval of individual 
chains is modeled. Two further issues must be decided, namely the content 
of the chains and how the chains are coupled to form a continuous sequence. 
First, we deal with the issue as to how the individual chains are linked 
together to produce fluent behavior over a longer run of trials. The most 
straightforward way is to simply concatenate the retrieved chains. However, 
a simple concatenation, such as AABB followed by ABAB will create an 
additional transition at the point of linking (AABBABAB). In some cases, 
this will be a switch, in other cases a repetition. Because this coupling 
method creates unpredictable events, it is not very useful as a mechanism in 
a formal model. Therefore, another way of coupling task chains is needed. It 
seems plausible that the last task performed primes the start of the next chain 
(e.g., Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998), so that the next 
retrieved chain will start with the same task that ended the chain. The 
spurious transition that occurs in concatenation can now be avoided by 
assuming that the chains are merged, so that the common task at the junction 
is selected only once. Given the selected chains ABBA and AABB, the 
connected sequence will be ABB(A)ABB, where the A between parentheses 
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shows the merging of the two events. This will result in three repetitions and 
three switches, without inserting additional transitions. 
The second issue we need to address is the content of the chunks in 
LTM. It seems natural to suppose that the chains learned and stored in LTM 
are chains of task names. Recent evidence from registration of event-related 
potentials in VTS (Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in 
press) suggests that subjects have a bias to repeat the previous task, 
overruling this bias on switch trials. This could indicate that transitions 
rather than tasks are selected. Also in the model proposed here, information 
about the difficulty of the transitions is needed for the selection of chains 
with more easy transitions (repetitions). Another argument in support of this 
idea is that in a task-switching context, subjects will quickly learn that they 
have to repeat the task or that they have to switch to the other task. By 
storing chains of transitions, the chain contains the information which is 
relevant for preparation for the upcoming task. A third argument is that after 
retrieval of the transition chain, the load on working memory is smaller 
because a chain of transitions contains less events than an equivalent chain 
of tasks.  
In view of all these arguments, it could be decided to develop two 
versions of the model, one where the chains contain task names and another 
version where the chains contain transitions. In comparison with the version 
where the chains contain tasks, for the version where chains contain 
transitions it is useful to assume that the chains are simply concatenated and 
not merged. This is because simple concatenation of the retrieved chains of 
transitions would not result in a sequence in which extra transitions are 
added. For example, concatenation of RSR to SSS results in RSRSSS, which 
contains exactly the same transitions as the component chains. Even though, 
it is on a theoretical level possible to distinguish the two versions of the 
chain-retrieval model, they share the same parameters so that an empirical 
distinction between these versions is not easy to obtain. However, because 
the model based on task chains produces sequences of task choices, it 
predicts sequences of tasks, whereas the model based on transition chains 
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predicts sequences of transitions. This provides the possibility to test the 
model in two ways, namely by fitting the model to sequences of tasks and by 
fitting it to sequences of transitions. In view of all this, we focus on only one 
possibility, namely the chain-retrieval model; it will be tested twice, once on 
tasks and once on transitions. 
In sum, the formalization developed in the previous paragraphs 
specifies a number of constraints on the psychological processes expressed 
in the three free parameters (m, p, r). This description of the model suggests 
it is possible to build similar models with slightly different assumptions. 
Appendices A and B contain an overview of other possibilities and how they 
fare when used to fit actual data. As all these variations result in poorer fits 
and/or predictions, we do not consider them in the main text. In the next 
sections, we apply the model to choice data obtained in an experiment. First, 
we describe the experiment and its results. Next, we apply the model to these 
data. 
EXPERIMENT 
In this section, we report the results of an investigation of task 
selections in VTS. In order to obtain task selections which are maximally 
independent of task execution, we used the double-registration procedure 
described by Arrington and Logan (2005, Exp. 6). In this procedure, each 
trial consists of two parts. First, a probe (‗?‘) is presented, instructing the 
subjects to indicate which task they will perform. Second, a stimulus is 
presented, to which the selected task must be applied. Only the first response 
(task indication) is of interest in the present context. 
METHOD 
Subjects  
Eighty first-year psychology students at Ghent University participated 
for course requirements and credit. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-
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normal vision, were right-handed, and all were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to two conditions (forty 
subjects per condition) that differed in the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
of the stimulus and the probe (see below). 
Materials  
Stimuli were the digits 1-9, excluding 5. Subjects were required to 
classify the digits either on the basis of their magnitude (smaller or larger 
than five) or their parity (odd or even). Responses were registered by means 
of the numeric pad of a standard keyboard. One hand was used for pressing 
the task-selection keys; the other hand was used for pressing the task-
execution keys. 
Procedure  
Although we only need the task-selection data, we describe the 
complete procedure of data collection, which served other purposes that are 
not relevant to the present endeavor (Demanet, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, 
& Verbruggen, under revision). Pentium III personal computers with a 17-
inch color monitor running the Tscope C/C++ library (Stevens, Lammertyn, 
Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006) were used. Each session lasted for 
approximately 45 minutes. After subjects signed an informed consent, 
instructions were presented on screen and paraphrased if necessary. The 
instructions concerning unpredictability of voluntary task switches were the 
same as those used by Arrington and Logan (2005), namely that each task 
should be performed about equally often and that the sequence should form a 
random order as in coin tossing. 
On each trial, a probe (‗?‘) was presented in a square 5 mm above the 
centre of the screen. This probe disappeared when subjects pressed one of 
the task-selection keys. This was followed 400 ms later by the appearance of 
the target stimulus, 5 mm below the centre of the screen. The target 
remained on screen until subjects responded on the basis of the previously 
selected task or until a maximal response time of 2,500 ms elapsed. The 
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probe of trial n appeared either 50 ms (short SOA condition) or 1,500 ms 
(long SOA condition) after the presentation of the stimulus of trial n-1. 
After two practice blocks of 64 trials, subjects performed two 
experimental blocks of 256 trials. In the first practice block, the emphasis 
was on familiarization of the procedure of selecting and executing the 
different tasks. In the second practice block, the emphasis was on random 
generation of the tasks. In order to increase subjects awareness of their 
selection behavior, the warning ‗do not forget to switch tasks‘ was shown for 
1000 ms whenever the subjects selected the same task four times in a row. 
When the subjects switched between tasks four times in a row, the warning 
‗do not forget to repeat tasks‘ appeared for 1,000 ms. This task-selection 
feedback was presented in the second practice block only. 
During the entire experiment, subjects received on-line feedback 
about their performance. A red screen appeared for 50 ms when they made 
an error on the target. When they were too slow to select a task (RT > 2,500 
ms), the message ‗no task selected‘ was displayed for 1,500 ms. Following 
each block (practice and experimental), a general summary about the 
performance during that block was shown. This feedback included the mean 
reaction times on the targets, the percentage of errors, the selection 
percentage of each task, the percentage of failures to select a task, and the 
percentage of task repetitions and task switches. If necessary, subjects were 
corrected: they were urged to switch more or to repeat more when the 
proportion of repetitions or switches was above .70, to make fewer errors 
when percentage of errors was above 15%, to respond faster when mean 
task-execution reaction time was above 1,200 ms or when the proportion of 
trials without a task-indication response was above 10%, and to be more 
random when they selected a particular task on more than 75% of the trials. 
Data analysis 
The analysis focuses on the series of task choices and task transitions. 
Such sequences of random events are often summarized by using a runs 
statistic, which yields a proportion of the runs of the same event at a series of 
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lengths. As the task choices and the transitions within the sequence of tasks 
are binary events, the sequence of events can be expressed as a series of 
binary digits (0 or 1). A sequence of tasks is a series of task names; using the 
letters M (magnitude judgment) and P (parity judgment), an example of a 
series of selected tasks may be MMPMPPM. Similarly, the letters R 
(repetition) and S (switch) can be used to describe a sequence of transitions. 
To convert the sequence to binary values, M can be recoded as 1 and P as 0 
(or vice versa) and R can be coded as 1 and S as 0 (or vice versa). 
The runs statistic (Sternberg, 1959a; Vandierendonck, 2000a), can be 
defined as follows 
  
 
(1), 
 
where N is the number of events in the complete sequence and is the 
proportion of runs with length k in which = 1. Consider a sequence like 
‗0110111010100011‘, where the target outcome is coded 1. The number of 
runs of length 1 equals the number of 1s in the sequence, which is 9 (code 1 
occurs 9 times). Runs of length 2 consist of two consecutive 1s; there are 
four such groups of 1s in the sequence. Runs of length 3 consist of three 
consecutive 1s; there is only one such group. By dividing these counts by the 
number of possible runs of a particular length, a proportion is obtained for 
each length. Although the runs statistic captures deviations from 
independence, it is not particularly sensitive in detecting very small 
deviations from independence because the values become smaller as the run 
length increases (see example). However, the statistic is useful because it 
captures deviations from statistical independence in both directions: when 
there are more repetitions, there will be fewer short and more long runs, and 
when there are more alternations, the opposite pattern will occur (relatively 
more short and fewer long runs).  
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In addition to the runs statistic, we used the autocorrelation statistic 
(Sternberg, 1959a; Vandierendonck, 2000a), which is very sensitive to 
deviations from independence, and therefore useful to make a more fine-
grained analysis of the data. This statistic expresses the tendency for pairs of 
events in the sequence to correlate with each other. The pairs of events that 
are considered can be close together or further apart (short or long lag).  
The autocorrelation statistic lag k ( ) is defined as 
 
 (2), 
 
The correlation expresses the probability that both elements in the pair 
(separated by lag k) are the same. When lag is 1, for example, the 
autocorrelation expresses the probability that the current event is the same as 
the previous one. Considering the example we had before 
‗0110111010100011‘, the autocorrelation lag 1 looks at all occurrences of 
two consecutive 1s; there are 4 of these. Actually, by definition this is the 
same as runs of length 2. The autocorrelation lag 2 looks at two occurrences 
of a 1 separated by another (not relevant) outcome. The triplets to consider 
are 011, 110, 101, 011, 111, 110, 101, 010, 101, 010, 100, 000, 001, 011 and 
there are only four cases out of these 14 where the first and the third element 
are both 1. The autocorrelation statistic is a measure that is sensitive to 
statistical dependencies based on learning to repeat an event: the 
autocorrelation will tend to be larger when a learning process governs the 
production of the events in the series (Sternberg, 1959a, 1959b). Application 
of the statistic requires that one task is coded 1 and the other 0. By applying 
the statistic twice to the sequence of task choices, once with Magnitude 
coded as 1 (Parity 0) and once with Parity coded as 1 (Magnitude 0), the 
joint outcome specifies all correlations in the data. This joint outcome is 
complementary to all tendencies to alternate instead of to repeat. Hence, the 
statistic applied in this way is sufficient to describe all deviations from 
independence. 
ck
ck
1
N k
xi
i 1
N k
xi k
116     CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
The entire data analysis will be performed in two steps. In the first 
step, the analysis focuses on the sequence of task choices; in the second step, 
on sequences of transitions. The analyses of the runs and the autocorrelation 
statistic are reported separately. Each statistic is calculated on the task 
sequence with magnitude coded as 1 and a second time with parity code as 1. 
The average of these two calculations is entered into the analysis.  
Focus on tasks 
For the magnitude task, the 2 x 256 task selections of each subject 
were coded 1 when magnitude was selected and 0 otherwise (parity or no 
selection). Similarly, for the parity task, the selections were coded 1 when 
parity was selected and 0 otherwise. About 1% of the trials were non-
selections. Due to the coding, non-selections did not contribute to the run 
length or the autocorrelation data. 
These data were used to calculate the proportion of runs of lengths 1-
10 and autocorrelations at lags 1-10. Per statistic, the multivariate general 
linear model was applied to the data on the basis of a 2 (SOA: 50 or 1,500 
ms) x 2 (Task: magnitude vs. parity) x 10 (Lengths or Lags) factorial design 
with repeated measures on the last two factors. For all analyses, α = .05, 
unless otherwise mentioned. In order not to overload the report with an 
enumeration of statistical tests, the outcomes of the complete analyses are 
presented in Table 2; only the effects that are central to our main purpose are 
reported in the text.  
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Table 2. Results of the analyses of variance of the proportions of runs and autocorrelations in 
the task-based analysis on the basis of a 2 (SOA: 50 vs 1,500 ms) × 2 (Task: magnitude vs 
parity) × 10 (Lengths/Lags 1-10) factorial design with repeated measures on the last two 
factors. 
  Runs  Autocorrelations 
Effect df  F  ηp
2 
 F  ηp
2 
SOA (S) 1,78  8.2 ** .09  1.0  .01 
Task (T) 1,78  34.1 *** .30  40.2 *** .34 
Lag (L) 9,70  7108.6 *** 1.00  27.0 *** .78 
T x L 9,70  4.6 *** .37  .6  .07 
S x T 1,78  3.1  .04  .7  .01 
S x L 9,70  2.0 † .20  1.5  .16 
S x T x L 9,70  1.6  .17  1.0  .12 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; † p = .051 
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Runs. Figure 1 (top) displays the runs proportions as a function of 
task, run length and SOA. On average, the selection proportions of 
magnitude and parity were 0.48 and 0.51 respectively. As can be seen in 
Table 2, run proportions depended on task, length, and SOA. Proportions of 
runs were higher for the parity task (M = .13) than for the magnitude task (M 
= .11), and they decreased with run length. Run proportions were smaller 
when SOA was long (.10 for long versus .13 for short SOA). Length 
interacted with task and with SOA. The drop in the proportions was less 
steep for the parity task and for short SOA. This shows that there was a 
tendency to repeat the parity task more than the magnitude task and also a 
tendency to repeat tasks more at short than at long SOA. 
Autocorrelations. The autocorrelations are shown in Figure 1 
(bottom) as a function of task, lag and SOA. Only the effects of task and lag 
were reliable (see Table 2). Figure 1 shows that the correlations start high 
and then quickly drop off and stabilize from lag 5 on. Overall, 
autocorrelations were lower in lags 2-4 (M = .22) than in lags 7-9 (M = .24), 
F(1,78) = 23.76, ηp
2
 = 0.23. This contrast interacted with SOA, F(1,78) = 
6.47, ηp
2
 = 0.08. The contrast was smaller at short (.22 vs. .23) than at long 
SOA (.21 vs. .25). These findings show that there is a rather strong repetition 
tendency (autocorrelation) at lag 1, but that in lags 2-4, the autocorrelation is 
rather weak. This suggests that a tendency to immediately repeat the task is 
soon followed by one or more switches.  
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Figure 2.  Transition-based analysis of task choices.  Top Panel: Proportion of runs 
length 1-10 as a function of SOA (50 vs.  1,500 ms) and transition (repetition vs.  
switch).  More frequent and longer runs of repetitions occur in the short SOA 
condition.  Bottom Panel: Proportions of autocorrelations lag 1-10 as a function of 
SOA (50 vs.  1,500 ms) and transition (repetition vs.  switch).  At lag 1 the 
proportion of correlations is lower than at the later lags, where it is quite stable.  
Correlations are higher for repetitions especially at short SOA. 
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Focus on transitions  
In the sequential analysis of the transitions, repeating the same task 
was coded 1 and changing the task or failing to select a task was coded 0; in 
the calculation targeting on switches, changing tasks was coded 1 and 
repeating the same task or failing to select a task was coded 0. In all other 
respects, the same data-analytic method was used as for the analysis 
focusing on task selections. The statistical analyses are reported in Table 3. 
Runs. Transition runs are shown in Figure 2 (top) as a function of 
transition, length and SOA. Clearly, runs of repetitions (M = 0.14) were 
more frequent than runs of switches (M = 0.07) at all lengths
4
. Run 
proportions were only slightly longer on short (M = 0.103) than on long 
SOA (M = 0.102). All interactions were reliable (see Table 3). The dominant 
presence of repetitions confirms the repetition bias at the level of tasks. 
Repetitions were repeated more often than switches especially at short SOA. 
Autocorrelations. Figure 2 (bottom) displays the transition-based 
autocorrelations as a function of transition, lag and SOA. In contrast with the 
task-based autocorrelations, the transition-based autocorrelations seem quite 
stable, except at lag 1. Lag correlations were larger for repetitions (M = .38) 
than for switches (M = .17). They also varied over lags. In particular, 
correlations were lower at lag 1 (M = .22) than at other lags (M = .28), 
F(1,78) = 146.54, ηp
2
 = 0.65. This contrast explains most of the variance 
among the means per lag: r
2
 = .98. Transition and lag interacted, which 
basically corresponds to an interaction of transition with the contrast 
between lag 1 and lags 2-10, F(1,78) = 72.20, ηp
2
 = 0.48. Transition was also 
involved in an interaction with SOA, as displayed in Figure 2. Finally, the 
                                                     
4
 Proportions of repetitions and switches are inversely proportional.  For this reason 
they should not be entered together in an ANOVA.  This does not apply to 
proportions of runs of repetitions and switches. 
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triple interaction of SOA, transition and lag was also significant. Repetitions 
are selected more often than switches and therefore repetitions also tend to 
be repeated more than switches. However, for both, repetitions and switches, 
this tendency is smaller at lag 1 than at longer lags, where transitions rather 
show a pattern of independence, but repetitions are still repeated more than 
switches. 
Table 3. Results of the analyses of variance of the proportions of runs and autocorrelations in 
the transition-based analysis on the basis of a 2 (SOA: 50 vs. 1,500 ms) × 2 (Tasks: 
magnitude vs. parity) × 10 (Lengths/Lags 1-10) factorial design with repeated measures on 
the last two factors. 
  Runs  Autocorrelations 
Effect df  F  ηp
2
  F  ηp
2 
SOA (S) 1,78  4.4 * .05  2.8  .03 
Trans(T) 1,78  26.8 *** .26  55.1 *** .41 
Lag (L) 9,70  9424.5 *** 1.00  20.5 *** .72 
T x L 9,70  37.9 *** .83  9.25 *** .54 
S x T 1,78  8.5 ** .10  6.1 * .07 
S x L 9,70  2.2 * .22  1.3  .14 
S x T x L 9,70  6.5 *** .46  5.4 *** .41 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 2.  Transition-based analysis of task choices.  Top Panel: Proportion 
of runs length 1-10 as a function of SOA (50 vs.  1,500 ms) and transition 
(repetition vs.  switch).  More frequent and longer runs of repetitions occur in 
the short SOA condition.  Bottom Panel: Proportions of autocorrelations lag 
1-10 as a function of SOA (50 vs.  1,500 ms) and transition (repetition vs.  
switch).  At lag 1 the proportion of correlations is lower than at the later lags, 
where it is quite stable.  Correlations are higher for repetitions especially at 
short SOA. 
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Discussion  
The task-based analysis revealed that both the proportions of runs of 
lengths 1-10 and the autocorrelations lag 1-10 depended on task and on 
SOA. An immediate task repetition bias was followed by more alternations 
in the lag 2-4 window and by a stabilization of the autocorrelation from lags 
5-6 on. Thus, the task-repetition bias reported in the literature (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004, 2005) was confirmed, but the present study showed that this 
bias is rather a local effect mainly present at lag 1. The presence of more 
alternations in lags 2-4 is consistent with the observation of Lien and 
Ruthruff (2008) that task repetitions at lag 2 (i.e., ABA and BAB) are 
avoided.  
In a second step, we focused on sequences of transitions. This analysis 
indicated that proportions of runs of lengths 1-10 depended on SOA and 
transition, whereas autocorrelations at lags 1-10 depended on SOA, 
transition and their interaction. In sum, the sequential analysis based on the 
transitions confirms that repetitions are the more frequent kind of transition, 
but any kind of transition shows a tendency to be followed by the other kind 
of transition so that a rather weak (local) alternation bias is present. 
MODEL TESTING 
In this section, we report the results of the model tests performed on 
the data that are reported in the previous section and that are representative 
of findings in other VTS studies. As already explained, the chain-retrieval 
model could work with chains of tasks and then it would predict task choices 
or it could work with chains of transitions and then it would predict 
transition selections. Therefore, we report two different tests of the chain-
retrieval model. In the first test, we will use the information in task-run 
proportions to fit the model parameters and use these to predict 
autocorrelations. The second test is completely similar, but will be based on 
transition-run proportions to fit the model parameters. The results of the two 
tests will then be compared and discussed.  
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Pr(xi ) a (1 a)q
Each test follows the same sequence of analyses. First, we will present 
the results of fitting the chain-retrieval model to runs proportions obtained in 
the experiment. In order to provide an additional context for comparison, 
also the results of the statistical independence (Bernoulli) model and two 
dependency models are presented. One of these statistical dependency 
models is the perseveration model (Vandierendonck, 2000a). It assumes that 
with probability a the previous event is repeated and if no such repetition 
occurs, with probability q an event is sampled independently from the 
previous event: 
 
           (3), 
 
where Pr(xi) refers to the probability that a certain event (x) occurs at time i, 
a represents the probability that the previous event is repeated (perseverates) 
and q is the probability that the present event is sampled independently from 
the previous trial. The second dependency model is the alternation model 
(Vandierendonck, 2000a). This model is also based on equation (3): with 
probability a an alternation occurs (i.e., the previous event is not repeated) 
and if no alternation occurs, with a probability q an event is sampled 
independently from the previous event.  
In a next step, the parameter estimations obtained in these fits of the 
four models (chain retrieval, Bernoulli, perseveration and alternation) will be 
used to predict the autocorrelations for sequences of tasks and sequences of 
transitions. After this phase of global model testing, more specific tests of 
the chain-retrieval model will be reported. To that end, each of the free 
parameters will in turn be clamped to a particular value and the other 
parameters will be estimated resulting in new fits and new predictions. 
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TASK-BASED TEST  
Model fitting and parameter estimation 
First we used the run proportions of the task-based data analysis to 
estimate the parameters of the task-chain retrieval model and the three 
comparison models, namely the statistical independence model, the 
perseveration model and the alternation model. Because the data of each 
individual subject are sufficient to fit the models, the runs data of each 
subject were used to estimate the free parameters of the best fitting model for 
that subject. The fits per subject could then be entered in statistical analyses 
comparing the merits of the models
5
. 
For the Bernoulli model, the single parameter was estimated 
separately for the magnitude task and the parity task data on the basis of the 
observed runs proportions length 1-10 and the degree of fit was calculated 
by comparing the predictions of the runs proportions on the basis of the 
estimated parameters with the observed values by means of formula (3). For 
the other models, a univariate search method (Brent, 1973) was used on the 
                                                     
5
 This procedure has several advantages over the alternative procedure based on 
fitting the models on the between-subject average of runs.  First, the processes 
described in the chain retrieval model and also those of the other dependency 
models are constrained by the skills and capacities of each subject.  This variability 
is given the best chance by using individual data.  Second, the between-subject 
average of the runs statistics does not adequately represent the processes that 
resulted in the generated random sequences.  It is easy to imagine that the average 
runs of a subject generating a sequence with a repetition bias and another subject 
generating a sequence with an alternation bias will show either a very small bias or 
no bias at all. 
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basis of the same data. On each step of the iteration, the current parameter 
values were used to generate a sequence of 50,000 tasks. On the basis of this 
generated sequence, estimated runs for the magnitude task were calculated. 
Next the sequence was converted (0 was recoded to 1 and 1 to zero) to 
calculate the estimated runs for the parity task. The sum of squared 
differences between the estimated and the observed runs proportions of the 
10 lengths in both tasks was then used as a goodness-of-fit measure,  
 
 (4),  
 
where is the observed proportion of runs at length i and is the 
estimated proportion of runs at length i. The search procedure would then 
sample new parameter values and start a new step. This continues until a 
minimum is obtained. By performing the estimation jointly for the two tasks, 
the characteristic of random succession of the two tasks is captured in the 
parameter fit. The search procedure finds a local minimum in a very efficient 
way. In order to maximize the chance of finding the global minimum, the 
search procedure was applied ten times with random starting values. In the 
application for the task-chain model, this estimation procedure was repeated 
for each of the values 3-6 of m. Per subject, the value of the three parameters 
of the best fitting model was then selected. 
Table 4 displays the fit and the estimated parameters of the four 
models. This table shows that the average fit over all subjects was quite good 
for each of the models, except for the alternation model. The fit of the task-
chain retrieval was, however, much better than that of the other models: all t-
tests comparing the fit of this model with the other models were significant. 
This significantly better fit to the task run proportions of the chain-retrieval 
model is interesting in that it suggests that the model better captures the 
relevant information in the data; however as the model has more free 
parameters, additional tests will be needed to show that the model is really 
better than the other ones.  
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Table 4. Comparison of the chain-retrieval model to statistical independence and dependence 
models in the task-based test. For each model variant the following results are shown: 
goodness-of-fit of the estimation (Fit), t-test of the difference with the chain-retrieval model, 
the estimated free parameters, goodness-of-prediction of the autocorrelation statistics 
(Prediction), and t-test of the difference of this prediction with the prediction of the chain-
retrieval model. The parameter p of the independence and dependence models is the 
probability of occurrence of the target task. In the parameter r column, for the perseveration 
and alternation models, the probability of respectively, a perseveration and an alternation, is 
shown. Further explanations in the text. 
Models Fit t(78) m p r Prediction t(78) 
Chain retrieval 0.005  3.95 0.60 0.31 0.012  
Statistical  
independence 
0.013 2.64  0.53  0.027 4.28 
Perseveration 0.008 2.58  0.49 0.16 0.031 8.88 
Alternation 0.061 3.60  0.47 0.05 0.064 5.35 
 
As an additional test of the goodness of fit, we tested whether the 
estimated parameter values captured differences between the subjects due to 
a short versus long SOA between the previous target and the present probe 
stimulus in the experiment. The estimated values of parameters m and p did 
not depend on the SOA, but the value of the r parameter did: with short SOA 
the parameter value was larger (M = 0.38) than with long SOA (M = 0.23), 
F(1,78) = 14.30, p < .001, ηp
2
 =.15. This is consistent with the assumption 
that r represents the probability of intrusions which would be expected to 
occur more often at short SOA because of the larger repetition bias at short 
SOA (Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005). Similarly, the estimated parameter 
of the Bernoulli model was larger (.55) with short than with long (.50) SOA, 
F(1,78) = 7.83, p < .01, ηp
2
 =.09, which is also a way to capture the more 
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frequent repetitions under short SOA. In the perseveration model, only the 
perseveration parameter was sensitive to SOA, with a larger perseveration 
tendency at short (.22) than at long (.10) SOA, F(1,78) = 8.11, p < .01, ηp
2
 
=.09. This is again consistent with the findings of a larger repetition 
tendency at short SOA. In the alternation model, the alternation parameter 
was not, but the general probability was sensitive to SOA with a smaller 
probability at short (.45) than at long (.48) SOA, F(1,78) = 5.67, p < .05, ηp
2
 
=.07. As the alternation parameter can only capture task alternations, the 
only way for this model to cope with the difference due to SOA is by having 
a larger general probability. This also shows that the alternation model is not 
really suited to account for these data. 
Model predictions 
The estimated parameters of these four models were used to predict 
the autocorrelation statistic for both the task data and the transition data. In 
order to keep task and transitions statistics equivalent in terms of number of 
events, lags 1-10 were used for the task data and lags 1-9 for the transition 
data. In order to calculate the predictions of the models, also a sequence of 
50,000 events was generated and the predicted statistic was calculated from 
this sequence. In order to obtain transition statistics, the generated sequence 
was converted to transitions, once with focus on repetitions and once with 
focus on switches. The correspondence of the predictions and the data is 
shown in Figure 3 for the predictions of the task autocorrelations (top) and 
the transition autocorrelations (bottom). The outcomes of the statistical tests 
of this correspondence are displayed in Table 4 in the column labeled 
‗Prediction‘. Figure 3 illustrates that the task-chain retrieval model yielded 
the best correspondence between predictions and data, and this was 
confirmed by the significant difference with each of the other models (Table 
4). When applied to data that are more sensitive to deviations from statistical 
independence than the runs statistic, it seems that the chain retrieval model 
significantly better accounts for these deviations than the other dependence 
models.  
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Figure 3.  Observed and predicted proportions of autocorrelations lag 1-10 in 
the task-based tests.  Top Panel: Besides the observed task choice 
autocorrelations, the predictions of the chain-retrieval, the Bernoulli, the 
perseveration and the alternation models are shown.  The predictions of the 
chain-retrieval model seem to correspond best with the data.  Bottom Panel: 
Observed transition autocorrelations and predictions by the same models.  The 
figure shows lags 1-10, although for the predictions only 9 lags were used.  The 
predictions of the chain-retrieval model seem to correspond best with the data. 
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Model validation 
As the model has three free parameters, it is also important to know 
whether each of the parameters is indispensable. To that end, each of the 
parameters in turn was clamped and with one parameter fixed, new 
estimations of the other two parameters were obtained. Table 5 and Figure 4 
show that in the absence of bottom-up triggering of repetitions (r = 0), in the 
absence of a preferential retrieval of chains with repetitions (p = 0.5), and 
with a minimal working memory capacity (m = 3), the fit and the predictions 
were dramatically worse. This shows that all these parameters and the 
underlying processes are needed to account for the data. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of the fixed-parameter versions and the free parameter version of the 
chain-retrieval model in the task-based test. For each model variant the following results are 
shown: goodness-of fit of the estimation (Fit), t-test of the difference with the free-parameter 
chain-retrieval model, the estimated parameters, goodness-of-prediction of the autocorrelation 
statistics (Prediction), and t-test of the difference of this prediction with the prediction of the 
full-parameter chain-retrieval model. Further explanations in the text. 
Models Fit t(78) m p r Prediction t(78) 
Chain retrieval 
full version 
0.005  3.95 0.60 0.31 0.012  
Chain retrieval 
 m = 3 
0.006 5.29 3.00 0.55 0.38 0.015 5.02 
Chain retrieval 
p = 0.5 
0.007 6.18 3.95 0.50 0.36 0.014 3.44 
Chain retrieval 
r = 0.0 
0.032 2.23 5.35 0.77 0.00 0.031 4.21 
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Figure 4.  Observed and predicted proportions of autocorrelations lag 1-10 in the 
task-based test.  Top Panel: The predictions of the task choice autocorrelations 
by the full chain-retrieval model (3 parameters) and of the three versions with 
the value of one parameter clamped to a neutral value.  The predictions of the 
complete chain-retrieval model correspond best with the data.  Bottom Panel: 
Same for the transition autocorrelations lag 1-10.  The figure shows lags 1-10, 
although for the predictions only 9 lags were used.  The predictions of the chain-
retrieval model seem to correspond best with the data. 
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Discussion 
The chain-retrieval model seems quite promising when fitted to 
sequences of tasks. Compared to the statistical independence model and 
existing statistical dependence models, both the parameter fit to the runs 
proportions and the predictions of the autocorrelation statistic yielded a 
better correspondence to the data than each of these other models. In a final 
test designed to investigate whether the processes underlying the three free 
parameters are all involved in achieving this good correspondence, each of 
the parameters in turn was clamped to a neutral value so as to exclude or to 
minimize the role of the underlying process. These analyses indicated that all 
three parameters of the model and the underlying processes are important in 
achieving the good correspondence with the data. Other assumptions for the 
underlying processes of the model were also investigated; these are reported 
in Appendix A. The appendix shows that changing the present assumptions 
does not seem to improve the chain-retrieval model fitted to task sequences. 
TRANSITION-BASED TEST 
Model fitting and parameter estimation 
The same procedure was followed to estimate the best fitting 
parameters of the chain-retrieval model on the basis of the proportions of 
transition runs and it was compared with the fits of the three comparison 
models on the same data. In order to use an equivalent amount of data, runs 
lengths 1-9 were used for parameter estimation. The procedure used was 
otherwise the same as the one used in the task-based test. Table 6 displays 
the fit and the free parameters obtained. Fits to the transition run proportions 
were very good for all four models, and in fact the fit of the chain-retrieval 
model was only significantly better than the fit of the perseveration model 
and was not reliably different from the fit of the other two models. These 
results indicate that all four models were efficient in capturing the 
information available in the sequence of transitions. 
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Table 6. Comparison of the chain-retrieval model to statistical independence and dependence 
models in the transition-based test. For each model variant, the following results are shown: 
goodness-of fit of the estimation (Fit), t-test of the difference with the chain-retrieval model, 
estimated free parameters, goodness-of-prediction of the autocorrelation statistics 
(Prediction), and t-test of the difference of this prediction with the prediction of the chain-
retrieval model. The parameter p of the independence and dependence models is the 
probability of occurrence of the target task. In the parameter r column, for the perseveration 
and alternation models, the probability of respectively, a perseveration and an alternation, is 
shown. Further explanations in the text. 
Models Fit t(78) m p r Prediction t(78) 
Chain retrieval 
full version 
0.008  4.29 0.65 0.26 0.009  
Statistical  
independence 
0.013 0.79  0.52  0.026 5.00 
Perseveration 
 
0.008 0.10  0.55 0.02 0.031 9.43 
Alternation 
 
0.061 3.20  0.72 0.31 0.064 5.57 
 
We also analyzed the values of the parameters of the four models in 
relation to the design factor SOA. Parameters m and p of the transition-chain 
model did not depend on the SOA between the previous target and the 
present probe stimulus, but the value of the r parameter did: with short SOA, 
the r parameter value was larger (M = 0.30) than with long SOA (M = 0.22), 
F(1,78) = 4.34, p < .05, ηp
2
 =.05. This again shows that the larger repetition 
tendency at short SOA can be accounted for by the presence of more bottom-
up triggered repetitions at short SOA. Similarly, the estimated parameter of 
the Bernoulli model was larger (.55) with short than with long (.50) SOA, 
F(1,78) = 7.79, p < .01, ηp
2
 =.09; this captured the stronger repetition bias at 
short SOA. In the perseveration model, only the general probability 
parameter was sensitive to SOA, with a larger value at short (.58) than at 
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long (.51) SOA, F(1,78) = 7.57, p < .01, ηp
2
 =.09. That the general 
probability changes with SOA, is also indicative of a rather poor fit of this 
model, because with a good fit, the perseveration parameter should capture 
this information. In the alternation model, neither of the parameters was 
sensitive to SOA. This also suggests that this model does not capture 
important aspects of the data. 
Model predictions 
The estimated parameters were next used to predict the transition 
autocorrelations (lags 1-9) and the task autocorrelations (lags 1-10). 
Important differences in the correspondence of predictions and data of the 
four models were observed. Table 6 and Figure 5 both show that the 
correspondence between data and predictions was best for the chain-retrieval 
model. This model‘s predictions were significantly better than those of each 
of the three comparison models, which all demonstrated rather bad 
correspondence to the data. 
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Figure 5.  Observed and predicted proportions of autocorrelations lag 1-10 
in the transition-based test.  Top Panel: Besides the observed task 
autocorrelations, the predictions of the chain-retrieval, the Bernoulli, the 
perseveration and the alternation models are shown.  The predictions of the 
chain-retrieval model seem to correspond best with the data.  Bottom Panel: 
Observed transition autocorrelations and predictions by the same models.  
The figure shows lags 1-10, although for the predictions only 9 lags were 
used.  The predictions of the chain-retrieval model seem to correspond best 
with the data. 
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Model validation 
In order to test the role of the processes underlying the three free 
parameters, each of the parameters was in turn clamped to a neutral value. 
With this value fixed, a new fit was obtained with the remaining parameters. 
On the basis of these fits, predictions for the autocorrelation statistic were 
calculated. Table 7 shows the comparisons of these three versions of the 
model with the full-parameter model. Clearly, the fits and the predictions of 
these restricted models are all worse than those of the full-parameter model. 
Figure 6 shows that these predictions deviate strongly from the 
autocorrelation data and from the predictions of the full-parameter model. 
These findings show that the processes underlying the three free parameters 
all contribute to the model‘s predictions. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of the fixed-parameter versions of the chain-retrieval model to the full-
parameter version in the transition-based test. For each model variant the following results are 
shown: goodness-of fit of the estimation (Fit), t-test of the difference with the transition-chain 
model, estimated free parameters, goodness-of-prediction of the autocorrelation statistics 
(Prediction), and t-test of the difference of this prediction with the prediction of the chain-
retrieval model. Further explanations in the text. 
Models Fit t(78) m p r Prediction t(78) 
Chain retrieval 
full version 
0.008  4.29 0.65 0.26 0.009  
Chain-retrieval 
m = 3 
0.014 4.68 3.00 0.62 0.37 0.014 5.78 
Chain-retrieval 
 p = 0.5 
0.021 5.50 4.03 0.50 0.37 0.013 5.99 
Chain-retrieval 
r = 0.0 
0.061 2.23 5.31 0.76 0.00 0.025 4.32 
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Figure 6.  Observed and predicted proportions of autocorrelations lag 1-10 
in the transition-based test.  Top Panel: The predictions of the task 
autocorrelations by the full chain-retrieval model (3 parameters) and of the 
three versions with the value of one parameter clamped to a neutral value.  
The predictions of the complete chain-retrieval model correspond best with 
the data.  Bottom Panel: Same for the transition autocorrelations lag 1-10.  
The figure shows lags 1-10, although for the predictions only 9 lags were 
used.  The predictions of the chain-retrieval model seem to correspond best 
with the data. 
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Discussion 
The transition-based tests of the chain-retrieval model show that 
although the fits of the model on the transition-run proportions were not 
reliably better than those obtained with the independence and the 
perseveration model, the predictions of the chain-retrieval model were much 
better than the predictions of these other models. Besides, the full-parameter 
model also yielded better fits and better predictions than the restricted 
models with one of the parameters clamped to a neutral value. This suggests 
that the processes underlying these parameters all contribute to the good fit 
of the model. An analysis of changes in other assumptions of the chain-
retrieval model when fitted to transition data is presented in Appendix B. 
None of these changes constitutes an improvement of the model. 
Comparison and discussion 
It was already clear from the empirical data that the task and transition 
sequences contain different information and this is reflected in the fits of the 
chain-retrieval model to these two aspects of the data. A more direct test of 
this tentative conclusion was attempted by comparing the fits and the 
predictions of the model in the two data-sets. In a first analysis, the average 
goodness-of-fit of the chain-retrieval model was not significantly different 
between the task-based and transition-based fits (F < 1). The second analysis 
of variance based on a 2 (Test: task-based vs. transition-based) × 2 (Statistic: 
task vs. transition autocorrelation) design was used to compare the goodness-
of-prediction (the degree of correspondence between observations and 
predictions of autocorrelations as defined in equation 4). Overall, the 
goodness-of-prediction value was smaller (better) in the transition-based 
than in the task-based analysis, F(1,79) = 31.69, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .29. 
Although no overall difference in goodness-of-prediction for the task and the 
transition autocorrelations was observed, this factor interacted with the 
factor test, F(1,79) = 13.53, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15. This interaction was due to a 
poorer prediction of the task autocorrelations in the task-based test (M = 
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.009) than in the transition-based test (M = .006), while no such clear 
difference was present for the transition autocorrelations (.007 vs. .005). 
These analyses demonstrate that the goodness-of-prediction was 
reliably different between the task-based and the transition-based application 
of the chain-retrieval model, even though the goodness-of-fit did not differ 
across the two applications and related data aspects were used to fit the 
model. This suggests that the transition data contain more useful information 
than the task data. 
Given that there is variability in the goodness-of-fit and goodness-of-
predictions in the subject sample, it may be considered that some of the 
subjects rely more on the sequence of tasks, while the other subjects rely 
more on the sequence of transitions. In order to test this, the subjects were 
partitioned according to their goodness-of-fit in the two tests. This resulted 
in a group of 34 with a better goodness-of-fit value in the task-based test 
than in the transition-based test, and a group of 45 that obtained a better 
goodness-of-fit in the transition-based test than in the task-based test. One 
subject was excluded because both fit values were equal. While the average 
goodness-of-fit obtained in the transition-based test tended to be better (M = 
.0009) than the one obtained in the task-based test (M = .0014), the 
difference was not reliable (p > .25). For each subject in the two groups, the 
goodness-of-prediction values obtained with their best fit were subjected to 
an analysis of variance based on a 2 (Test: task-based vs. transition-based) × 
2 (task vs. transition autocorrelations) factorial design with repeated 
measures on the last factor. This analysis revealed a main effect of group 
with a better goodness-of-prediction in the transition-based group (M = .004) 
than in the task-based group (M = .009), F(1,78) = 5.05, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .06. 
This was the only significant effect. The prediction of the transition 
autocorrelation seemed to better in the transition-based group (.003) than in 
the task-based group (.009), F(1,78) = 4.65, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .06. Also the 
prediction of the task autocorrelation was better in the transition-based group 
(.005) than in the task-based group (.009), F(1,78) = 4.83, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .06. 
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These analyses show that even when for each subject in the sample, 
the best fit of the two was selected, the parameter values obtained in the 
transition-based test still yielded better predictions than the parameter values 
obtained in the task-based test. This advantage was present as well in the 
transition autocorrelations as in the task autocorrelations. These findings 
suggest that the information available in the sequence of transitions is more 
useful than the information contained in the sequence of tasks. Interestingly, 
this result is obtained on the basis of a model which is neutral with respect to 
whether task information or transition information is used to feed the task 
selection process. This indicates that transition information is used by a 
majority of the subjects, probably in the chain representations in LTM.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
The objective of the present study was to develop and test a model of 
task choice in VTS. Taking into account findings from earlier work on 
random generation, we hypothesized that subjects acquire chains containing 
task information. In task selection, such chains are retrieved from LTM to 
guide the trial-by-trial choice of tasks. We assumed that working memory 
capacity constrains the length of the chains retrieved, that chains with more 
repetitions tend to be more likely to be retrieved, and that bottom-up 
triggered repetitions intrude into the sequence of task selections made. This 
view was specified in a model with three free parameters corresponding to 
these assumed processes. This model‘s performance was compared with that 
of a statistical independence model (Bernoulli) and with performance of two 
statistical dependence models, one with a repetition bias (perseveration 
model) and one with an alternation bias (alternation model). 
For the purpose of a comparative test of these models, task choice 
sequences were collected. These data were analyzed from two perspectives, 
namely as a sequence of tasks and as a sequence of transitions between 
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tasks. The task-based analysis of these data confirmed the task repetition 
bias in task selection (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2004). However, the 
autocorrelation statistic showed that this bias was only present at lag 1, 
which is consistent with the avoidance of lag-2-repetitions in VTS (Lien & 
Ruthruff, 2008). In other words, when subjects executed task A, there is a 
tendency to immediately repeat task A (lag-1 repetition/autocorrelation), and 
next to switch back and forth between the two tasks (in the lag 2-5 window). 
At longer lags (longer than 5), there is no strong evidence for a statistical 
dependency. 
The transition-based analysis of the choice data showed a dominance 
in the proportion of repetitions, but between the two types of transitions an 
alternation bias was observed. This means that subjects seem to be reluctant 
to keep using the same transition twice in a row.  
Because of these two ways of analyzing the data, the chain-retrieval 
model and the models in the comparative analysis were tested twice, once by 
fitting the model parameters to the task data and once by fitting the model 
parameters to the transition data. In both tests, for most models in the 
comparison an appropriate fit to the runs proportions was obtained. 
However, only the chain-retrieval model produced an adequate 
correspondence between predicted and observed autocorrelations. The 
poorer correspondence of the independence model with the data indicates 
that the task and/or transitions selected by subjects in VTS are not 
statistically independent. The rather poor correspondence of the statistical 
dependence models indicates that the statistical dependence in the subjects‘ 
choices is quite specific and this specificity seems to be adequately 
accounted for by the chain-retrieval model. 
Comparing the two tests, it was noteworthy that although the chain-
retrieval model obtained similar goodness-of-fit in the two situations, the 
predictions in the transition-based test were significantly better than those in 
the task-based test. This suggests that the transition data contain more useful 
information that is picked up in parameter estimation. Taking this one step 
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further, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects in a VTS 
experiment are storing and using the transition information and this could 
explain why the transition-based model fit is able to better grasp the 
statistical properties of the sequence of generated tasks and transitions. The 
present data do not allow a decisive conclusion in this respect, and further 
tests of this hypothesis that transition information rather than task 
information is used in VTS are indispensable to settle this issue. 
The three free parameters of the model correspond to a number of 
hypothesized processes. In order to test whether each of these processes 
contributes to the model‘s performance, each of the parameters in turn was 
clamped to a neutral value while the other two parameters were freely 
estimated. These analyses confirmed that all three hypothesized processes 
are critical to account for the model‘s performance. More specifically, there 
seems to be individual variation in the length of the chains retrieved from 
LTM and maintained in working memory. There also seems to be a 
preference for retrieving chains with more repetitions and bottom-up 
intrusions seem to occur at a certain rate. In fact, it can be imagined that not 
all situations involving a bottom-up priming lead to an intrusion because 
endogenous control processes probably intervene to block some of these 
potential intrusions. We did not include a fourth parameter to model this 
endogenous process, though, because its effects would be completely 
absorbed in the rate at which intrusions do occur. In practice, this means that 
the parameter r can be interpreted as the result of the occurrence of bottom-
up events and the blocking of part of these events by control processes. 
While the present study supports the chain-retrieval model, the 
evidence considered here also has some limitations. For one thing, the model 
test was based on data of only one experiment that used the double-
registration procedure of VTS. It may be objected, therefore, that the validity 
of the model is limited to situations where the task must be explicitly 
indicated before the task stimulus appeared. A similar objection may 
evidently be raised against the empirical part of the present study. Until now, 
many VTS studies used the single-registration methodology in which each 
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task is assigned to a particular hand so that the task selection is apparent 
from the hand used to respond to the target. It is possible that the present 
observations are specific to the double-registration procedure. In order to 
counter this criticism, we analyzed the data of a single-registration VTS 
experiment (Liefooghe et al., 2009). Although the experiment was based on 
a smaller number of subjects (18) and each subject performed only 4 blocks 
of 64 trials, we observed the same pattern of results regarding runs 
proportions and autocorrelations. Taking this into account, it seems that the 
findings reported here can be considered as representative for VTS in 
general. We also applied the task-chain model to these data and even though 
the data were noisier, we replicated the findings that the model yielded 
excellent fits and that the predictions obtained with a transition-based 
parameter estimation were better than those obtained with a task-based 
parameter estimation. This application of the model to data from a single-
registration experiment shows that the findings reported in the present article 
are not specific for the double-registration procedure. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical basis and implications of the 
assumptions we made in developing the chain-retrieval model. This 
discussion considers the assumptions related to the three free parameters. 
The three parameters of the model were introduced to grasp particular 
constraints of the task selection process in VTS. Parameter m was introduced 
to specify the amount of working memory available for this aspect of the 
task. Considering that the retrieved chain has to be kept in working memory 
until all events in the sequence have been used for task execution, the 
allowed length of the sequence is determined by this parameter. The usage of 
this parameter is consistent with a number of findings that have been 
reported in studies in which random generation was used to tax executive or 
cognitive control. In particular, Baddeley et al. (1998), for example, found 
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that the deviation of randomness in generated key presses increased when an 
irrelevant memory load was larger, which shows that maintaining a memory 
load may interfere with cognitive control processes needed for the 
generation task. Several studies have also reported poorer recall on a 
memory task when an unrelated random generation task was performed 
concurrently (e.g., Fisk & Sharp, 2003; Macizo, Bajo, & Soriano, 2006; 
Towse & Cheshire, 2007; Vandierendonck, 2000a, 2000b; Vandierendonck, 
De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998a, 1998b; Vandierendonck, Kemps, 
Fastame, & Szmalec, 2004), suggesting that random generation interferes 
with maintenance of unrelated memory contents. Based on these findings, 
the expectation could be formulated that performing VTS under a memory 
load should result in the usage of shorter chains. However, the impact of a 
memory load depends on working memory capacity. Persons with a larger 
working memory capacity are more able to maintain a load while performing 
another cognitive demanding task (e.g., Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). 
Therefore, the expectation that shorter chains would be used in VTS under a 
memory load would probably mainly affect persons with a low working 
memory capacity. 
Related to the effect of a memory load, it must be considered that such 
a load increases the task-repetition bias (Demanet et al., in press). It is quite 
likely that a memory load sets the stage for more bottom-up intrusions (see 
e.g., Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004); consequently, the r 
parameter is expected to increase when load increases, also because the 
control processes that block upcoming intrusions are expected to be less 
efficient when there is a working memory load. If it is the case that under 
load, task switching would become more difficult, this would also imply that 
a larger p-value would be expected under load than without load. This could 
also imply that low working memory subjects would also be more vulnerable 
to the effects of load and develop a stronger bias towards repetitions. Taken 
together, in an individual differences approach, subjects with larger working 
memory capacity should be observed to generate longer sequences of events, 
and they would be expected to be less vulnerable to bottom-up intrusions. In 
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terms of the modeling, high working memory subjects should show a larger 
value for m and a smaller value for r and p than low working memory 
subjects. 
A second parameter, p, biases the selection of sequences in such a way 
that sequences are more likely to be retrieved when they contain more 
repetitions compared to when they contain more alternations. The inclusion 
of the p parameter in the modeling shows that the probability of retrieving 
particular chains depends on the ease of execution. The values obtained for p 
were clearly above 0.5 (even higher than 0.6) so that it seems that subjects 
were sensitive to the difficulty of the task transitions. If the model would be 
applied to random generation tasks, this parameter would be useless because 
the ease of execution is not relevant. In other words, if in a VTS design 
subjects were not required to execute the chosen tasks, the value of p would 
become irrelevant, and this would result in task selection that is not sensitive 
to the difficulty of switching. In a similar vein, if subjects would not be 
sensitive to the ease of task execution, the value of the parameter would 
probably have been close to 0.5 or it could even have been smaller than 0.5 
which would then reflect a bias towards sequences with switches (e.g., 
Rapoport & Budescu, 1997). 
The good correspondence of the model‘s predictions and the data is 
consistent with the idea that there is a bias towards a selection of sequences 
with more repetitions. How can this be explained? One obvious possible 
explanation relates to the assumption we adopted to motivate the inclusion of 
the p parameter, namely that subjects develop such a bias during task 
execution on the basis of the experience that repetitions are easier to execute 
than switches. Whether subjects indeed develop a bias towards a larger p 
value, is one of the avenues for further research that follows from the present 
modeling attempt. Making switching easier or more difficult to execute 
should affect the value of this parameter. This is in line with Botvinick‘s 
integrative account of the functioning of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(Botvinick, in press). 
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Interestingly, the p parameter may be considered to yield a measure of the 
degree to which repetitions are favored in the selection of tasks. This would 
possibly be a better measure than one often used now, namely the proportion 
of task repetitions in the sequence, because the latter measure not only 
counts generated repetitions but also bottom-up triggered repetitions. A 
drawback of this proposal is that in order to know the value of p the model‘s 
parameters must be estimated, which is time consuming because it involves 
statistical analysis of the task sequence, and parameter estimation. 
The third parameter, r, specifies the probability that a repetition 
intrudes in the generated sequence. The estimated value of r shows that these 
events play an important role as its value suggests that more than 1/4 of the 
trials were affected by it. This parameter was included to account for 
previous findings regarding bottom-up effects in VTS. The parameter value 
also suggests that these kinds of events are happening quite often. This 
confirms the difficulty of remaining in control of task selections while trying 
to avoid to be distracted by exogenous events (Mayr & Bell, 2006). Another 
interpretation of this parameter is that it may reflect execution errors on the 
part of the subjects. Erroneously executing a repetition instead of a switch 
would have the same effect. Given that error rates in task-switching research 
are usually around 5%, errors cannot completely account for the value of r. 
The interpretation that r represents bottom-up intrusions that could not be 
blocked by top-down control mechanisms is also supported by the 
observation that the size of r depended on the SOA between the previous 
stimulus and the present task probe. The value of r was namely larger with a 
short SOA. This is exactly what would be expected if this parameter is 
related to intrusions. On the same count, no such effect is expected for the 
other parameters and this was also confirmed. Further tests of the model 
could include other well chosen design variations, such as the number of 
target repetitions (Mayr & Bell, 2006) or invoked response repetitions 
(Demanet et al., under revision). Data based on such procedural variations 
should lead to larger values for r in conditions that result in more repetitions. 
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It is interesting to note that like the parameter p, the r parameter in the 
model is tightly related to the fact that in VTS task executions are required. 
Two out of three model parameters are directly related to this particular 
feature of VTS, which is not present in typical random generation tasks. This 
should make it clear that although random generation is common to both 
task settings, the requirement to randomly select tasks in VTS is done in the 
service of another goal and is not a goal on its own as in random generation 
tasks. 
The joint effects of the bias towards selecting chains with repetitions 
(p parameter) and the intrusion of repetitions (r parameter) in the chain-
retrieval model, may raise the suspicion that the repetition bias as presently 
modeled is stronger than the repetition bias as typically observed in VTS. 
One should bear in mind, though, that the sequences of tasks that comply 
with the criterion of equal task frequency are in general biased towards 
alternation. Inspection of Table 1 makes this abundantly clear. Sequences of 
4 tasks (3 transitions) contain on average 3 repetitions and 6 switches. In 
combination with a 25 % chance of repetition intrusions this leads to a small 
repetition bias. Furthermore, the parameter tests confirmed that both 
parameters are critical in obtaining a good fit of the models.  
 
VOLUNTARY TASK CHOICE 
While the present study was completely framed within the VTS 
procedure, the modeling reported here, does have implications that go far 
beyond VTS. First, the model presented here, was designed to provide an 
explanation of task choice in VTS, but it can also account for the different 
pattern of findings in randomization behavior in a range of task settings. The 
model is, for example, also applicable to binary randomization tasks (e.g., 
coin tossing). Such an application should be successful with parameters p 
and r fixed. In fact, with only retrieval of balanced sequences of events, the 
model could also be considered as a variant of the Rapoport and Budescu 
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(1997) model: on the one hand, the balanced sequences are similar to 
plausible random sequences in their model; on the other hand, instead of 
building the sequence on-line as in their model, the sequence is retrieved 
from LTM. 
Second, the chain-retrieval model implements a cluster of hypotheses 
about the cognitive processes involved in task selection. The fact that in the 
VTS procedure, subjects are requested to generate tasks in a random order 
may be seen as an attempt to curtail voluntary task choice. Indeed, when no 
constraints are imposed on the tasks chosen, the frequency of switches is 
very low (Kessler, Shencar, & Meiran, 2009; Liefooghe et al., in press). In 
order to collect useful data in a task-switching paradigm, instructions that 
increase the number of task switches are necessary. Usage of randomization 
instructions, no doubt, helps in achieving this goal. An important question is 
whether this occurs at the expense of voluntary task choice. Research on 
random generation has convincingly shown that trying to be random requires 
a continuous attempt to block or interrupt automatic responding (Baddeley, 
1996; Baddeley et al., 1998; Towse & Cheshire, 2007). It can be said that 
each time an automatic response is successfully blocked, this response is 
‗voluntary‘. Similar observations have been reported in VTS research. For 
example, Mayr and Bell (2006) report that individuals who are slower in 
repetition trials but not in switch trials are less vulnerable to bottom-up 
triggered task repetitions. These individuals seem to have more top-down 
control and have more voluntary task choices than individuals who do not 
show such selective slowing. In the same vein, ERP-research in VTS 
indicates that there is a strong tendency to repeat the task even before the 
stimulus is presented, but that on a proportion of the trials, this tendency is 
overruled to execute a switch (Vandamme et al., in press). If there is a 
controlled slowing in handling this preparedness to repeat, it seems evident 
that suppressing the repetition and executing a switch instead becomes more 
likely. Working memory loads are often used to interfere with top-down 
control (see Lavie, 2005, for a review). Usage of this method in VTS has 
shown that under load, top-down control becomes less efficient and the 
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probability that bottom-up triggered events intrude into the sequence of 
selected tasks becomes larger (Demanet et al., in press), which again 
suggests that voluntary task selection also involves blocking of ‗unwilled‘ 
choices. In terms of the task-chain model, this means that the more choices 
are voluntary, the lower the value of r should be. As the average value was 
lower at long than at short SOA, it seems that at long SOA more voluntary 
task choices were made. Although the upper value of how frequently 
bottom-up intrusions occur is not known, the changes in the value of 
parameter r could be used to estimate variations in the extent to which 
voluntary task choice does occur. 
Notwithstanding the stress on processes involved in ‗task choice‘, the 
present study also indicates that we cannot be sure that it is really task choice 
that matters. The chain-retrieval model as developed here with retrieval of 
chains of tasks from LTM is parametrically not distinguishable from a model 
with the same assumptions but based on the storage of chains of transitions 
in LTM. The reason that this distinction is not possible is because the chains 
stored in the two versions of the model are completely equivalent. 
Nevertheless, we observed that when the parameters were fitted on the basis 
of transition sequences, the model yielded better corresponding predictions 
than when the parameters were fitted on the basis of task sequences. This 
indicates that people seem to prefer transitions over tasks, which is 
consistent with ERP-findings (Vandamme et al., in press). Yet, the usage of 
transitions may be restricted because transitions are useless if the choice 
would be among more than two tasks. As the mechanism behind task-chain 
retrieval remains unclear, further research about which information (tasks or 
transitions or both) is stored in LTM, and how this information is coded 
would be useful.  
The idea of retrieving stored chains of tasks is quite similar to 
retrieving a plan of actions. When people make a plan, in order to achieve 
the goal, appropriate subgoals are retrieved and chained into a sequence of 
steps. These chains are stored in LTM and can be retrieved for later usage. 
The retrieved chains guide task execution which subsequently results in 
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achieving the goal. In other words, the chain-retrieval model can be 
considered as a special case of more general goal-directed processing and of 
planning in particular. It is no coincidence that there are some similarities 
between the present modeling and the task-span procedure introduced by 
Logan (2004, 2006).  
 
CONCLUSION 
The present study showed that the repetition bias in VTS is due to a 
locally-based statistical dependency in the sequence of selected tasks or 
transitions. The model based on a chain retrieval accounts very well for these 
data and suggests (a) that short sequences of tasks (or maybe transitions) are 
retrieved from memory, (b) that these sequences of tasks are maintained in 
working memory to guide task selection, (c) that the length of these 
sequences is constrained by working memory capacity, and (d) by the 
probability that the sequences contain repetitions linked to ease of execution, 
and finally (e) that bottom-up intrusions of repetitions play an important part 
in the repetition bias. This model has a number of implications that can be 
tested in future research. The memory processes postulated in the model 
propose a hypothesis on how randomization in general and more particularly 
how task selection in VTS may occur. The assumption that task selection is 
based on chains of events retrieved from memory provides a possible answer 
regarding the cognitive control of task selection, namely that in VTS, not 
single tasks but chains of tasks or possibly even action plans are selected. 
Finally and not least important, the modeling also indicates that the adjective 
‗voluntary‘ in voluntary task switching may refer to the process of selecting 
tasks but also to the process of blocking intrusions.  
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL TASK-BASED TESTS OF CHAIN-RETRIEVAL MODEL 
Using the same formal basis defined by the three parameters of the 
chain-retrieval model, other assumptions can be made to implement model 
variations. Instead of merging the end of the previous chain with the start of 
the following chain, the task-chain retrieval model could use concatenation 
of chains. With respect to the bottom-up intrusions, instead of assuming that 
the activated chain can be kept on hold and is continued afterwards (the 
present model), the intrusion can replace one of the events in the activated 
chain or the activated chain could be aborted when the intrusion occurs. In 
order to account for these variations, each of them has been tested as a 
variation of the model as outlined in the main text. The results of the tests of 
these model variations are presented in Table A1, which compares the 
goodness-of-fit and the correspondence of the predictions of the task-chain 
retrieval model with other possible assumptions that could have been made. 
The table also gives the values of t-statistics for the contrast of the model 
with these other variants. 
 The table shows that the model yields a better fit to the observed runs 
proportions than all the other variants tested, except for the variant where the 
bottom-up intrusion replaces the task selected from memory instead of 
postponing the selected task to the next trial. However, the predictions of 
that variant were significantly poorer than the predictions of the reference 
model. In fact, the chain-retrieval model‘s predictions were significantly 
better than those of the variants. 
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Table A1. Comparison of model variants of the chain-retrieval model. The table compares the 
basic version of the model to variations of the model in which one assumption was changed. 
For each model variant the following results are shown: a specification of the assumptions 
made, goodness-of fit of the estimation (Fit), t-test of the difference with the target model, the 
estimated free parameters, goodness-of-prediction of the autocorrelation statistics 
(Prediction), and t-test of the difference of this measure and the target model. Explanations in 
the text. 
Models
a 
Fit t(78) m p r Prediction t(78) 
merge-intrude (basis) .005  3.95 .60 .31 .012  
concatenate-intrude .006 5.09 4.09 .58 .25 .013 2.62 
merge-replace .005 -2.64 4.41 .66 .28 .013 1.81 
merge-restart .006 2.79 4.20 .63 .26 .012 1.13 
a The models differed from each other with respect to whether on retrieval the chains are 
simply concatenated or merged (combining the first element of the new chain with the last 
element of the previous chain), and whether intrusions merely intrude (and keep the chain 
intact), replace the current element of the chain or result in losing the chain from memory so 
that a restart is needed. 
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APPENDIX B 
ADDITIONAL TRANSITION-BASED TESTS OF CHAIN-RETRIEVAL MODEL 
In a similar way the assumptions of the chain-retrieval model were 
tested on the transition-based model fitting. The same alternatives were 
tested. The results of the tests of these variations are presented in Table B1, 
which compares the goodness-of-fit and the correspondence of the 
predictions of the chain-retrieval model with other possible assumptions that 
could have been made. The table also gives the values of t-statistics for the 
contrast of the model with these other variants. 
As for the task-based tests, the table shows that the transition-based 
tests of the chain-retrieval model yields a better fit to the observed transition 
runs proportions than all the other variants tested. The predictions of all 
these variants were significantly poorer than the predictions of the reference 
model. In fact, the chain-retrieval model‘s predictions were significantly 
better than those of the variants. 
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Table B1. Comparison of model variants of the chain-retrieval model. The table compares the 
basic version of the model to variations of the model in which one assumption was changed. 
For each model variant the following results are shown: a specification of the assumptions 
made, goodness-of fit of the estimation (Fit), t-test of the difference with the target model, the 
estimated free parameters, goodness-of-prediction of the autocorrelation statistics 
(Prediction), and t-test of the difference of this measure and the target model. Explanations in 
the text. 
Models
a 
Fit t(78) m p r Prediction t(78) 
merge-intrude .008  4.29 .65 .26 .009  
concatenate-intrude .011 2.64 4.45 .65 .22 .011 2.05 
merge-replace .046 12.93 4.68 .52 .56 .035 10.74 
merge-restart .062 3.17 3.80 .17 .38 .029 7.33 
a The models differed from each other with respect to whether on retrieval the chains are 
simply concatenated or merged (combining the first element of the new chain with the last 
element of the previous chain), and whether intrusions merely intrude (and keep the chain 
intact), replace the current element of the chain or result in losing the chain from memory so 
that a restart is needed.  
 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
‘If we are to use the methods of science in the field of human affairs, we must 
assume that behavior is lawful and determined. We must expect to discover 
that what a man does is the result of specifiable conditions and that once 
these conditions have been discovered, we can anticipate and to some extent 
determine his actions. This possibility is offensive to many people. It is 
opposed to a tradition of long standing which regards man as a free agent, 
whose behavior is the product, not of specifiable antecedent conditions, but 
of spontaneous inner changes of course…. If we cannot show what is 
responsible for a man’s behavior, we say that he himself is responsible for it. 
The precursors of physical science once followed the same practice, but the 
wind is not longer by Aeolus, nor is the rain cast down by Jupiter Pluvius.’ 
– Burrhus Skinner (1953, pp. 6-7, 283) 
  
162     CHAPTER 6 
The main goal of the present thesis was to learn more about the role of 
endogenous and exogenous factors in goal-directed behavior by using the 
voluntary task switching (VTS) procedure. In various domains in 
experimental psychology, for example in the domains of cognitive control 
(e.g. Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001), selective attention 
(e.g. Lavie, 2005; Yantis, 2000) and attention to action (e.g. Norman & 
Shallice, 1986), converging evidence was found that behavior is never 
driven exclusively by endogenous processes (top-down control) or by 
exogenous factors (bottom-up control), but is the result of an interplay 
between both. Results of a study by Arrington (2008) suggested that also a 
voluntary task choice is the result of an interplay between top-down and 
bottom-up control (e.g. Arrington, 2008). 
In the present thesis four studies were described in which we 
investigated the role of these two control modes and how these can interact 
in voluntary task selection by manipulating the relative contribution of both 
within different experimental designs, procedures and by inducing different 
kinds of bottom-up control. 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
In Chapter 2, we investigated how different elements in the 
environment can guide a task choice. Mayr and Bell (2006) were the first to 
report that immediate stimulus repetitions can affect task choice in such a 
way that more tasks are repeated. As a method to investigate the mechanisms 
underlying this effect we introduced a concurrent working memory (WM) 
load when selecting tasks voluntarily. In a first experiment was found that 
the impact of stimulus repetitions was stronger with a concurrent WM load. 
On the basis of two follow-up experiments, we concluded that the effect of 
stimulus repetitions is caused by the fact that on a subset of the trials no new 
task is selected but a response is associatively triggered when the stimulus is 
repeated. The observation that the impact of these stimulus-response 
associations is stronger with a concurrent WM load indicates that a function 
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of top-down control is to shield task selection from automatically triggered 
responses. In this study, it was also found that repetitions of task-irrelevant 
features can prime a task repetition and that a stimulus can prime the 
selection of a task through previously formed stimulus-task associations. In 
addition, in all three experiments, it was found that tasks were repeated more 
with than without a concurrent WM load. On the basis of this finding we 
argued that a WM load hampers the ability to overrule the natural tendency 
to repeat tasks. 
In Chapter 3, we pursued three research goals. First, we tested the 
account that the generally observed task-repetition bias is directly related to 
the requirement to select tasks and to the experience that task switches are 
more difficult to perform than task repetitions. Second, we wanted to collect 
more evidence for the account, defended in Chapter 2, that the effect of a 
WM load on voluntary task selection is related to the fact that subjects are 
hampered in their ability to overcome task repetitions when WM is loaded. 
Third, we tested the account, elaborated in Chapter 2, that the effect of 
stimulus repetitions is related to the formation of stimulus-response 
associations when executing a task. In two experiments, where hands, but 
not tasks, had to be selected randomly, we found evidence in support of all 
three accounts by observing a) a tendency to alternate hands (contrasted with 
the typical tendency to repeat tasks), b) that a WM load did not affect the 
hand-selection proportions (contrasted with the effects of a WM load on 
task-selection proportions), c) and that stimulus repetitions only affected the 
proportion of hand repetitions in Experiment 1, where a task had to be 
performed with the selected hand. In Experiment 2, where also a hand was 
selected but no task had to be executed, no stimulus-response associations 
were formed and the stimulus-repetition effect disappeared. 
In Chapter 4, we investigated the hypothesis that, in contrast with a 
single-registration methodology, as used in Chapter 2, a double-registration 
methodology provides a measure of top-down driven task choice 
uncontaminated by bottom-up intrusions. Because in double registration, a 
task has to be selected on presentation of a neutral probe, one can assume 
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that this leads to a situation in which no external factors that can affect the 
task choice are present. In two experiments, we found evidence against this 
hypothesis by observing that sequences of preceding task-execution 
responses can bias the task choice. This indicates that new bottom-up effects 
are induced by using two responses per trial in double registration. In 
addition, the two experiments showed that the course of these sequential 
effects over different stimulus-probe intervals (SPIs) depends on whether 
SPI is manipulated as a between- or a within-subjects factor. This 
inconsistency suggests that the impact of top-down control, which is 
necessary to overcome bottom-up influences, can be strategically adapted. 
In Chapter 5, we proposed a model of voluntary task selection in 
which we incorporated a) the requirement to produce random sequences, b) 
the consideration that experience with execution of the tasks (repetitions are 
easier than switches) are taken into account, and c) the possibility that 
bottom-up factors guide a task choice. This model assumes that task 
selection is based on an automatic retrieval of chains of task information 
from long-term memory (LTM). These chains are formed in the initial phase 
of the experiment. In Chapter 5, it was shown that the properties of task 
sequences construed by this chain-retrieval model provide an excellent fit of 
the properties of the observed task sequences. The chain-retrieval model 
needs three free parameters. A first parameter m corresponds to the maximal 
length of the retrieved chain, and is related to WM capacity. A second 
parameter p corresponds to the probability of a task repetition in the stored 
chains. When p is high the chance is higher that sequences with more 
repetitions will be retrieved. A third parameter r is related to bottom-up 
priming of a task repetition. In this chapter, some tests were included in 
which the importance of all three parameters was confirmed. In addition, 
evidence was found that the retrieved chains not only contain information 
about the tasks but also about the task transitions in the chain. 
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
WHAT MAKES VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION SO EXCEPTIONAL? 
In a growing number of studies investigating VTS, the task-selection 
proportions are considered to represent properties of the processes 
underlying a task choice (e.g. Arrington, 2008; Arrington & Logan, 2004; 
2005; Kessler, Shencar, & Meiran, 2009; Liefooghe, Demanet, & 
Vandierendonck, in press; Mayr & Bell, 2006; Vandamme, Szmalec, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press; Weaver & Arrington, in press). 
However, to this day it was never investigated whether these proportions 
really represent exclusive features of a task choice. Especially in the 
frequently used single-registration procedure, in which each task is mapped 
onto a separate hand, it is possible that these proportions represent nothing 
more than random sequences of hand selections. Clearly, for the sake of the 
validity of the VTS procedure in the study of task-selection processes this 
issue needs to be investigated. In Chapter 3, hand-selection sequences were 
compared directly with the task-selection sequences of Experiment 1 of 
Chapter 2. The results showed that the typically observed repetition bias in 
VTS (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2004) appeared exclusively when tasks were 
selected, while an alternation bias, which is a typical observation in human 
random generation of events, was observed when only hands were selected. 
In addition, we found that the effect of a concurrent WM load on the number 
of repetitions disappeared when hands were selected. Both findings support 
the idea that task-selection proportions and the manipulations that influence 
these proportions can be used to study task-selection processes. On the basis 
of the results of Chapter 3 and 5 we argued that a distinctive property of 
selecting tasks over other events (such as hands) is that switching between 
tasks is perceived to be more difficult than repeating tasks and that this 
relative difference in outcome of a choice is taken into account when 
selecting a new task. In the chain-retrieval model proposed in Chapter 5 the 
tendency to avoid task switches is represented by the size of parameter p.   
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THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP CONTROL IN 
VOLUNTARY TASK SELECTION. 
In the present thesis, we collected convincing evidence for the view 
that, independent of the procedure used, bottom-up factors always play a 
significant role in the task choice. In a recent study, Arrington (2008) found 
that bottom-up control contributed to the task choice more with short than 
with long preparation intervals. As an account for this interaction, she 
proposed a horse-race model for voluntary task selection. On the basis of the 
executive control theory of visual attention of Logan and Gordon (2001), she 
suggested that voluntary task selection depends on a race between the tasks 
activated by top-down control and tasks activated by bottom-up control. In 
this perspective, when the preparation interval is short and top-down control 
is less efficient, tasks activated by bottom-up control reach a selection 
threshold first, and guide the task choice.  
The results of Experiment 1 of Chapter 2 can be interpreted as support 
for the horse-race model by showing that stimulus repetitions affect task 
choice more with a concurrent WM load. Because other studies have shown 
that a WM load can reduce the efficiency of top-down control (Logan, 
2004), this finding fits with the idea that tasks activated by bottom-up 
control reach the selection threshold first because top-down is hindered by 
the WM load. However, based on two additional experiments, we were able 
to conclude that stimulus repetitions do not prime tasks, but simple 
responses. In Experiments 2 and 3 of Chapter 2, it was observed that, the 
impact of other bottom-up factors, such as repetitions of task-irrelevant 
information and stimulus-task associations, are not affected by this load. 
This contrasts with the effect of stimulus repetitions, and suggests that top-
down control in VTS is not involved when activating and selecting tasks, as 
proposed by Arrington (2008), but is especially necessary to shield task 
selection against automatic response tendencies that do not correspond with 
the activated task (see also Hübner & Druey, 2006). Possibly, this shielding 
function of top-down control in task selection can be related to findings in 
studies investigating visual selective attention (for a review see Lavie, 2005). 
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In these studies was found that automatically triggered irrelevant responses 
(for example, in the Erikson flanker task) were suppressed less efficiently 
when performed under a concurrent WM load. Recently, other parallels 
between voluntary task selection and selective attention were already 
discussed by Arrington and Yates (2009) and Weaver and Arrington (in 
press). 
Evidence in support of Arrington‘s (2008) horse-race model may have 
been present in Experiment 2 of Chapter 4, in the observation that response-
sequence effects were stronger with shorter stimulus-probe intervals (SPIs). 
However, the results of Experiment 1 of Chapter 4 seem to challenge this 
model by showing that the interaction disappears when the length of the SPIs 
was unpredictable and varied from trial to trial. This different course of the 
sequence effects with various SPIs over the two experiments indicates that 
the contribution of top-down control, which is necessary to shield task 
selection from bottom-up intrusions, can rely on strategic adaptations. In our 
view these results can be explained by the horse-race model when in this 
model is incorporated that the strength of top-down control is not only 
influenced by manipulations of the preparation interval but also by the use of 
strategies. Although it is difficult to trace which strategies really take part, it 
is possible that subjects are more motivated to invest top-down control when 
the length of SPI varies from trial to trial. Possibly, when in the initial phase 
of the experiment subjects experience that their investment of top-down 
control results in successful shielding on a part of the trials (e.g. when SPI is 
long) they can adopt a strategy to invest more top-down control in the entire 
block. Also in a study of Mayr and Bell (2006), where individual differences 
in task selection were investigated, evidence for strategic modulation of top-
down control was reported.  
On the basis of the estimated parameters of the chain-retrieval model 
in Chapter 4 we also found evidence for an interplay between top-down and 
bottom-up control. We observed that the parameter r, which represents the 
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probability that a task selection is interrupted by a bottom-up intrusion, is 
higher with shorter preparation intervals
1
.  
In sum, evidence in the present thesis suggests that top-down control 
is particularly involved when task choices are shielded against automatic 
responses. The present study also shows that strategic modulations of top-
down control have to be taken into account when one wants to manipulate 
the contribution of top-down and bottom-up control. In our view the findings 
that top-down control can be influenced by strategies and that stimuli can 
prime a task independent of top-down control, are both examples of the 
flexibility of our cognitive system to deal with different situations when 
performing goal-directed behavior. 
AUTOMATICITY IN GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 
Already in the early ages of psychology, James (1890) acknowledged 
that people can perform actions with little thought and conscious awareness, 
or in other words, automatically. In view of the conviction that top-down 
control is a limited resource, it seems reasonable that not every action or task 
that is performed has to appeal on these resources and that actions and tasks 
can be activated by a separate mechanism.  
 
                                                     
1
 We found further support for an interaction between top-down and bottom-up 
control when estimating the parameters of the chain-retrieval model on the task 
sequences in Chapter 2, in the no-load and load conditions. We observed that the 
parameter r was higher under load, replicating the finding that bottom-up control is 
stronger when top-down control is less efficient. We also observed that the p 
parameter increased under load. This suggests that subjects attach more importance 
to task repetitions in cognitive demanding situations. Finally, we observed that the 
parameter m was reduced under load, indicating that chains maintained in short term 
memory are shorter when WM was loaded. We did not report these analyses in the 
main text because it is difficult to draw strong conclusions based on the chain-
retrieval model when applied on such short sequences as in Chapter 2.  
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Logan (1988) proposed a mechanism for automatic behavior in his 
‘instance theory of automatization’. In this theory, it is assumed that when a 
task is performed, representations are formed in LTM, called instances, 
which consist of information about the stimulus and the response. In this 
theory, behavior is considered to be automatic when it relies on the retrieval 
of these stored instances from LTM and not on time consuming top-down 
processes. Another implication of this theory is that behavior can only be 
automatic when actions are trained with a particular stimulus.  
More recently, in studies in social psychology, it was found that when 
a person repeatedly pursued the same goal within a particular environment, 
the representation of that goal, together with the action schemas necessary to 
achieve that goal, will become active in the same environment (Bargh, 
1990). These findings led Bargh (1990) to introduce the auto-motive model. 
This model extends the instance theory by assuming that also the 
representation of a goal can become associated with a representation of a 
stimulus. Hence, according to the auto-motive model the ‗trigger‘ that starts 
a goal into operation can be removed from top-down control when it is 
activated through these associations. Recently, in several studies in cognitive 
psychology, these ideas could also be confirmed with task goals by 
observing that these can be activated automatically by elements in the 
environment (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Mattler, 2003; Mayr & Bryck, 2007; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) and by established associations between stimuli 
and task goals (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 
2003). In these studies evidence for automatically activated task goals was 
derived from performance data, and to this day it was never investigated 
whether these associations could actually trigger the selection of a task goal.  
In the present thesis, evidence was found for the mechanisms 
proposed by Logan (1988) and Bargh (1990). In Experiment 1 of Chapter 2, 
we confirmed the finding of Mayr and Bell (2006) that subjects repeated 
tasks more when the stimulus was repeated. On the basis of this chapter we 
can conclude that the stimulus-repetition effect can be related to the 
formation of instances, including information of the stimulus and the 
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response. In Chapter 3, we found that such instances or associations are only 
formed when a stimulus has to be translated in a response during task 
execution. The observation in Chapter 2 that the influence of these instances 
was stronger when top-down control was less efficient, supports the idea that 
top-down control is necessary to shield behavior against the influences of 
instances that are irrelevant for the activated task goal.  
Additionally, in Experiment 3 of Chapter 2, we observed that when a 
stimulus was learned in the context of a particular task goal in a training 
phase, this stimulus influenced the selection of that task goal in a following 
test phase. This result can be framed within the auto-motive model of Bargh 
(1990), in that it suggests that the trigger to select a particular task goal can 
be associated with a stimulus and that when this stimulus reappears the 
selection of this task is facilitated. Important to mention is that we avoided 
the influence of stimulus-response associations by using a different response 
modality in the training than in the test phase. We also observed that the 
impact of stimulus-task associations did not depend on the efficiency of top-
down control. In our opinion, this indicates that the effects of bottom-up 
control on the task choice do not always have to be interpreted as failures of 
top-down control to shield intentional task choice. Especially the effects of 
stimulus-task associations can be seen as examples of the ability of our 
cognitive system to use past experiences with stimuli, stored in long term 
memory, to delegate task choice to the environment (for similar ideas see 
Mayr & Bryck, 2007).  
It speaks for itself that this mechanism plays an important role in daily 
life. Imagine a situation in which a person is driving a car and is approaching 
a red light. When this person is an experienced driver and has learned by 
experience that one has to reduce speed in front of a red light, the task goal 
(e.g. reducing speed) will be automatically activated and the response rules 
(e.g. hit the break) will be retrieved without top-down control coming into 
play.  
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CHAIN RETRIEVAL IN GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 
Based on the finding that the size of the task-repetition bias correlates 
with the speed of task repetitions, Mayr and Bell (2006) suggested that 
subjects adopt a discrete-events strategy by inhibiting the most recently 
executed task. However, in Chapter 5 we found strong evidence against 
these discrete events by observing that a model, in which task selection is 
based on chains of tasks retrieved from LTM, produces an excellent fit of 
observed task sequences. According to this chain-retrieval model the task-
repetition bias is not directly caused by a failure to overcome the tendency to 
repeat tasks, but by the fact that chains with more repetitions are more likely 
to be retrieved. It was argued that chains with more task repetitions are 
preferred because they are easier to perform than chains with more task 
switches (see also Chapter 3). During the execution of the task activated by 
these chains, bottom-up triggered repetitions can boost the number of task 
repetitions even more.  
The observation that task choice in VTS may be based on chains of 
elements retrieved from LTM, can be considered as an important finding, not 
only for voluntary task selection in specific, but also for goal-directed 
behavior in general. It shows that when people are trying to accomplish a 
high-order goal, which in VTS is to execute random sequences of tasks, 
information about the outcomes of past attempts to accomplish this goal, are 
stored in LTM. One can say that the cognitive system gives priority to more 
successful action plans when trying to accomplish a goal. This mechanism to 
learn about past choices is advantageous because it allows people to produce 
more efficient goal-directed behavior in the future. On a more general level 
this mechanism can also be related to the law of least mental effort, which 
states that the cognitive system will always try to find ways to avoid tasks or 
strategies asking for high levels of cognitive demand (Balle, 2002).  
172     CHAPTER 6 
INTENTIONALITY IN VOLUNTARY TASK SWITCHING 
On the basis of the results of Chapter 2 and 4, one can say that each 
time a bottom-up intrusion is overruled by top-down control, this task 
selection is intentional or voluntary. In this view, the intentional or voluntary 
act in VTS is not to activate what is ‗willed‘ but to avoid behavior that is 
‗unwilled‘. In Chapter 5, the strength of this intentional component of task 
selection is represented in the chain-retrieval model in the parameter r. In the 
framework of the model, one can say that the lower the r parameter, the 
more choices are intentional. This account can be related to the idea of Libet 
(1999), mentioned in Chapter 1. He argued that although intentional free 
will is not the cause of our behavior, it can still act as a veto over automatic 
activity. At first inspection, this idea implies that all other unshielded 
intrusions must be considered as unintentional behavior. However, in the 
viewpoint of compatibilists as Wegner (2002) or Dennett (2003), this is not 
always true. In a previous section we already argued that a task choice in 
VTS can be delegated to elements in the environment based on past 
experiences with those elements (see Experiment 3 of Chapter 2). In a 
compatibilist‘s view this is exactly what we should interpret as intentional 
behavior, because past experiences are taken into account when a new task is 
selected. In that perspective, only automatic responses that do not 
correspond with an activated task goal, as observed in Experiment 1 of 
Chapter 2, can be considered as unintentional behavior.  
In Chapter 5, we assumed that all task selections in which bottom-up 
intrusions are successfully suppressed are based on the automatic retrieval of 
chains from LTM. Does this task-selection mechanism correspond with 
intentional behavior? To our account, it does not with the classical 
perspective of intentionality because tasks are selected on the basis of 
automatic retrieval of tasks and are thus not selected on the basis of an 
intentional act. However, this mechanism fits with the idea of intentionality 
in a compatibilist‘s perspective, because the mechanism proposed by the 
chain-retrieval model entails that past experiences are stored and are helping 
future goal-directed to be more efficient. 
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CONCLUSION 
As already argued in the Introduction (Chapter 1) the issue whether a 
task choice can be considered as ‗voluntary‘ in the VTS procedure depends 
on the perspective the concept of intentionality is approached with. In the 
present thesis, no evidence was found for intentional control in the classical 
sense, because in each situation subjects were confronted with, task choices 
were influenced by external factors. However, we found support for 
intentional control in a compatibilist‘s sense, in the ability of the cognitive 
system to use past experiences (e.g. stimulus-task associations, task chains) 
in order to be more efficient in future goal-directed behavior.  
Importantly, we also showed that the task-selection proportions in 
VTS can be used to investigate the processes that are involved when a task is 
selected. With respect to the main research goal, we showed that the 
interplay between top-down and bottom-up control in voluntary task 
selection lies in the fact that top-down control is essential to shield the 
execution of a selected task goal from automatically triggered actions that do 
not correspond with that particular task goal. Finally, we found that the 
strength of top-down control in voluntary task selection can be modulated 
strategically.  
In sum, this thesis clearly shows that the voluntary task switching 
procedure is a useful tool to investigate the mechanisms of our cognitive 
system that allow us to perform efficient goal-directed behavior.   
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INDICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research did not only lead to some new theoretical 
considerations, it has also its limitations. In the next paragraph these 
limitations are discussed, together with some ideas for future research.  
In our view, the main limitation of the VTS procedure we used, is that 
subjects are instructed to generate random sequences of tasks. This 
instruction was first used by Arrington and Logan (2004) in order to obtain a 
sufficient number of task-switch trials needed for the analyses of the 
response latencies. Indeed, in recent studies of Kessler et al. (2009) and 
Liefooghe, Demanet and Vandierendonck (in press), it was found that 
without this instruction subjects rarely switched tasks. In our view, this 
finding indicates that voluntary choices are only made when a high-order 
goal (random generation) has to be accomplished. 
Many studies in the random generation literature have indicated that 
the concept of randomness is not well understood by people in general, and 
that different people can have very distinct ideas about randomness (e.g. 
Nickerson, 2002). Because of the randomness instruction in VTS, the 
production of random sequences of tasks can be considered as the high-order 
goal. In our view, because the high-order goal in this procedure is difficult to 
grasp, it makes it very difficult to extend our conclusions to other situations.  
A second limitation of the VTS procedure and the random instruction 
concerns the ecological validity, because in daily life people are confronted 
very rarely with situations in which tasks have to be selected in a random 
fashion. A potential solution for both limitations is to adjust the VTS 
procedure in such a way that subjects have to accomplish a well-defined 
high-order goal and can choose the tasks (sub-goals) on a voluntary basis in 
order to accomplish that goal. A paradigm that can be useful in this 
perspective is the so-called ‗cooking breakfast task‘ (e.g. Craik & Bialystok, 
2006). In this task, subjects must remember to start and stop cooking a 
number of foods and try to accomplish that all the foods are ready at the 
same time (high-order goal). In our opinion, it would be very interesting to 
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investigate the effects of stimulus-task and stimulus-response associations, 
as well as the formation of task chains in LTM in such a procedure.  
A third limitation of the procedure used also is related to the 
ecological validity. We believe that if one wants to generalize the 
conclusions made in the present thesis towards free task choices in daily life, 
where typically more than two tasks can be selected, one also has to use 
more than two tasks in future studies. 
A fourth limitation of the present thesis is that we did not account for 
individual differences in task selection behavior. Mayr and Bell (2006) 
suggested that different subjects can adopt different strategies, and maybe 
use different mechanisms when selecting tasks. A possible way to 
investigate this issue more thoroughly is to divide subjects in two groups 
based on their WM capacity. On the basis of the assumptions made in 
Chapter 5, one could predict that the estimated parameter m, related to the 
length of the retrieved chains, will be higher for subjects with a higher WM 
capacity. On the basis of Experiment 1 of Chapter 2 one could also expect 
that the r parameter, which is related to bottom-up intrusions, will be higher 
with low-capacity subjects. Another possibility is that low-capacity subjects 
have more difficulty with switching between tasks and that as a consequence 
chains with more task repetitions will be preferred. In this perspective WM 
capacity could have an effect on the size of the p parameter, in a way that 
this parameter is higher with low-capacity subjects.  
The finding in Chapter 2 that the general level of top-down control in 
task selection was higher when tasks were selected with a concurrent WM 
load raises the question if it is also possible to manipulate top-down control 
from trial to trial. In Chapter 4 was found that trial-to-trial variations of the 
length of the preparation interval did not lead to variations in top-down 
control because of strategic adaptation. An alternative approach to 
investigate trial-to-trial variations of top-down control can be found in 
studies investigating post-error and post-conflict adaptation of top-down 
control. In these studies was found that the efficiency of top-down control to 
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shield behavior against bottom-up intrusions was increased following trials 
which involved a response conflict or following response errors (e.g. 
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). These effects could be investigated in 
VTS when using tasks in which strong response conflicts are induced or 
when using difficult tasks in which a large amount of errors is made. On the 
basis of the present thesis, one could hypothesize that the influence of 
bottom-up triggered responses would be reduced following an error or 
following a response conflict. Because subjects made very few errors in the 
experiments described in the present thesis, this issue could not be 
investigated yet.  
Another approach to dissociate internally driven from externally 
driven task choice in VTS is to dissociate these components on a functional-
neuroanatomical level. Recent research in the domain of intentional action 
suggests that different systems might be involved in internally guided and 
environmentally guided control of behavior (Brass & Haggard, 2008; 
Waszak et al., 2005). The fronto-median cortex is related to internal 
components of action and the fronto-lateral cortex is crucial for externally 
guided action. There are only two brain-imaging studies that investigated 
intentional control in the context of VTS. Forstmann, Brass, Koch and von 
Cramon (2006) observed that the rostral cingulate zone in the medial pre-
frontal cortex was more active with internally driven task selection 
compared to a situation in which the tasks were cued. Furthermore, a pattern 
classification study by Haynes et al. (2007) showed that internally driven 
task choice could be best predicted from anterior medial prefrontal cortex, 
supporting the idea that voluntary task selection is related to the fronto-
median cortex. In our view, these studies could serve as a starting point to 
investigate the interplay of top-down control and bottom-up control in 
voluntary task selection using functional magnetic resonance imaging.  
  
GENERAL DISCUSSION    177 
REFERENCES 
Arrington, C. M. (2008). The effect of stimulus availability on task choice in 
voluntary task switching. Memory & Cognition, 36, 991-997. 
Arrington, C.M., & Logan, G.D. (2004). Episodic and semantic components 
of the compound-stimulus strategy in the explicit-task cuing procedure. 
Memory & Cognition, 32, 965-976.  
Arrington, C.M., & Logan, G.D. (2005). Voluntary task switching: Chasing 
the elusive homunculus. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 31, 683-702. 
Arrington, C. M., & Yates, M. M. (2009). The role of attentional networks in 
voluntary task switching. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 660-665. 
Balle, M. (2002). La loi du moindre effort mental: Les representations 
mentales. Sciences Humaines, 128, 36-39. 
Bargh, J.A. (1990). Auto-motives: Preconscious determinants of social 
interaction. In E.T. Higgins & R.M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of 
motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 93-130). New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Botvinick, M., Braver, T., Barch, D. Carter, C. & Cohen, J. (2001). Conflict 
monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108 , 624-65. 
Botvinick, M., Cohen, J. D. & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and 
anterior cingulate cortex: An update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 8, 
539-546. 
Brass, M. & Haggard, P. (2008). The What, When, Whether model of 
intentional action. The Neuroscientist, 14, 319-325. 
Craik, F.I.M., & Bialystok, E. (2006). Planning and task management in 
older adults: Cooking breakfast. Memory and Cognition, 34, 1236-1249. 
Dennett D.C. (2003). Freedom Evolves. London, Penguin Books. 
178     CHAPTER 6 
Forstmann, B., Brass, M., Koch, I., & von Cramon, D.Y. (2006). Voluntary 
selection of task-sets revealed by functional magnetic resonance 
imaging. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 388-398. 
Haynes, J, Sakai, K, Rees, G, Gilbert, S, Frith, C, & Passingham, RE 
(2007). Reading hidden intentions in the human brain. Current Biology, 
17, 323-328. 
Hübner, R., & Druey, M.D. (2006). Response execution, selection, or 
activation: What is sufficient for response-related repetition effects 
under task shifting? Psychological Research, 70, 245-261. 
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981. Originally published in 1890. 
Kessler, Y., Shencar, Y., & Meiran, N. (2009). Choosing to switch: 
Spontaneous task switching despite associated behavioral costs. Acta 
Psychologica, 131, 120-128. 
Lau, H.C., Passingham, R.E. (2007). Unconscious activation of the cognitive 
control system in the human prefrontal cortex. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 27, 5805–5811. 
Lavie, N. (2005). Distracted and confused?: Selective attention under load. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 75-82. 
Libet, B. (1999). Do we have free will? In B. Libet, A. Freeman, & K. 
Sutherland (Eds.). Towards a neuroscience of free will (pp. 47-59). 
Exeter, Imprint Academic. 
Liefooghe, B., Demanet, J., & Vandierendonck, A. (2009). Is advance 
reconfiguration in voluntary task switching affected by the design 
employed? Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65, 850-857. 
Liefooghe, B., Demanet, J., & Vandierendonck, A. (in press). Selecting tasks 
of unequal strength. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 
Logan, G.D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization. 
Psychological Review, 95, 492-527. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION    179 
Logan, G. D. (2004). Working memory, task switching, and executive 
control in the task span procedure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133, 218-236. 
Logan, G. D., & Gordon, R. D. (2001). Executive control of attention in 
dual-task situations. Psychological Review, 108, 393-434. 
Mattler, U. (2003). Priming of mental operations by masked stimuli. 
Perception and Psychophysics, 65, 167-187. 
Mayr, U., & Bell, T. (2006). On how to be unpredictable: Evidence from the 
voluntary task-switching paradigm. Psychological Science, 9, 774-780. 
Mayr, U., & Bryck, R.L. (2007). Outsourcing control to the environment: 
effects of stimulus/response locations on task selection. Psychological 
Research, 71, 107-116. 
Nickerson, R.S. (2002). The production and perception of randomness. 
Psychological Review, 109, 330-357. 
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and 
automatic control of behavior. In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwarts & D. 
Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation (Vol. 4, pp. 1-18). 
New York, NY: Plenum Press. 
Skinner, B.F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: Free 
Press. 
Vandamme, K., Szmalec, A., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (in 
press). Are voluntary switches corrected repetitions? Psychophysiology. 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G.D. (2008). Automatic and controlled response 
inhibition: associative learning in the go/no-go and stop-signal 
paradigms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 649-672. 
Verbruggen, F. & Logan, G.D. (2009). Automaticity of cognitive control: 
Goal priming in response-inhibition paradigms. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 1381-1388. 
180     CHAPTER 6 
Waszak, F., Hommel, B., & Allport, A. (2003). Task-switching and long-
term priming: Role of episodic stimulus-task bindings in task-shift 
costs. Cognitive Psychology, 46, 361-413.  
Weaver, S.M. & Arrington, C.M. (in press). What's on your mind: The 
influence of the contents of working memory on choice. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Wegner, D.M. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press. 
Yantis, S. (2000). Control of visual attention: Goal-directed and stimulus-
driven determinants of attentional control. In S. Monsell & J. Driver 
(Eds.). Control of cognitive processes (pp. 73-103). The MIT Press. 
 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
ROL VAN ENDOGENE EN EXOGENE FACTOREN BIJ HET ZELF-
GEGENEREERD WISSELEN TUSSEN TAKEN 
INLEIDING 
Zoals de titel aangeeft had deze thesis als doel de rol van endogene en 
exogene controle te onderzoeken in situaties waar mensen vrijwillig kunnen 
kiezen tussen verschillende taken. Het begrip endogene controle kan 
vergeleken worden met de invloed van interne processen op het gedrag, 
terwijl het begrip exogene controle kan vergeleken worden met de invloed 
op het gedrag door elementen uit de omgeving. In deze thesis werd de rol 
van deze vormen van controle op een taakkeuze onderzocht met behulp van 
de procedure van de vrijwillige taakafwisseling (VTA). Deze procedure 
werd oorspronkelijk ontwikkeld door Arrington en Logan (2004) om na te 
gaan of de zogenaamde taakwisselkost, die het verschil in prestatie tussen 
het herhalen van taken en het wisselen tussen taken uitdrukt, ook optreedt als 
de taakkeuze vrij is. In andere studies, waar cues gebruikt werden om aan te 
geven welke taak uitgevoerd moet worden, werd namelijk ontdekt dat de 
wisselkost niet door endogene controle, die nodig is om te wisselen tussen 
taken, werd veroorzaakt, maar door het wisselen van de cues zelf (Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). Niettegenstaande deze bevinding 
vonden Arrington en Logan (2004) met de VTA procedure, dus zonder het 
gebruik van taakcues, nog steeds een taakwisselkost. Dit suggereert dat deze 
procedure een goede meting oplevert van de interne processen (endogene 
controle) die nodig zijn om te wisselen tussen taken (zie ook Liefooghe, 
Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009; in press).  
Een ander voordeel van de VTA procedure is dat niet enkel de 
prestatie op een bepaalde taak onderzocht kan worden, zoals de reactietijd of 
de accuraatheid, maar ook de taakkeuze zelf. In een aantal studies die deze 
taakkeuze onderzochten met behulp van de VTA procedure, kwam men tot 
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de opmerkelijke bevinding dat een vrijwillige taakkeuze sterk beïnvloed 
wordt door externe factoren (e.g. Mayr & Bell, 2006). Men zou kunnen 
stellen dat een vrijwillige taakkeuze toch niet zo ‗vrijwillig‘ is als 
verondersteld werd. In een recente studie van Arrington (2008) werd ontdekt 
dat hoe minder sterk de impact van endogene controle was, hoe sterker de 
invloed van de exogene controle werd. In dit doctoraat zetten we deze 
onderzoekslijn verder en onderzochten we de interactie tussen endogene en 
exogene controle in verschillende situaties en procedures, alsook door het 
introduceren van verschillende exogene factoren. 
OVERZICHT VAN DE BEVINDINGEN 
In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we onderzocht hoe verschillende externe 
factoren een taakkeuze kunnen beïnvloeden. Mayr en Bell (2006) 
observeerden als eerste dat het herhalen van de doelstimulus de taakkeuze 
beïnvloedt. Zo werden taken meer herhaald wanneer de stimulus herhaald 
werd. Om de efficiëntie van endogene controle te manipuleren, vroegen we 
proefpersonen om vrijwillig te wisselen tussen taken terwijl hun 
werkgeheugen werd belast. In een eerste experiment vonden we dat de 
invloed van stimulusherhalingen groter was mét dan zonder een 
wergeheugenbelasting. In twee daaropvolgende experimenten vonden we dat 
een taakkeuze ook beïnvloed kan worden door het herhalen van taak-
irrelevante stimuli, alsook dat een stimulus een taakselectie kan uitlokken 
door vooraf gevormde stimulus-taak associaties. Deze effecten werden 
bovendien niet beïnvloed door de geheugenbelasting. Uit deze bevindingen 
konden we besluiten dat het effect van stimulusherhalingen veroorzaakt 
werd door associaties die gevormd werden tussen een stimulus en de respons 
op deze stimulus. De bevinding dat dit effect sterker is met een 
geheugenbelasting wijst er op dat endogene controle een belangrijke functie 
heeft bij het afschermen van een vrijwillige taakkeuze tegen automatisch 
uitgelokte responsen. In de drie experimenten bleek bovendien dat taken 
meer herhaald werden mét dan zonder een geheugenbelasting. Dit wijst er op 
dat door een geheugenbelasting, de endogene controle die verantwoordelijk 
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is om de natuurlijke tendens om taken te herhalen tegen te gaan, minder 
efficiënt wordt. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we drie hypotheses. Ten eerste 
onderzochten we of de algemene tendens om taken te herhalen gerelateerd is 
aan de bevinding dat het wisselen tussen taken moeilijker is dan taken te 
herhalen. Ten tweede onderzochten we de hypothese, die verdedigd werd in 
Hoofdstuk 2, dat het effect van een geheugenbelasting op de taakkeuze 
verband houdt met een verminderd vermogen om taakrepetities te vermijden 
wanneer endogene controle minder sterk is. Ten derde testten we de 
hypothese dat de bevinding gerapporteerd in Hoofdstuk 2, namelijk dat 
stimulusherhalingen taakherhalingen uitlokken, veroorzaakt wordt door het 
vormen van stimulus-respons associaties tijdens het uitvoeren van een taak. 
In twee experimenten, waar geen taken maar handen random geselecteerd 
dienden te worden, werd iedere hypothese bevestigd door de bevindingen dat 
(1) er een tendens is om tussen handen te wisselen (in tegenstelling tot een 
tendens om taken te herhalen), (2) een geheugenbelasting geen effect heeft 
op de handkeuze (in tegenstelling tot een taakkeuze), en (3) 
stimulusherhalingen enkel de handkeuze beinvloeden wanneer een taak 
uitgevoerd moet worden met de geselecteerde hand.  
In Hoofdstuk 4, onderzochten we de hypothese dat, in tegenstelling tot 
een procedure met een enkele registratie, zoals gebruikt in Hoofdstuk 2, een 
procedure met een dubbele registratie een meer accurate meting van 
vrijwillige taakkeuze oplevert, die bovendien niet beïnvloed wordt door 
exogene factoren. Deze hypothese steunt op de veronderstelling dat, doordat 
bij dubbele registratie een taak geselecteerd moet worden bij het verschijnen 
van een neutrale probe, er geen externe factoren aanwezig zijn die de 
taakkeuze kunnen beïnvloeden. In twee experimenten vonden we evidentie 
tegen deze hypothese. We vonden namelijk dat sequenties van voorafgaande 
acties een taakkeuze beïnvloeden. Deze bevinding impliceert dat wanneer er 
twee responsen per trial moeten worden gegeven, er nieuwe sequentiële 
effecten ontstaan die de taakkeuze beïnvloeden. Bovendien vonden we in 
deze twee experimenten dat het verloop van deze sequentiële effecten over 
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stimulus-probe intervallen (SPIs) met een verschillende lengte, afhankelijk is 
van de manier waarop de lengte van de SPI werd gemanipuleerd, namelijk 
als een binnen- of tussen-subject factor. Deze bevinding toont aan dat tijdens 
het selecteren van taken, de impact van endogene controle, die nodig is om 
externe invloeden te onderdrukken, door het gebruik van strategieën kan 
worden beïnvloed. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 werd een model ontwikkeld voor vrijwillige taakkeuze. 
In dit model werd verondersteld dat een vrijwillige taakkeuze gebaseerd is 
op een automatische activatie van ketens van taakgerelateerde informatie, 
opgeslagen in het lange termijn geheugen (LTG). Het zogenaamde ‗chain-
retrieval‘ model hield bij het produceren van taak sequenties rekening met 
drie parameters. Een eerste parameter, m, komt overeen met de maximale 
lengte van een geactiveerde keten van taken uit het LTG, en is gerelateerd 
aan de werkgeheugencapaciteit van de proefpersoon. Een tweede parameter, 
p, komt overeen met de proportie taakherhalingen in een in het LTG 
opgeslagen keten. Als p groot is, is ook de kans groter dat ketens met meer 
taakherhalingen worden geactiveerd. Een derde parameter, r, stelt de kans 
voor dat een taakkeuze door een externe factor uitgelokt wordt. We konden 
aantonen dat de eigenschappen van de sequenties van taken, zoals voorspeld 
door het model, zeer goed overeenkomen met de eigenschappen van de taak 
sequenties die gevolgd werden door de proefpersonen. Het model heeft 
bijgevolg een zeer goede fit in vergelijking met andere modellen. 
CONCLUSIE 
Op basis van deze thesis kunnen we stellen dat het interpreteren van 
een taakkeuze als ‗vrijwillig‘, afhankelijk is van het perspectief waaruit men 
het concept ‗intentionele controle‘ benadert. We vonden in deze thesis dat 
proefpersonen bij het kiezen van een taak, in elke situatie worden beïnvloed 
door verschillende externe factoren.  
Zelfs wanneer een keuze niet wordt beïnvloed door externe factoren, 
vonden we in het ‗chain-retrieval‘ model evidentie dat onze ‗vrijwillige‘ 
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taakkeuze gestuurd wordt door automatische activatie van informatie uit het 
lange termijn geheugen. Deze bevindingen pleiten tegen de aanwezigheid, in 
the VTA procedure, van intentionele controle in de klassieke betekenis, 
waarbij gesteld wordt dat keuzes worden gemaakt op basis van een eigen 
beslissing en niet gestuurd worden door automatische invloeden (uit de 
omgeving of door ons verleden). Anderzijds kunnen we intentionele controle 
bekijken als de mogelijkheid om vorige ervaringen op te slaan en deze te 
gebruiken om meer efficiënt te handelen in toekomstig doelgericht gedrag 
(zie Dennett, 2003). Zowel de bevinding dat stimulus-taak associaties 
worden gevormd, als het geheugen-mechanisme geïntroduceerd in het 
‗chain-retrieval‘ model, vormen vanuit dit perspectief evidentie voor 
intentionele controle.  
Met betrekking tot de belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag vonden we in 
deze thesis evidentie voor een interactie tussen endogene en exogene 
controle bij het vrijwillig selecteren van taken. We konden aantonen dat 
endogene controle belangrijk is om tijdens het uitvoeren van een 
geselecteerde taak, automatisch uitgelokte acties die niet rijmen met deze 
taak, te kunnen onderdrukken. Ook konden we aantonen dat de invloed van 
deze endogene controle strategisch gemoduleerd kan worden.  
Tot slot kunnen we op basis van deze thesis ook besluiten dat de 
procedure van de vrijwillige taakafwisseling een zeer goed instrument is om 
de flexibiliteit van ons cognitief systeem, wat ons toelaat om efficiënt 
doelgericht gedrag te kunnen stellen, te onderzoeken. 
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